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Editor’s note
To kick off the 2020s it seems fitting to produce a Special Issue of Security Challenges focused
on the ‘Plan B for Australian Defence’ concept. Australia’s Plan B for defence debate has
covered much ground over the past few years: alas Canberra still operates within somewhat
of a strategic ‘fog’. Calls have been made to increase strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific,
to brace for a US decline and potential for Canberra to go it alone in the region, to scrap
diesel-submarine projects and invest in a nuclear-powered future fleet, and to increase
Australian Defence spending to 3% of GDP.
This special issue features alternative voices in the ‘Plan B for Australian Defence’ debate.
Martin White’s article crafts a case for closer Indian-Australian ties to be an element of
Canberra’s Plan B strategy. White delves into the shared interests and potential for increased
intelligence cooperation between Delhi and Canberra, arguing the two are natural strategic
partners. Rebecca Strating’s article focuses the Plan B debate on the question of Australian
maritime strategy. Strating argues any Plan B approach should articulate how sea power
would be mobilised to protect Australia’s national interests. Strating presents a case for
Canberra to develop a new maritime strategy which is tailored to effectively deal with emerging
security challenges.
Graeme Dobell’s article provides an assessment of the Defence ‘beast’, illuminating the history
of the department and subsequent efforts to grapple with the complexity of the challenge
inherent in defending Australia. A Plan B, potentially to emerge from the upcoming ‘One
Defence’ review, will no doubt need to contend with renewed demands of Dobell’s ‘beast’.
Cameron Hawker’s article delves into the origins of our ‘Plan B for Australian Defence’ debate,
arguing it is a product of ‘strategic drift’ in the Australian strategic community. John Blaxland
presents a geostrategic SWOT framework for consideration in the Australian defence planning
debate. Blaxland’s article makes the case for revising Canberra’s defence planning to better
grapple with non-traditional security threats.
Rita Parker takes a broader view of the ‘Plan B for Australian Defence’ debate. Parker’s article
examines the contemporary strategic challenges for Australian security policy. In doing so,
Parker illustrates how defence strategy, Australia’s Plan A, is in need of reframing to better
reflect our current strategic situation. The Stephen Bartos article engages with Hugh White’s
thesis—how best to defend Australia. Bartos employs an economic lens to the challenge of
Australian defence, arguing Canberra’s interests are best served by economic and cultural
integration with our neighbours and not by expanding military power.
Mark Armstrong focuses on the role of Australian Defence Force (ADF) reservists as expressed
in Defence White Papers since 1976. Armstrong’s article considers how Canberra can optimise
the contribution from reservists to the defence force in future Defence White Papers by
unpacking the historical strategic guidance provided. Albert Chapman also approaches the
‘Plan B for Australian Defence’ debate from new territory. Chapman’s article uses Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO) reportage to assess Australian Army project procurement
and performance, in order to illustrate how Plan B forecasts (such as Canberra needing to
increase the defence budget due to reduced US support) might influence the ‘bottom line’
of Australian Army capabilities.
Dr Elizabeth Buchanan
Special Issue Editor
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Comment

The Big Defence Beast
Graeme Dobell

All Australian governments come to office with a deep admiration for the military and
some apprehension about the Department of Defence.
Politicians embrace the uniform but worry about the organisation. After some time in
office, the mystique of the slouch hat is confirmed; the men and women who salute are
as impressive as their reputation.
The Defence Department, though, is a big beast that doesn’t become more lovable by
close association. Apprehension shifts towards frustration and even anger.
The big beast is tasked with doing many things that are expensive, tough and complex.
The high degree of difficulty is matched by the huge dump of dollars.
Ministers are in the power game; they’re in it to make things happen, not have things
happen to them—or happen extremely slowly, if at all. Ministers push and pull at the
beast and coax and cajole, yet not much seems to shift.
Another dimension of this is that Defence’s mission is to see that catastrophic things
don’t happen. The beast gets fed huge amounts of cash, to what result? No war on our
shores. Tick. National security. Tick.
Trouble is, Australian voters tend to see defence as a given—a core mission that’s a
minimum competency. Defence is what any government is expected to deliver while
voters get on with their lives.
If Defence does its job, nothing happens. And governments know they don’t get much
credit from voters for what doesn’t happen. Ministers have to tend and feed the beast,
but fret about what they get in return.
The politics of this is delicate. Cabinet can’t be seen to be mean to Defence for fear of
accusations about mistreating the military and risking national security. The slouch hat
is a potent symbol that provides much bureaucratic cover.
Mostly, the beastly frustrations are muted. When a minister does roar (usually after
leaving office), the steam and smoke can be impressive. A notable vent was by Australia’s
longest serving treasurer, Peter Costello, who was in office from 1996 to 2007. All those
years feeding dollars to the beast gave Costello an intimate knowledge of its foibles and
temperament. He was not impressed.
Costello devotes a page of his memoirs to denouncing Defence as the despair of
Cabinet’s expenditure review committee. Costello recalls that Defence planners had
such a poor grip on their budget submissions they could not explain the details to their
own ministers.
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“When I first became Treasurer, Defence would not even itemise its Budget
submissions or state where the funds were being spent. It used to insist on a global
budget which, if the Government agreed to it, would enable the department to
allocate funds between projects as it saw fit.”1
In listing projects for capital acquisition, he says, Defence never allowed for depreciation
or, in some cases, for repairs. The problem was compounded by the five defence ministers
who served during the Howard era. “They did not have time to really get on top of all
the ins and outs.” The shuffles at the top mirrored the military custom of having officers
change chairs every couple of years.
“There is a high turnover of people in the various Defence hierarchies. All the
services protect their own areas. Every step in achieving more efficiency involved
a tussle over whether or not the central Government was entitled to a line-by-line
disclosure of how Defence spent its budget.”2
Costello writes that his longevity as Treasurer meant that he had a better recall of the
history of some acquisitions than those who turned up to make submissions.
“Defence is now making disclosures on a scale it has never done previously.
After eleven and a half years I had a handle on all this simply because I had been
involved in these decisions for longer than any of the Defence chiefs. I could actually
remember the reasons why we had decided on certain acquisitions. They had to rely
on the oral traditions passed down the chain of command. I was able to remind the
Defence chiefs of previous undertakings they had given about containing costs.”3
Usually, as Costello notes, it’s governments and ministers that don’t remember
past problems and solutions. The big beast is supposed to have the advantage of a
long memory.
A few things have shifted, but beasts are slow to change their nature, much less their
spots. Consider the simple question of whether Defence has even evolved to be one beast,
or is still just a herd of them. This is a Canberra conundrum that’s galloped around the
parliamentary triangle for decades: is Australia’s Department of Defence one big beast
or a herd of beasts? Is the Oz military a single tribe or a bunch of tribes?
The questions matter in many ways, not least because the nature of the instrument says
much about the purposes it can be used for. The means you create express the ends
you intend.
The Old Testament view of Australian defence dealt in plurality. The New Testament seeks
singularity. The New and Old Testament understandings both contend and combine.
The Old Testament prophet of Australian defence presided over a herd. An alliance–
expeditionary culture meant different service tribes could be sent off individually to work
with allied forces under foreign command.
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Peter Costello with Peter Coleman, The Costello Memoirs: The Age of Prosperity (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne
University Press, 2008), p. 99.

2

Ibid., p. 100.
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The New Testament prophet of Australian defence united the tribes and proclaimed them
one. The herd would be transformed into a single big beast to defend the land of Oz.
The Old Testament prophet was Sir Frederick Shedden, who headed the Defence
Department for nineteen years, from 1937 to 1956.
The New Testament prophet was Sir Arthur Tange, secretary of the Department of External
Affairs from 1954 to 1965, and secretary of Defence from 1970 to 1979.
Shedden was a tough, shrewd operator who spent his whole career at Victoria barracks
in Melbourne (refusing to move to Canberra). Shedden was described as a powerful
personality who was “ruthless with those who crossed him and devastating with
those … who could not rise to his exceptional standards of performance”.4 Exactly the
same description applied to Tange. These prophets both had steel at their core, fine
administrators always ready for a turf war.
As a superb bureaucrat, Shedden recorded his life on paper.5 Away from his desk, Shedden
was adrift. John Edwards describes Shedden’s ill humour when sailing with Prime Minister
John Curtin to the United States in 1944:
The voyage across the Pacific to San Francisco took two weeks. Separated from his
files, from his department, from his independence and authority as the bureaucratic
overlord of the national war effort, Shedden was morose. Files were knowledge, and
knowledge was power. A habitual note taker, he was suddenly bereft of content.6
As a fine example of his times, Shedden was a British Empire man. Dividing the Oz
defence tribes wasn’t merely a means for him to rule, but preparation for the dispatch
of individual elements to serve under British command. Even after the turn to the United
States in World War Two, Shedden’ s vision was to bring back the Brits—even resurrect
a naval strategy based on Singapore.
By the end of Shedden’s reign, as David Horner writes, Prime Minister Robert Menzies
thought that the problem with Defence was “the dead hand of Fred Shedden”.7
Arthur Tange overthrew much Shedden had made and carefully minuted. Tange’s
attack on the Old Testament was that it valued consistency above innovation, process
above outcome: “In my discussions with Shedden over the years, I heard few opinions
on Australia’s strategic interests or priorities. He was more interested, it seemed, in
procedures and respect for the Defence Committee”.8

4

David Horner, ‘Shedden, Sir Frederick Geoffrey (1893–1971)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National
Centre of Biography, Australian National University, published first in hardcopy 2002, <adb.anu.edu.au/
biography/shedden-sir-frederick-geoffrey-11670> [Accessed 22 January 2020].

5

David Horner wrote a biography based on Shedden’s files (2,400 boxes of material) and the 2,400 typed
pages of Shedden’s unpublished history of Australian defence policy from 1901 to 1945. See David Horner,
Defence Supremo: Sir Fredrick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy (St Leonards, NSW:
Allen & Unwin, 2000).

6

John Edwards, John Curtin’s War. Volume II: Triumph and Decline (Melbourne: Viking, 2018), p. 269.

7

Horner, ‘Shedden, Sir Frederick Geoffrey’.
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Sir Arthur Tange, Defence Policy-Making, A Close-Up View, 1950-1980, edited by Peter Edwards, Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 169 (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), p. 8; <press.anu.edu.au/
publications/series/sdsc/defence-policy-making>.
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Tange killed off four separate beasts, the departments of Army, Navy, Air Force and
Supply (each with a separate minister), and merged their functions into a single Defence
department; he created the civilian-military leadership diarchy and resurrected the term
Australian Defence Force (ADF).
Shedden’s military world was the AIF (Australian Imperial Force). Tange brought forth
the ADF, recalling:
I took the opportunity to employ symbolism to reflect the concept that a common
purpose must govern the activities of the three Services. I restored to usage the
compendious title ‘Australian Defence Force’ which the 1915 Defence Act had
declared to be composed of ‘three arms’. … In due course (after my time) the
commander had his title changed to the unambiguous ‘Chief of the Defence Force’.9
In criticising the three services, the word Tange used a couple of times was ‘tribalism’.
Shedden sought to control the tribes; Tange wanted to make them one.
Tange made a new structure for a new strategy. In seeking to turn the herd into a single
beast, Tange aimed to remake policy, as Peter Edwards notes:
He strongly endorsed, and possibly coined, “self reliance” as the concept to
replace ‘forward defence’, and he supported the idea of defence focused on the
continent and its approaches. But that didn’t mean a wholesale rejection of the
US alliance—an issue on which he sparred in his later years with his friend and
admirer Malcolm Fraser. Tange’s subtle balance between robust independence
and alliance confused many.10
Tange remade structure, but elements of the Old Testament still pulse through the
system. Heresy still happens.
The only man to have emulated Tange, in heading both Foreign Affairs and Defence is
Dennis Richardson.11 Four decades after Tange, Richardson confessed he was still waging
the struggle to create a single beast and unite the tribes.
Richardson said he had “a very strong philosophy to make Defence more of a unitary
state rather than a federation, and a loose federation at that”.12
Unitary state versus loose federation! The testaments still contend.

9

Tange, Defence Policy-Making, p. 58.

10 Peter Edwards, ‘Sir Arthur Turns 100’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 18 August 2014,
<www.aspistrategist.org.au/sir-arthur-turns-100/>.
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Graeme Dobell, ‘Dennis Richardson and Arthur Tange: Part 1’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, 22 April 2013, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/dennis-richardson-and-arthur-tange-part-one/>;
and ‘Dennis Richardson and Arthur Tange: Part 2’, 24 April 2013, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/dennisrichardson-and-arthur-tange-part-ii/>.

12

Dennis Richardson, ‘Transcript of Proceedings’, Secretary Address, Institute of Public Administration,
National Portrait Gallery, Canberra, 21 November 2016, p. 3. <vs286790.blob.core.windows.net/docs/
Event-Documents/IPAA%20Secretary%20Address%20-%20Dennis%20Richardson%20AO%20-%20
Transcript%20-%2021%20November%202016.pdf>.
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The Tangle of Kit and Costs, Complexity and Strategy
‘Strategy without money is not strategy.’
—Arthur Tange13
‘Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.’
—Carl von Clausewitz14
Australian governments are always trying to simplify defence and rein in costs.
In Canberra’s world of inputs, outputs and deliverables, Defence is the big-bucks beast
that eats much and always demands more. And what, exactly, does the beast deliver for
a nation that has its own continent?
To put the question more formally: What is the optimal defence strategy of an affluent
and stable country with no land borders that has never in its modern history experienced
enemy soldiers setting foot on its land?
The conundrum was well presented fifty years ago in a wonderful Bruce Petty cartoon,
headed ‘The great defence shake-up’.
A senior Oz military officer is sitting at his desk, amid a clutter of paper and models of
military kit, yelling in frustration: “For the 500th time can somebody tell me. It’d be a great
help. In the light of current allied attitudes: WHO ARE WE TO DEFEND! AGAINST WHAT?”
A civilian bursts through the door and announces that it’s time for streamlining and a
basic restructure, declaring: “Defence planning must assume a new FLEXIBILITY. Our
goal is a new dimension in departmental cooperation.”
The maps and model planes and rockets are swept from the desk and the uniformed
officer is plonked on top of the filing cabinet. The be-suited bureaucrat plugs in his electric
kettle, organises the rubber bands, then sits at the newly cleared desk and announces
to the officer: “Now all I want from you is: who are we to defend against what?”
The civilian is booted out and the process begins all over again. It’s a succinct rendering
of what Paul Dibb later called “the lack of a real consensus in this country on what the
Defence Force is defending us against”.15
When Petty drew that cartoon, Australia was deeply involved with the United States in
losing a war in Vietnam. Yet, even as Vietnam went from failure to tragedy, the visiting
British strategist Michael Howard could observe: “The real defence problem of Australia
is, in fact, that it does not have a defence problem: that there is not at present a single
cloud on the horizon that seriously threatens Australian security”.16

13

Paul Dibb, Defence Policymaking’, in Peter Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor (eds), Australia’s
Defence: Towards a New Era? (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2014), p. 166.

14

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 7: ‘Friction in war’, The Clausewitz Homepage, <clausewitz.
com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch07.html>.

15

Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence (Canberra:
AGPS,1986), p. 176.

16

Michael Howard, broadcast as ‘Guest of Honour’, ABC, 3 October 1971, and printed as ‘Australia in World
Affairs: A British View’, in David Pettit (ed.), Selected Readings in Australian Foreign Policy, 2nd edition
(Toorak, Vic.: Sorrett Publishing, 1975), p. 63.
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Fifty years on, there’s a growing cloud called China. Lots of other stuff, though, looks
familiar. The continent is still secure. Now, as then, Australia worries about the United
States withdrawing from Asia. Still we ponder the reliability of the alliance. As ever,
Canberra grapples with the complexities of the defence beast.
The cash that Canberra throws at the beast has much to do with the cost of the military
kit. The kit is costly and complicated because government and bureaucracy grapple with
Clausewitz’s truth (doing simple things in battle is hard) while confronting Augustine’s
laws.17 The laws are the aphoristic observations of Norman R. Augustine, an American
aerospace engineer who did several stints in the Pentagon. Among my Augustine favourites:
• The last 10 per cent of performance generates one-third of the cost and two-thirds
of the problems.
• The process of competitively selecting contractors to perform work is based on a
system of rewards and penalties, all distributed randomly.
• The weaker the data available upon which to base one’s conclusion, the greater the
precision which should be quoted in order to give the data authenticity.
• Simple systems are not feasible because they require infinite testing.
• Hardware works best when it matters the least.
The most notorious law states that defence budgets grow linearly while the unit cost of
new military aircraft grows exponentially. Canberra understands this law to the extent
that we’re not building fighter planes. Instead, we build submarines.
The tangle of kit, costs, complexity and strategy explain why the Department of Defence
is the most inquiry-prone creature in Canberra. Defence has had fifty reviews since 1973,
(thirty-five significant reviews and many more supplementary reviews).18
The 1973 start point is when Arthur Tange brought forth the New Testament. Tange’s act
of creation and Petty’s cartoon stand together five decades back, yet still today prime
ministers puzzle, defence ministers struggle and treasurers rage.
For the political masters, admiration and appreciation still mingle with exasperation and
frustration. The beast will never be tame. But how well can it be ridden?
The most recent major report on the defence organisation—the First Principles Review—
noted in 2015: “The sheer frequency of reviews over the past decade has meant that
many were short-lived or simply overtaken by the next review. Often the recommended
changes were not allowed to bed in before another review began”.19
If any of the answers were simple or cheap, they’d have been implemented long ago.
The beast shifts slowly as reviews come and go, pushing at the history, habits and habitat
of Russell Hill. Tange’s creation has a diarchic brain, with military and civilian sides; the
creature spends a lot of energy just connecting its thoughts.
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Norman Augustine, ‘Augustine’s Laws’, Wikipedia, 4 May 2018, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine%27s_laws>.

18

Department of Defence, First Principles Review, Creating One Defence (Canberra: Department of Defence,
2015), p. 13., <www.defence.gov.au/Publications/Reviews/Firstprinciples/Docs/FirstPrinciplesReviewB.
pdf>.

19

Ibid., p. 13.
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The First Principles review found that Defence’s way of doing things was “complicated,
slow and inefficient in an environment which requires simplicity, greater agility and
timely delivery. Waste, inefficiency and rework are palpable. Defence is suffering from
a proliferation of structures, processes and systems with unclear accountabilities”.20
Savour that recurring lament of reviews through the decades.
Reviews happen for many reasons. Oppositions pledge to overhaul Defence as one of their
promises to remake Canberra; and if they win power, a review is a promise that can be kept.
Governments usually order reviews to tackle a bothersome headache or damp a crisis.
After some time in office, though, they often reach for an all-purpose shake-up to vent
frustration, tighten the reins and sharpen the spurs.
Defence white papers and strategic reviews are a special genre, a form of self-analysis
using a geopolitical crystal ball and an equipment wish list. The beast tries to explain
itself to government (and itself) while looking out from Russell at what’s happening in
other parts of the jungle.
In line with the big beast metaphor, Peter Jennings channelled his inner naturalist to
describe the life cycle of a defence review as though it were a gnu or wildebeest roaming
the grasslands. Under punny headlines ‘Nothing Gnu Here’ and ‘No Gnus is Good News’,
he records the tough truth that few reviews survive long enough to be fully implemented:
“Just as for Gnus in Africa, life is brutal and short on the policy veldt. Many reviews get
trampled underfoot by newer processes”.21
Life is hard for reviews because Defence’s problems aren’t just complex and costly; they
reach beyond vital towards existential. As an example, consider Paul Dibb’s account of
why he was asked to report on Australia’s defence capabilities in 1985 (one of the reviews
that lived long enough to have a real impact).
Dibb was called in after twelve months of internal argument, when Defence couldn’t
“come to even a preliminary agreement on force structure priorities for the defence of
Australia”. Ponder that. Defence couldn’t answer the question that’s the heart of its
existence: how do we defend Oz? The diarchic brain was in turmoil.
Dibb describes the entrenched differences between the senior military and civilian
hierarchies:
The secretary and the chief of the defence force had got bogged down in exchanging
130 classified memos about the theology of defence policy on such concepts as
defence warning time; low-level conflict; more substantial conflict; and whether
Australia’s unique geography should basically determine its force structure, as
distinct from expeditionary forces for operations at great distance from Australia.
Most of the ensuing debate was not constructive: it was hostile with little agreement
on even basic principles for force structure priorities.22

20 Ibid., p. 13.
21

Peter Jennings, ‘Defence Reviews: Nothing Gnu Here’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
20 April 2015, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-reviews-nothing-gnu-here/>; and ‘Defence Reviews:
No Gnus Is Good News’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 21 April 2015, <www.
aspistrategist.org.au/defence-reviews-no-gnus-is-good-news/> [Both accessed xx month 20xx].

22 Paul Dibb, ‘Revisiting the North in the Defence of Australia, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, 27 June 2019, <www.aspistrategist.org.au/revisiting-the-north-in-the-defence-of-australia/>.

The Big Defence Beast

9

As the outsider, Dibb says his main policy aim was to get a “workable compromise
between these bitterly held positions”.23
Workable compromise is the spur of choice for the beast.
Reviews always wail about fuzzy accountability and indirect responsibility. The critique
was immortalised by Defence Department Secretary Allan Hawke, back in 2000, when he
decried “a culture of learned helplessness among some Defence senior managers—both
military and civilian. Their perspective is one of disempowerment”.24
Hawke described the problem this way:
Putting the budget/financial situation to one side, the most significant
organisational issue we face relates to leadership. Not to put too fine a point on
it, too many of our people lack confidence in many of Defence’s senior leaders.
Justified or not, Defence’s leadership is seen as lacking coherence, as failing to
accept responsibility and as reactive. Issues such as visibility and caring arise.
Far too often, it seems that wherever one sits in the hierarchy, all the problems
besetting the organisation in terms of its management and leadership come from
higher up the ladder.25
Defence had “been through massive change that is often not well appreciated”,
Hawke said. His version of the department as a big beast was that it was “far too inwardly
focussed”. Yet the beast had trouble understanding its own “mission, vision and values”.
The rest of government, he noted, was equally puzzled:
The reality today … is that there is widespread dissatisfaction with Defence’s
performance in Canberra—from ministers, central agencies within the public
service, industry, and even from within the Defence organisation itself. In essence,
we have a credibility problem.26
Many reviews later, the newest ‘learned helplessness’ attack is in Hugh White’s How to
Defend Australia. The book stirred so much controversy that not much attention was
paid to his call for a ‘savage cut’ to the beast he once rode as a deputy secretary.
White sets up his assault with this aside: “It is a sobering reality that anyone attempting to
understand defence management should start with the works of C. Northcote Parkinson,
especially Parkinson’s Law”.27 The law states that “work expands so as to fill the time
available for its completion”. The naval historian built his satirical analysis on two sublaws:
the Law of Multiplication of Subordinates and the Law of Multiplication of Work. Later
he added further edicts such as one on triviality, observing that organisations spend
disproportionate time and effort on minor matters.

23 Ibid.
24 Allan Hawke, ‘What’s the Matter? A Due Diligence Report’, Edited Address by Secretary, Department
of Defence, to Defence Watch Seminar, National Press Club, Canberra, 17 February 2000, in Australian
Defence Force Journal, no. 141 (March/April 2000), <www.defence.gov.au/adc/adfj/Documents/
issue_141/141_2000_Mar_Apr.pdf>.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (La Trobe University Press with Black Inc., 2019), p. 309.
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White judges that Australia has a record of failed defence reforms. Benchmarked against
Singapore, Israel and France, he writes, Australia doesn’t get value for money. The
reviews “have not delivered big long-term savings and seem to have done nothing to
redress the poor performance”.28
A key reason defence is less efficient, White argues, is complacency. Our leaders and
the military and civilian hierarchies have assumed “that Australia does not really face
serious strategic risks, because we can always rely on the Americans”.29
White wants to spend a lot more money bulking up the body of the beast, but make its
head smaller:
One organisational reform which might make a real difference is a savage cut to
the size of the civilian and military staffs in defence headquarters on Russell Hill …
[W]e would get better decisions faster if a lot fewer people were involved. The big
benefit here is not that we need fewer people on the payroll; it’s that we get better
decisions about big strategic questions.30
The beast has a fine record of discipline. Efficiency is tougher, not least because Defence
lives in arcane and difficult places; that’s why private-sector business-based answers
can offer only partial answers.
Rigour in the thinking matters because in conflict even simple things are hard. And the
diarchic brain has to decide not just the best strategy to guard an affluent and stable
nation with its own continent, but to relate that thinking to all the forces surging across
the Indo-Pacific. In an era of great power contest, where the international system strains
and sags, Canberra frets at “the most consequential changes in the global environment
since WWII” pushing at the prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific.31
Australia needs the big beast to be strong and versatile, smart on strategy and ready
with the best kit.
So, naturally, it’s time for another review.
In October 2019, Defence Minister Linda Reynolds announced Defence will do a “hardheaded assessment” of the “changes and challenges” confronting the beast.32 Senator
Reynolds said “to adapt to the reality of the changes around us”, Defence will ponder:
• What changes we need to make to our strategy;
• What changes we need to make to our capability [although Reynolds also said, ‘I do
not envisage any changes to our major capability programs’]; and
• [H]ow we transform Defence into an organisation that can deliver on the national
tasks for the decades ahead.
28 Ibid., p. 277.
29 Ibid., p. 280.
30 Ibid., p. 279.
31
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32 Linda Reynolds, Speech at Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, International Convention Centre,
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The speech had twelve mentions of ‘change’, ‘transformation’ made three appearances
and ‘strategy’ was there eight times. The vision is of beast guided by strategy, not by
habit and history. As Senator Reynolds put it:
The First Principles Review made Defence a far more strategy-led organisation.
It succeeded, in my mind, in getting the Defence enterprise aligned at the starting
line of on an ongoing transformation process. The next step is to define this new,
more adaptive strategy framework, to ensure One Defence is agile in responding
to current circumstances.33
The times demand more of the beast. Time, again, to push the beast.

Graeme Dobell is journalist fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

33 Ibid.
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Developing a new Plan B for the ADF:
Implications from a Geostrategic
SWOT Analysis for Australia1
John Blaxland
Australia’s geostrategic circumstances are in a greater state of flux than seen in
generations. Great power contestation has flared and the rules-based order is in question,
while environmental catastrophe looms and governance challenges, ranging from cyber
attacks, foreign interference, terrorism and transnational crime, flourish. In reflecting
on how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should respond, traditional thinking about
conventional military capabilities for the defence of Australia or forward defence is no
longer adequate. A more holistic reassessment is called for. This paper considers the
nation’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; in so doing, it presents an
argument for establishing a national institute of net assessment. In turn, that institute
needs to place as top priority consideration on a range of proposals to bolster capabilities
to defend the nation and its interests. Significant increase in defence expenditure and
bold new recruitment and funding initiatives are necessary.

The SWOT Analysis
In order to consider what options Australia has to address an emergent array of challenges,
a geostrategic SWOT analysis, weighing up internal strengths and weakness, and external
opportunities and threats, points to a number of steps that the ADF and other arms
of government can take. Critically reflecting on the circumstances of Australia and its
neighbours presents a useful mechanism to commence a dialogue about the net effects
of these threats and the most appropriate responses. The SWOT analysis considers the
following factors:
Internal strengths include: abundant natural resources; a strong economy (albeit one
that is declining relative to neighbouring economies); domestic political stability and the
rule of law; an educated workforce; a robust multicultural society; a honed and hi-tech,
albeit boutique, defence force; the nation’s geography as an island continent, with no
land border disputes; and the leverage gained from access to advanced US military and
intelligence capabilities.
Internal weaknesses include: a complacency about security and our place in the world;
infrastructure pressures and uneven population distribution; fuel dependency on oil
refineries abroad; power vulnerabilities and underdeveloped solar, hydro and potential
nuclear energy resources; web-dependence and cyber vulnerabilities; and limited and
declining sovereign industrial capacity.
1

This paper derives its foundation from ‘A Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia’, Centre of Gravity series,
no. 49 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, June 2019).
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External opportunities, by region, include: in the Pacific—climate, resource and social
challenges present an opening for respectful Australian leadership alongside New Zealand;
in Southeast Asia—there is a regional and sub-regional appetite for closer Australian
engagement and investment; in Northeast Asia—trade growth opportunities persist; in
the Indian Ocean region—ties to India and beyond, including the east coast of Africa, are
growing; with some NATO member countries—a resurgent interest in China’s rise provides
openings; with the United States—multifaceted and deep ties with Australia’s principal
ally remain of enduring consequence; with Antarctica—Australian responsibilities and
obligations loom larger than most realise.
External threats include: levels of foreign interference not seen since the height of the Cold
War; cyber attacks from industrial, state and non-state actors; an ideational retreat from
leadership by the United States; challenges to the fundamentals of the rules-based order;
religiously and politically motivated violence at home and abroad—both near (Southeast
Asia and South Pacific) and far (Middle East); increasing prospects of conventional and/
or thermonuclear war; increased environmental challenges at home and abroad; other
transnational security concerns; large scale unregulated people movement; diminished
biodiversity and pandemics, challenges to fishing stocks in the Pacific and beyond; and
the possibility of a breakdown in relations with Indonesia—a country with ten times
Australia’s population that possibly could eclipse us economically in the near term.
This SWOT shows that a range of factors, from political, economic and human security
concerns, environmental challenges including looming environmental catastrophe at
home and abroad, cyber security issues and a range of maritime, territorial and homeland
security problems are combining to present an unprecedented challenge for the nation
and the region. In essence, then, this can be distilled to three fundamental components:
great power contestation, environmental strains and local, national and international
governance challenges.
Whilst important, some of these SWOT factors may not appear to be urgent. Yet many
of these must be addressed sooner than later; for if we wait until they appear urgent, we
may have waited too long and left things too late.

Awakening to the New Spectrum of Modern Conflict
& Uses of Armed Force
Focusing in on what this SWOT analysis means for defence and security, what emerges
is a greater awareness of a new, broader spectrum of security challenges. In the age of
so-called ‘grey-zone’ warfare as well as expanding cyber security challenges, artificial
intelligence, robotics and the militarisation of space, the very concept of warfare is subject
to redefinition. Indeed, as is becoming clear to many, the traditional way of differentiating
between peace and war is insufficient. We think of being at peace or war but potential
adversaries do not necessarily think that way.2
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Rather than being one dimensional, a more comprehensive approach to the use of armed
force requires management of several states of being that relate to the conflict-cooperation
spectrum: collaboration, cooperation, contestation, confrontation and, where possible,
compromise to avert armed conflict.3 Yet even here, the very terms suggest to some
that we may be able to muddle our way through without significant additional investment
in defence of the nation. The fact remains that Australia currently has limited sovereign
capacity to respond to the growing range of traditional and non-traditional security
threats. Increased capacity and endurance in a number of areas is required for Australia
to be self-sufficient.
In response, the nation needs a domestic political and societal re-awakening to face
the array of challenges presenting themselves. A national institute of net assessment,
akin to the productivity commission, should be established on a statutory basis, with
links to government through a national security authority, to consider the SWOT
spectrum, drawing on the breadth of research expertise in the university sector, as well
as industry, think tanks, government and beyond. Such an institute would look beyond
the tyranny of the urgent to develop viable options to address holistically challenges with
intergenerational consequences. That institute should examine the proposals below.
Firstly, there is a growing need for the nation to invest further in the capacity of the ADF
and related government instrumentalities and other infrastructure (including in the cyber
domain) to be able to endure prolonged security challenges including those presented
by nations posing advanced technology threats and possibly war.
Within the military itself, there is a demand for additional trained personnel across
the three services and in the joint (overlapping) domains. My SDSC colleague, Hugh
White, has argued that Defence expenditure should significantly increase but it should
focus on acquisition of additional fighter aircraft and submarines.4 The SWOT analysis
provides pointers to a range of scenarios which indicate that additional expenditure
is indeed becoming urgent, but beyond that, the capability prescription he proposes
would unduly limit government options in response to a range of potential scenarios
that do not necessarily respond well to the use of such items. Conventional great power
contestation is certainly in the mix, but so are many other considerations relating to
governance and environmental concerns. The spectrum of challenges raised in the
SWOT analysis suggests that it is not inconceivable that Australia may need to deploy
forces concurrently in response to:
1. a major humanitarian disaster akin to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004
or the Fijian Cyclone in 2016;
2. catastrophic fires and drought as well as floods and cyclones in multiple locations
across Australia like, or worse than, those experienced during the 2019-20 summer;
3. a potentially violent and hotly contested man-made crisis—akin to the crisis in East
Timor in 1999 and 2006, Solomon Islands in 2003 or Bougainville in 1998—that could
arise at short notice, like the siege of the city of Marawi mounted by violent Islamist
extremists in the southern Philippines in 2017;
3
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4. calls to support regional security partners facing potentially existential threats—
related to crises that could arise over the South China Sea, East China Sea, Korea and
Taiwan;5
5. a multifaceted terrorist incident, or incidents, possibly in multiple locations;
6. a cyberattack, or multiple cyberattacks, against critical infrastructure that disrupts
the electricity grid and shuts down critical industries;
7. a major border security challenge—one such that could be linked to a surge of refugees
arriving by sea following a spike in, say, the crisis affecting the displaced Rohingya
people in Bangladesh; and
8. a natural or man-made disaster threatening the lives of those forming part of Australia’s
Antarctic presence and posing a threat to Australia’s claims there.
These are plausible scenarios and it is quite possible that several of them could strike at
once. The ADF (let alone any other arm of government tasked to respond to emergencies)
simply is not structured or resourced to tackle more than a couple of these possible
contingencies at once; and yet the prospect of several of them occurring simultaneously
is greater than ever before.

Developing a New Plan A for the ADF
The defence force of today is much smaller than it has been at the height of earlier crises.
In land power terms alone, Australian full-time armed forces today consist of just over
one division of troops. Part time reserve forces maintain a hollow second division. In
contrast, in the Second World War, Australian land forces included the equivalent of
over fourteen divisions from a population base of seven-to-eight million. A repeat of
a Second World War scenario is not what is being argued here, but the comparison is
instructive. In addition, the ADF’s capabilities are largely tactical and with relatively short
range. This means that Australia poses only a modest deterrent to potential aggressors.
Therefore, while the ADF is a capable force, should Australia ever face a challenge from
a nation with advanced weapons systems, this force may be inadequate for the task. A
one-division regular-army force of three combat brigades and some special forces, a navy
of a dozen or so warships and a handful of submarines, and an air force of only 100 fighter
aircraft, means Australia has little if any ability to sustain significant attrition in case of
a substantial conflict. In effect, the ADF is only a one-punch force. This is inadequate in
view of emergent issues.
In response to many of these circumstances, Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper of
2017 outlined what I call a ‘Plan B’ for international engagement.6 I would argue that in
response to that plan and to the evolving circumstances, Australia’s defence capabilities
now also need a new ‘Plan B’. Defence capabilities are fundamental to international
engagement as well as national security. The spectrum of potentially existential
matters facing our country and the world is unprecedented. Australia is ill-prepared to
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respond appropriately, with limited sovereign capacity and with the ADF designed for a
much more benign setting when ten years’ warning time of any major threat to the nation
was expected.7
Australia’s unpreparedness is in part because many of these issues are beyond the
jurisdiction of one state or federal entity; meanwhile international mechanisms to handle
them are weak and disjointed. The defence minister, for instance, can rightly say many
of these issues are not her problem. Similarly, the home affairs minister can say they are
not his; and the foreign affairs minister, likewise, with significant resource constraints,
can say this is way beyond the scope of her remit. Yet it is increasingly evident that such
narrow responses to the challenges faced are inadequate. A visionary, inclusive and
comprehensive solution is needed if Australia is to be prepared for the potential onslaught
of emergent security challenges. The main challenge in overcoming this shortfall relates
to recruitment and retention of personnel. With that broad range of concerns in mind, this
paper proposes expanding and reorganising a range of force elements as outlined below.

Naval Forces
With the acquisition of new surface warships and submarines, it is tempting to use
the equipment update to justify a streamlining of personnel requirements. Arguably,
however, the acquisitions should be made in addition, not instead, of extant capabilities.
The upgraded Anzac class frigates, for instance, have sophisticated capabilities that
should not be retired simply because a replacement platform is scheduled. In addition,
the production run of those replacement warships should be extended. Similarly, the
eventual construction of the Attack class submarines should not be used to justify
retirement of the highly capable Collins class submarines. Necessity is the mother of
invention and innovative solutions for additional life extension programs for the Collins
submarines should be considered to allow the submarine fleet to grow not just from six
to twelve submarines, but to a combined total of eighteen Attack and modified Collins
class submarines, equipped with a fleet of underwater drones in support.
Sophisticated, capable of being armed and unattended aerial vehicles should be acquired
for operations from the flight deck of the amphibious landing helicopter dock ships
(LHDs) HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide. These ships are already proving to be in
high demand to bolster security and stability domestically, in Southeast Asia and the
South Pacific. They have demonstrable capabilities to help bolster security and stability
in places where environmental challenges are grave, security is precarious, governance is
weak, and where great power contestation is increasing. With so many scenarios for which
a response may be required, their operational tempo can only be expected to increase.
An additional replenishment ship and an additional LHD would add considerably to the
ADF’s ability to sustain an operational tempo that might be generated by a combination
of these scenarios. These should also be able to operate deep in the Southern Ocean.

7
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Air and Space Power
The Joint Strike Fighter has proven to be an expensive acquisition. There is scope for
an increase in the planned fleet from 70 to 100, but this should not come at the expense
of retiring the Super Hornets—a sophisticated almost-new aircraft type: this fleet
should be expanded further. Drones, including the Loyal Wingman program, should
be acquired as part of the mix. In the meantime, critical enablers for the ADF, including
the C17 Globemaster and C130 Hercules transport aircraft, the air-to-air refuellers and
surveillance planes, as well as airborne early warning and control aircraft will continue to
be of critical importance in order to be able to deploy and sustain force elements across
the region in response to contingencies that we can expect to arise with little if any
notice. Firefighting and other disaster response is not core military business; specialists
manage these functions more economically, but ADF air elements remain well placed
to assist when necessary.
With satellite technology becoming increasingly miniaturised and cost effective and antisatellite technology maturing amongst a range of nations in the Indo-Pacific, the Air Force
will need to expand its remit to more fully cover the space domain. This should include
the acquisition of Australia’s own satellite capability for surveillance, communications,
as well as command and control purposes, in order to operate in a more self-reliant and
resilient manner.

Land Forces
Land forces today are small by the standards of almost all of Australia’s neighbours, except
for the Pacific Island states. With so many potential calls for the commitment of land
forces, there is scope for an additional rotational regular-force combat brigade to be raised
and, perhaps, operated from the nation’s west coast. That would allow for potentially a
second brigade to be ready to respond to one of the many possible contingencies, while
the others undergo the readying and reset phases of the Army’s force generation cycle.
More importantly, the critical specialist support enabling capabilities (currently found
in 6 Brigade (command and intelligence support), 16 Brigade (aviation) and 17 Brigade
(logistics), should be filled out to enable more robust dedicated support of the regularforce combined-arms combat brigades (1, 3 and 7 Brigades) that are intended to operate
in rotation through the ready, readying and reset force generation cycle. Reserve brigades
(with a mix of part-time and full-time members) should be beefed up to assist. Precision
medium-range strike capabilities would enable these forces to provide robust defence
of airfields and key infrastructure in a contested crisis that might arise in Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific maritime approaches to Australia.

Cyber Force
The broadening and deepening of the array of cyber security challenges, points to the
need to bolster significantly the ADF’s cyber capabilities. Cyber security concerns have
seen the establishment of an Information Warfare Division inside the Defence Capability
Group; but more concerted action is required.8 The ADF already includes electronic
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warfare (EW) units in the three services, but the cyber domain is an area of increasing
demands that stretch the old definitions and capabilities of the EW realms. Growth in this
area is of fundamental importance, but that has to be coordinated with developments
in the Australian Cyber Security Centre and other arms of government concerned to
develop strong defensive and, in places, offensive cyber capabilities.

Domestic Security
Cyber concerns are alive and well in the community at large, as are enduring concerns
about terrorism and growing threats of sabotage and evidence of foreign interference. The
combination is corrosive, eating at the core of institutions. The ADF’s special operations
forces have an important role to play in support of the national and state counter-terrorism
plans. They also have important contributions to make in a range of regional scenarios
abroad. Preparing for such contingencies requires considerable investment of time and
effort developing regional ties and closer relations with counterparts in the neighbourhood,
across from the Indian Ocean, through Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific. To do
all of that effectively additional growth is required.

Border Force
The Home Affairs Department has responsibility for managing border security in
conjunction with the ADF through Border Protection Command. Closer coordination
and greater resourcing of the offshore patrol fleet, with additional and more robust ships
and aircraft, supplemented by sophisticated unattended aerial vehicles will be required
in order for the nation to be adequately prepared to respond to the growing range and
scale of environmental and governance challenges around Australia’s periphery.

International Ties
Building on the Australia-ASEAN Special Summit of 2018,9 Australia should strengthen
and deepen ties with ASEAN member states, notably Indonesia, as well as others beyond
that are willing to work closely with Australia to bolster regional security and stability.
This already includes regional counter terrorism initiatives10 but it should also involve
elements of the ADF being involved in a much greater level of language study and cultural
awareness training. Additional opportunities to work collaboratively with neighbours on
benign activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training scenarios
should be vigorously pursued with Indonesia, the FPDA partners (notably Singapore
and Malaysia) and other Southeast Asian and Pacific neighbours.11
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Tying in Indonesia more closely with Australia’s other close Southeast Asian regional
partners Singapore and Malaysia, may well be achieved if a regional maritime cooperation
forum could be developed for ‘sweet’ or MANIS, ties. Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand,
Indonesia and Singapore have many reasons to foster closer, sweeter ties.12
Ties with partners in the Pacific should be strengthened further as well. Beyond the
Pacific ‘step-up’,13 a compact of association with South Pacific countries is needed
for shared governance, akin to the treaty arrangements the United States and New
Zealand have with several Pacific micro-states. In return for residency rights, Australia,
along with New Zealand, should respectfully offer closer partnering arrangements to
assist with management, security and governance of territorial and maritime domains.
Pacific islanders should be encouraged to join Australia’s defence and national security
institutions in return for additional benefits including Australian citizenship.14
Australia should maintain and strengthen its economic and security ties with the United
States and other closely aligned states. Utilising its trusted access,15 Australia should
counsel against adventurous US initiatives that undermine international institutions,
but support initiatives that reinforce the rules-based order. Australia’s US engagement
has a demonstration effect in the region, being closely scrutinised by the neighbours.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is not necessarily a significant international
body in the Indo-Pacific, but it is one with which Australia shares common values and
overlapping interests.16 Several NATO member states, the United Kingdom and France,
for instance, appear interested in engaging with Australia. France has a military presence
based in New Caledonia. It makes sense for the ADF to cooperate judiciously on France’s
Pacific initiatives. Australia also should encourage Britain to engage in Australia’s
neighbourhood, but must remain alert to the fact that Britain’s power is limited and its
interests varied. In the meantime, while Germany’s trade and economic influence has
little of the hard-power edge of France and Britain, its economic and industrial weight is
significant. Closer cooperation could work well. Then there is Australia’s ‘strategic cousin’
in Canada, another NATO member country and close US ally, and also a Pacific power with
shared interests in the Asia-Pacific region.17 Australia should look to capitalise on ties
and shared interests, including security interests and requirements for air, sea and land
capabilities. The NATO connections may appear distant, but in an increasingly connected
world, distance is of reduced concern and such ties can prove of considerable utility.
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An Australian Universal Scheme for National and Community
Service (AUSNACS)
Critics of the argument made so far would contend that the proposed expansion
of capabilities is fanciful. As it stands, Australia’s newly upgraded Anzac class ship,
HMAS Perth, is up on stilts in Fremantle, having been put there due to crew shortfalls.
Similarly, army and air force units struggle to recruit and retain sufficient personnel to
maintain critical capabilities. There is a way, however, to address these shortfalls that
could make a significant difference to the security and stability of the nation and the
region—a scheme enlisting the support of young Australians from all of the nation’s
multicultural walks of life.
Given chronic personnel shortfalls and a wide array of agencies that could benefit from
extra people involved, an expansive and inclusive Australian Universal National and
Community Service Scheme (AUSNACS)18 should be considered through which all young
Australians could contribute.19 There might even be significant societal side benefits as
such a scheme would draw in young people from all walks of life across the nation.
Critics may look to discount the utility of such a scheme, arguing Defence does not need
that many extra people and that training them would drain resources from operational
capabilities. That is valid, to a point, but the need for extra personnel applies not just
to the armed services. If introduced as a national and community service initiative, the
personnel involved could be shared access state and federal police forces, border force,
state emergency services, rural fire services, state health services and DFAT’s Australian
Aid akin to the US ‘Peace Corps’. Others may hark back to the societal tensions of the
Vietnam War era. This scheme would look to negate such concerns by ensuring a wide
range of choices for Australia’s young people to consider. Benefits that could accrue for
AUSNACS participants could include concessional loans or reduced higher education
contributions.

Proximity and Risk Management
The analysis outlined in this article points towards the need for Australia to focus more
attention on its region, to bolster its capabilities considerably, and to be more self-reliant.
In my book The Australian Army: From Whitlam to Howard,20 I identified a number of
determinants of government expectations concerning the efficacy of use of military force.
In large part, these revolve around three things: proximity to Australia versus necessity of
participation, alliance management, and the government’s risk tolerance. Australia has
spent almost a generation providing niche military and aid contributions far away while
inconsistently engaging on major issues of concern in its own neighbourhood. Yet close
to home the nation faces a future where it may have to commit considerable resources
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to lead a coalition of participating forces, organisations, agencies and countries with
whom Australian authorities are not experienced at leading or even working alongside.
This could be in response to an environmental catastrophe, a regional crisis or other
issues generating calls for an Australian response, collaborating, for instance, with, say,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea or Malaysia. Should the requirement be for something
involving an adversarial state with advanced weapon systems, Australia’s defence force
lacks the resilience or size to be able to absorb a significant blow—and that prospect
appears more likely than in previous or recent generations.
What this means is that the ADF needs to be better positioned to address the spectrum
of emergent challenges. Perhaps for the first time in more than half a century, it needs to
grow beyond its standard three regular-force combat brigades, 100 combat aircraft and
a dozen or so warships, to include a surge in AI-enabled equipment, unmanned vehicles
and sensors, and enhanced space and cyber capabilities.

Funding
There is a truism that states strategy without funding is not a strategy. This article has
outlined an ambitious plan to expand capabilities across a range of domains; for it to
be realised, there is no question that a detailed costing would be required before plans
could be confirmed to see the proposals outlined here come to fruition. There is a broad
consensus emerging amongst defence, strategy and security pundits, however, that
Australia will need to significantly increase its expenditure in defence of the nation and
its interests across a range of domains. In broad terms, that likely will see the need to
double down on the budget, increasing expenditure from 2 per cent of GDP to between
3 and 4 per cent. Such a high level of expenditure on defence has not been experienced for
several decades but it has been done before, notably during the Vietnam War, the Korean
War and during the period of defence build-up in the late 1930s. For this to be politically
acceptable, the Australian people will need to come to an understanding of the scale and
scope of the security challenges that are looming. For that, the government has to lead.

Conclusion
This article started by revisiting a Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia. It pointed to
the need for an awakening concerning the spectrum of modern conflict and the possible
demands for the use of armed force, including a range of plausible contingencies which
could arise at short notice. This indicates the current boutique ADF is inadequately
resourced for a range of looming challenges. The article then argued for a national institute
for net assessment and, specifically for the defence and security purposes, the need to
develop a new Plan B for the ADF, bolstering naval, air, space, cyber and land forces, as
well as domestic security and border forces. International ties also need to be refreshed
and expanded, including with ASEAN member states, the FPDA countries, the potential
MANIS forum, the Pacific partners, the United States and other NATO member countries.
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To do all this, the current ADF is not big or strong enough. An Australian Universal Scheme
for National and Community Service (AUSNACS) is required. The proximity of these
challenges and the heightened risk of them materialising without adequate preparation
indicates the Australian Government must find the funds to make it happen. It must also
engage in a conversation with the Australian people to explain how it plans to respond
and why a new Plan B is necessary.

John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies in the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.

Developing a new Plan B for the ADF: Implications from a Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia

23

A Plan B for Australia? Hard Truths
and Political Realities in Canberra’s
Strategic Policy Debate
Cam Hawker

When Coral Bell looked back at the attitudes and outlook of defence policymakers facing
great change and uncertainty in Australia’s strategic landscape in the late 1960s and
early 1970s she concluded that they were
Like a group of lost explorers marooned on an ice flow; the frozen surface was
visibly breaking up all around them while they were insisting loudly that nothing
really much was happening.1
At that time, Canberra was facing the reality of the British withdrawal ‘East of Suez’ and
the announcement by Richard Nixon that henceforth Washington would look to regional
allies to play a greater role in their own defence.
In some respects, the last decade or so of Australia’s strategic policy debate has echoed
this period. We have, and are, witnessing, a profound transition as the world’s centre of
gravity shifts east. China has become rich and is increasingly inclined to flaunt that wealth
in the form of military spending and carefully targeted foreign infrastructure ventures
such as the Belt and Road Initiative. It has also become more assertive, diplomatically,
militarily, and in more covert forms. At the same time, the United States has wavered in
its regional leadership as talk becomes less centred on Washington’s capacity to maintain
regional dominance and more focused on its will to do so.
Like the late 1960s and early 1970s to which Bell alluded, the last decade has featured
denial and denialism. As the assumptions on which Australia has so long based strategic
policy have become increasingly challenged by the emergence of China, and its quest
to convert its economic heft into the hard currency of power, and an associated relative
decline in American primacy that has become apparent, the loudest voices have often
been those insisting that nothing much needs to change. In these circles, it has until
very recently been accepted that Australia could enjoy its security relationship with its
reliable and preponderant ally in Washington, and continue to grow rich in its dealing
with its now major trading partner in Beijing. This argument has been maintained even
as the relationship between those two has evolved and soured.

1
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The 2016 Defence White Paper was based on the assumption that the United States
will remain the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades. It
will continue to be Australia’s most important strategic partner through our longstanding alliance, and the active presence of the United States will continue to
underpin the stability of our region.2
It argues that China
will not match the global strategic weight of the United States, the growth of China’s
national power, including its military modernisation, means China’s policies and
actions will have a major impact on the stability of the Indo-Pacific to 2035.3
The assumption that the United States would remain engaged in the region, at least in
terms we have traditionally understood it, as the hub of so many spokes, was challenged
almost immediately after the publication of the 2016 Defence White Paper with the
election of Donald Trump and the ill-defined ‘America First’ strategy. However, it would
be a mistake to see Trump as a cause of Washington’s strategic malaise when he is rather
a symptom of a broader American political crisis and of a country still searching for a
post-Cold War identity when signs of this have been apparent for years.
The initial period of the Trump presidency saw a degree of apprehension from
Washington’s allies and partners, including Canberra, as they attempted to quantify
this unknown quantity. An early view was that the presidency would change Trump
much more than he would change the presidency.4 Much of this thinking rested on the
presence of experienced figures like Jim Mattis (Secretary of Defense) H. R. McMaster
(National Security Adviser) and John Kelly (Chief of Staff) and the view that they would
restrain Trump’s more extreme impulses and socialise him into the responsibilities of
his office. However, by mid-2018 these figures had been sidelined. By the following
year all had departed. Trump, meanwhile, had stunned allies with a series of actions
and pronouncements too numerous to catalogue here. However, his July 2018 remarks
that characterised the European Union as a “foe”, ahead of Russia and China, rankled
many.5 While closer to home, a 2017 leaked phone call between Trump and Prime Minister
Malcolm Turnbull suggested that the relationship was delicate.

A Not So Sudden Change in the Weather
In July 2018, a new chapter Australia’s strategic policy debate was opened by the Executive
Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) when he argued that the time
had come for Canberra to formulate a Plan B for its defence policy.6 Jennings located
2
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his argument firmly in the context of the Trump presidency. Since then, a variety of
contributors, some of them great luminaries, have endorsed, weighed in on, or disputed
Jennings’s contention.
The key advocates of a Plan B for defence have started from the excellent premise that
the ANZUS alliance cannot be taken for granted and that it cannot be assumed that
Trump is an aberration. Therefore, it is prudent to plan around and mitigate the effects
of a region in which the United States is less actively involved.
However, a number of flaws immediately undermine this approach. Firstly, many, though
not all, advocates of the Plan B approach make the mistake of seeing Trump as a cause of
crisis rather than a symptom of it. Therefore, they do little to engage with the underlying
issues of Washington’s changing position in the regional order. With a few exceptions, calls
for the adoption of a Plan B do not advocate anything that is truly new. Most assessments
rest on the assumption that a continued US presence in the region can either be expected,
or sought, by greatly increased defence spending and adopting a more forward leaning
force structure.7 This leads to a fractured kind of logic that asserts that certain big ticket
power projection platforms such as long range bombers and submarines are desirable
because US protection is uncertain, but that the acquisition of these platforms will also
help keep the United States engaged in the region.
Most, though not all,8 advocates of Plan B speak of it as though defence policy exists
in a vacuum and is not intrinsically linked to foreign policy and trade policy, and the
broader realities of government and budgeting. Few, if any, of those who have mooted or
evaluated Plan B have done so with serious consideration of the attitudes and priorities
of policymakers, and by policymakers it is useful to consider not just entrenched officials
at Russell, but their elected masters across Lake Burley Griffin.
Before we assess Plan B, it is useful to consider Plan A, which is probably best understood
as the arrangements that Australia has enjoyed, with some modification, since Federation.
The country’s security has been largely, but not entirely underwritten by a preponderant
maritime power with which it shares strong cultural and values-based ties. In 1901 that
power was Britain, though it is less useful to think of Australia’s relationship with Britain
at that time as being one of allies than as a relationship between imperial master and
newly minted dominion. While the Commonwealth of Australia was self-governing, its
foreign policy was subject to London’s veto and would not be fully emancipated until
the Second World War.
At the same time, Australia’s economic prosperity has, since 1901, been assured by
the custom of either the security guarantor or a power aligned to it. Until 1942 that was
Britain. Following the fall of Singapore, Australia famously turned to the United States.
However, it would be wrong to think that Britain no longer factored in Australia’s strategic
calculations from that point. As Bell has noted, when Menzies spoke of “Great and Powerful
Friends” he did so in the plural.9 Britain remained a key trading partner and an important
part of Australia’s security architecture until well after the war, but the relationship with
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Washington and the associated alliance soon became dominant. In this period, Americanaligned Japan became Australia’s largest trading partner following the establishment
of the 1957 Commerce Agreement. Although Canberra did not recognise the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) until 1972, a strong trade in non-strategic goods existed from
the 1950s. This became a source of some frustration for Washington over the years.
The fact that it continued is an indication of a pragmatic approach to the region.
In retrospect, the back-to-back addresses made by US President George W. Bush and
China’s President Hu Jintao to the Australian Parliament in October 2003 represent an
extraordinary moment. Such duality would be impossible today. It took place in an era
when Prime Minister John Howard made the assurance that Australia did not have to
“choose geography or history”.10
By 2007, the same year that Howard left office, China became Australia’s largest trading
partner. For the first time, Australia looked to powers that were not only unaligned, but
increasingly in competition with each other for our security and prosperity. Plan A ended
there. Everything since has been strategic drift.
Today Canberra faces a strategic landscape where its largest trading partner is a state
that it increasingly regards to be a threat to its security, yet remains indispensable to its
economic prosperity. At the same time, Australia is allied to a state in a deep and likely
prolonged political crisis. One led by a president who appears at best to be ambivalent
towards the concept of a liberal rules-based order. At times, he is openly hostile to the
idea of alliances and has voiced this hostility directly to certain partner states.

Assessing Plan B
The allure of Plan B is that it is a seemingly tangible response to a tangible problem. At
the heart of it is the sensible point that ANZUS is of enduring value to Australia and that
it cannot be taken for granted. As Jennings notes, Trump’s leadership is “increasingly
bizarre”.11 He is right to point out that “the 2016 defence white paper shows that the
current Plan B is even more of the alliance’s Plan A”.12 Yet his Plan B offers little that is
truly different in respect to the alliance or strategic planning.
At the core of Plan B is an argument for increasing the defence budget from its current
rate of just under 2 per cent of GDP to somewhere between 3 and 4 per cent.13 Jennings
has also argued for a lift in personnel numbers from 58,000 to about 90,000. What would
this money be spent on, and how would these personnel be used? Jennings advocates
an enhanced conventional force including nuclear powered submarines, capable of long
range operations. Richard Menhinick laments our lack of ability to “impose our will and
deter adversaries at a distance across the Indo-Pacific”.14 Paul Dibb argues the need for
10 John Howard, ‘Address to the Asia Society, “Australia and Asia: An Enduring Engagement”’, 8 May 1997,
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a “radically new defence policy”.15 But there is nothing radical or new in the author of the
1987 Defence White Paper’s call for a regional focus and self-reliance within the alliance.
It is notable that several advocates of a defence Plan B noted above envisage a force
designed for forward operations with a strong emphasis on Sea Control. While Plan B is
predicated on the idea that US leadership in the region cannot be taken for granted, it
also appears to assume that the ADF will be deployed in areas of operation made secure
by the United States and will continue to operate alongside US assets. Assuming that
increased military spending and forward deployments will prove Canberra’s mettle and
worth as an ally to Washington is nothing new. It is a classic play from the Australian
manual of alliance management echoing the era of Forward Defence.
Jennings also calls for the establishment of formal alliances with Britain, France and
Japan. It is hard to see what advantage the first two would offer. One wonders if anyone
remembers SEATO. As Mike Scrafton points out, an alliance with Japan is likely to provoke
China.16 Such an alliance might well risk entrapping Canberra in a Sino-Japanese conflict
without offering any tangible benefit in return.
Some broader thinking on the Plan B proposal have come from Tony Milner who argues
the importance of a “diplomatic and political strategy” as a driver of defence planning.17
Mike Scrafton questions the assumption that Australia is materially capable of altering the
course of events in the region. He points out that the mooted 3-4 per cent of GDP spent
on defence translates roughly to an increase from 6 to 9 per cent in overall government
spending for defence, something that it is unlikely to politically palatable.18
Another questionable assumption at the heart of most Plan B proposals is the idea that
conventional military force can act as a credible deterrent against a nuclear power. When
we consider that this may be taking place without the umbrella of US extended nuclear
deterrence, the assumption becomes even more questionable. It is worth asking in what
circumstances do we imagine a beefed up, but conventionally armed, forward deployed
ADF operating against China without US support?
A more robust set of arguments is made by Hugh White and Rod Lyon. In White’s 2019
book How to Defend Australia, he soberly makes the case that we ought to revisit a
discussion last had in the early 1970s, and consider if the development of a nuclear
weapons capability is in the national interest.19 The fact that White is advocating the
discussion, rather than championing nuclear acquisition, has to some extent been lost
in the public discourse. Rod Lyon takes us a step back in a recent piece for ASPI in which
he points out that the development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program would
take at least 15 years and that it would be prudent for us to act now to minimise that lead
time in order to be better placed to make the decision.20
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A sub-argument of some Plan B discussion has centred on Australia’s perceived over
exposure to the Chinese market. Dibb contends that Canberra should “consciously
diversify (our) trade, investment, tourism and international student businesses with other
countries. These should include Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam and Indonesia—as
well as Europe”.21
Diversification is happening in niche areas such as defence related technology and rare
earth minerals. This is sensible and will continue. However, broader divestment is both
unrealistic and undesirable. While our tourism, education and resources sector will no
doubt continue to seek out new markets, no single market or indeed combination of existing
markets, is going to replace China from its dominant position in the foreseeable future.
It is Australia’s dilemma that while it has become increasingly wary of China’s growing
power, and rightly regards a China that seeks to overturn the prevailing order as being
contrary to its interests, a weak China is not in its interests either. Australia needs China to
be rich in order to trade with us and to be constructively engaged in the global economy. It
is now trade, and differing approaches to trade, that is emerging as a key point of difference
between Canberra and Washington in their attitudes and approaches towards China.

The (Increasingly Hawkish) View from Washington
In a series of speeches over the last year or so, US Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo have laid out the prevailing Washington view on China. In a speech
delivered at the 2018 APEC Summit in Port Moresby, Pence pledged Washington’s
commitment to a “free and open Indo Pacific” while ending what he characterised as
an era of Chinese exploitation of the United States.22 He expanded on these themes
in remarks to the Wilson Centre in October 2019.23 Here Pence lamented the failure of
economic engagement in transforming China into a “free and open society”. Although
Pence explicitly rejected the idea of economic “decoupling” and denied that Washington
seeks to contain Beijing, he made it clear that acceptable Chinese development is that
which takes place on Washington’s terms.
In an extraordinary speech to the Hudson Institute in the same month, Mike Pompeo
characterised China as a “strategic competitor at best” and praised the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue as a mechanism for ensuring that it “retains only its proper place in
the world”.24 In a more recent speech, Pompeo spoke of US “accommodation” of China
that had been made in the hope that the country would become “more free, more market
driven, and ultimately, hopefully more democratic”.25 Pompeo also appeared to question
21
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the wisdom of Washington’s decision to end its recognition of the Republic of China in the
1970s. This is a radical suggestion as it criticises the diplomacy that laid the foundations
for a period of peace and prosperity that underwrote the final quarter of the twentieth
century in Asia and greatly benefited the region, including Australia.
An American hope that economic engagement with China and China’s integration into
the global economy would in turn lead to political liberalisation and perhaps even the end
of the CCP state is not new. It is after all an articulation of liberalism itself. According to
liberalism, free markets and free societies are intrinsically linked. Some forty years since
China began its market liberalisation, and thirty years since Tiananmen, Washington
has apparently decided that the jury is in on Beijing’s progress towards enlightenment.
All this raises the question of what sort of China is acceptable to Washington. If the answer
is only a democratic one, Australia is faced with a dilemma.

The View from Parliament House, Canberra
Traditionally there has been a broad consensus among Australia’s political class in support
of Plan A, with some differences on tone and prioritisation. ANZUS has certainly enjoyed
long and strong bipartisan support, with opposition from the Left of the Australian Labor
Party being confined to the fringe since the Hawke era.
The ANU academic Andrew Carr has made a thoughtful contribution to this underexamined area by pointing out that a strategic policy debate that is not contested in
a political context is at risk of growing stale and that bipartisanship in this area is not
necessarily a good thing.26
However, in the post–Plan A world of today the major differences that exist within the
political class on strategic policy are more evident within the major parties than between
them. So far, these differences are more pronounced around China than they are in
relation to the American alliance, though events and Donald Trump could change this.
Within the Liberal-National Party Government differences on China can be observed
along portfolio lines. Trade Minister Simon Birmingham will emphasise the importance of
China to Australia’s economy, while Defence Minister Linda Reynolds and Foreign Minister
Marise Payne will tend to focus on the challenge that China poses to the existing order.
These differences are far starker when we observe the Cabinet in contrast to the
government’s backbench. Here we find evidence of far more hawkish views on China.
Of course, within our system it quite usual for backbench Members of Parliament (MP)
to speak out on issues that concern them, even if this places them against the Cabinet.
From time to time the back bench will exert real influence over the Cabinet. It is rare for
this to happen on matters relating to Defence or Foreign Affairs. However, we now know
that prominent backbenchers Tim Wilson and Andrew Hastie (among others) pressured
the government to drop plans to sign an extradition treaty with China in 2017.27
26 See Andrew Carr, ‘I’m Here for an Argument: Why Bipartisanship on Security Makes Australia Less Safe’,
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More recently, Wilson has emerged as a vocal supporter of the rights of the people of
Hong Kong. Hastie, often spoken of as a future party leader, has utilised his position
as Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to raise his
concerns over growing Chinese influence within Australian institutions.
Opposition attitudes are harder to assess. At the time of writing, the parliamentary
Labor Party remains in state of disarray following its unexpected defeat in the May
2019 election. On one hand, Shadow Foreign Minister Penny Wong continues to map
out sensible policy vision. At the same time, Shadow Defence Minister Richard Marles
appears to be out of his depth. Opposition Leader Anthony Albanese has said little on
strategic policy thus far.
So far, we have seen little real disagreement either within or between the major parties on
the alliance. Differences have been internal and have tended to focus on Trump and the
apparent dysfunction of his White House. The hollowing out of the State Department and
management issues within the Pentagon have also been causes for concern. A second
Trump term, or some disagreement that places us in divergence with him, could bring
those differences into focus.
Canberra’s Trump strategy has been to personalise the relationship to a high degree.
We have done this ever since we used golfing legend Greg Norman as an intermediary.
As Director of the Lowy Institute Michael Fullilove has noted, Trump “likes people
who like him”.28 In this spirit, we have used the ‘100 years of mateship’ campaign to
socialise Trump into the history of the alliance and liberally applied flattery to lubricate
the process.
It is a potentially high reward, but also very high risk approach. So far, the rewards have
been more apparent. Australia is now one of few liberal western nations to be on truly
good terms with the Trump administration. Australia was exempted from steel tariffs in
2018. To continue the metallic theme, Prime Minister Morrison was recently celebrated
at the White House as a “man of titanium”.29 But beneath all the bonhomie and talk of
the second century of mateship the points of difference are apparent. Recently, US
Ambassador Arthur Culvahouse gave a speech urging Australia to display more confidence
and suggested that taking part in freedom of navigation operations in the South China
Sea might be an ideal way to do so.30 The invitation was not taken up by the Morrison
government. The government was also quick to end speculation that it would agree to
host US intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

28 Michael Fullilove quoted in Matthew Knott, ‘Why Scott Morrison’s Dinner with Trump is a Diplomatic
Victory’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 2019, <www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/why-scottmorrison-s-dinner-with-donald-trump-is-a-diplomatic-victory-20190920-p52t65.html> [Accessed
22 October 2019].
29 David Crowe, ‘Trump Lauds Scott Morrison as a “Man of Titanium”’ The Sydney Morning Herald,
21 September 2019, <www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/donald-trump-lauds-scott-morrison-as-a-man-oftitanium-20190921-p52tio.html> [Accessed 22 October 2019].
30 Phillip Coorey, ‘Show Backbone against China or Risk New Cold War: US Ambassador’, Australian Financial
Review, 14 September 2019, <www.afr.com/politics/federal/stand-up-to-china-or-risk-cold-war-20190912p52qsp>

A Plan B for Australia? Hard Truths and Political Realities in Canberra’s Strategic Policy Debate

31

A risk for Canberra may be that Trump feels he has made certain allowances for Australia
over tariff exemptions and matters such as the so-called ‘people swap deal’ and that he is
therefore owed favours in kind. We possibly saw something of this thinking when Trump
reportedly requested that Canberra assist in the investigation by US Attorney-General
William Barr into the Mueller inquiry.31 However, this request is very little in terms of
what might be asked.

The Prime Minister’s Dilemma
At the centre of all this sits the Prime Minister himself. To a large degree, it his view,
more than any other single view that matters. The views which he chooses to listen to are
consequently of great importance. On the surface, Scott Morrison is a values driven man.
He recently spoke strongly on the plight of the persecuted Uighur people within China.
Yet a closer examination of the Prime Minister, particularly a reading of his speeches,
suggests something more pragmatic. There can be no doubt of Morrison’s commitment
to ANZUS. Indeed, his emotional attachment to its ideal and the history behind it appears
strong. However, Morrison also speaks unapologetically of the benefits to Australia of a
strong trade relationship with China.32
Like Menzies before him, Morrison appears to think of Australia’s “Great and Powerful
Friends” in the plural. Though unlike Menzies, Morrison’s embrace is broad enough to
include a range of regional partners as diverse as the United States, Indonesia, Japan
and China.33 Morrison’s dilemma is that some ten years or so since Plan A lapsed he
has inherited a situation in which he is reacting to events without much in the way of a
strategic framework. And he is doing so at a time when Canberra’s great security ally
and its major trading partner are increasingly opposed and increasingly demanding of
it. Australia has long attempted to avoid ‘choosing’ between Washington and Beijing
because it is essentially the choice between security and prosperity. It now finds itself
making choices on a daily basis.
Advocates of a Plan B for defence would do well to recall that Morrison was Treasurer
before becoming Prime Minister. Of the many departments jostling for his ear, it is
invariably Treasury which he listens to first and last. Money is after all the alpha and
omega of the policy process. Although we may question the necessity of reaching and
maintaining a budget surplus, we would be foolish to dismiss the importance which the
government places on it. They believe that their delivery of, an albeit, small surplus ahead
of the election was central to their victory and that the loss of that surplus will likely mean
the loss of the next election. They are therefore unlikely to adopt policies that would do
this. Nor are they likely to raise taxes, even in areas as broadly popular as defence.
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Conclusion
A renewed approach to Australian strategic planning is necessary after more than a
decade of drift. However, such an approach must not limit itself to defence, with a focus
solely on capability, without a firm understanding of the strategic purpose of those
capabilities. A renewed approach to strategic planning must also include foreign policy
and the proper resourcing of diplomacy. It must include trade and the recognition that
free trade is not only vital to prosperity but fuses interests and promotes peace. It will
require policymakers to make difficult decisions on budgeting and resource allocation. All
this demands that Canberra addresses the core assumptions on which it makes strategic
planning assessments. Inevitably this will mean addressing hard truths and questions
of prioritisation. Sir Arthur Tange is well known for saying “until you’re talking dollars,
you’re not talking strategy”. We should not lose sight of this. However, strategy is also
about ends. It concerns means as a method of obtaining them. A frank assessment of
Canberra’s desired strategic ends in a landscape that was already changing when Donald
Trump was a mere reality TV star, must be the basis of any Plan B.
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Is Australia’s Defence Policy Right
for the Times?
Rita Parker
This paper seeks to identify some of strategic issues that need to be considered in
reassessing Australia’s defence policy. While past Defence White Papers identified several
such issues, these need to be re-evaluated in the context of a dynamic and complex global
strategic environment. This will enable policymakers to ensure that defence policy is
relevant to the future geostrategic environment and that Australia’s defence forces are
sufficiently prepared for contemporary and future challenges. Currently defence policy
reflects a degree of institutional bias founded on past force structure models based on
Cold War precepts and a war-fighting basis. There is a pressing imperative for defence
policy to be reframed to reflect the way conflict has changed, factors that have influenced
that change, and the resulting contemporary non-geographic transnational security
challenges that often arise from non-military sources.
Security policy in the twenty-first century has altered, partly because the nature of conflict
has changed. Competition between the United States and China, Russia’s activities in and
since its annexation of Crimea, North Korea’s refusal to abandon its nuclear program, the
Syrian conflict—its humanitarian crisis and shifting power alliances—grey-zone conflicts,
and actions by non-state actors all highlight that the notion of security has changed.
Security is no longer confined to the conventional military dimension of a nation-state
and inter-state relations or confined to strategic balance of power issues. The situation is
further compounded by complex trade relationships and dependencies, energy supplies
and vulnerabilities, new complex non-geographic threats, as well as changes in the
population mix due to regular and irregular migration flows, infectious diseases and the
fragility of nation-states. Large numbers of displaced people are driven by conflict, climate
change and natural disasters that affect food and water supplies as well as secure places
to live.1 Many of these issues also affect and shape the geostrategic environment and
the operational space of Australia’s defence personnel. All of these factors underscore
the challenges for defence policymakers and the need to improve Australia’s defence
preparation, as well as the imperative to reassess the strategic underpinning of the 2016
Defence White Paper, its strategic defence interests and objectives.
Wars were generally short during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—they lasted
only for about two years between the declaration of war and the signing of the peace
treaty.2 There were further changes in the nature of conflict following the experience
of the two world wars. Cross-border wars were primarily a “small- or medium-power
activity”,3 which meant the attention of great powers was focused on other types of
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conflicts. In the period from 1946 to 1991 there was political discord, military tension
and a series of proxy wars—where third parties were substitutes for opposing powers
fighting each other directly.
The Cold War period involved several conflicts, the most notable were the Berlin Blockade
in the late 1940s (1948–49), the Korean War in the 1950s (1950–53), and in the 1960s
there was the Berlin Crisis (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). The Vietnam
or ‘American’ War, as it is known in Vietnam, which lasted sixteen years to 1975, was
followed in 1979 by the Soviet War in Afghanistan which lasted a decade. During the
Cold War period Australian defence forces were involved in several conflicts at the behest
of Australia’s allies. These included the Korean War (1950-53), the Malayan Emergency
(1950-60), the Borneo Confrontation (1962-66), the Vietnam War (1965-73) and the
Gulf War (1990-91).
Most of the armed conflicts during the Cold War period were between states; by contrast,
since 1989 the majority of conflicts have been internal.4 During the Cold War period there
were enemy states and errant leaders. Hostile states were often treated from a realist’s
perspective as rational actors who could, sometimes, be dissuaded from hostile intent
through explicit deterrence measures. It was a period in which game theory, brinkmanship
and nuclear strategy were at the forefront of much decision-making. During this time,
wars were often conducted ‘unofficially’; that is, without formal declarations of their
beginning or end, such as the Greek civil war in the late 1940s. Other conflicts could be
described as a war in all but name, such as in Northern Ireland which lasted for decades
until the historic Good Friday Agreement in 1998.5
With the break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century, the political
and intellectual climate changed6 but many policy analysts, scholars and security
specialists were uncertain how to interpret the consequences of change. The geostrategic
environment could no longer solely be defined in terms of sovereignty or territorial defence.
The growing range of issues included within the security agenda challenged the traditional
realist concept of security and compelled development of a different perspective to view
and to frame the security environment to take account of ongoing change.7 This included
analysis of security in the context of public policy and, separately, the reshaping and
reframing of national security policy with implications not only for security policy but
also for defence policy, its force structure, and capabilities. At the end of the last century,
this debate was characterised as “a contest between traditionalists, who would like to
maintain the field’s focus on military conflict, and ‘wideners’ who believe that security in
the modern world involves economic, environmental, and social issues as much as guns
and bombs”.8 Since that time, there has been a greater awareness of the imperative to
accept that security encompasses wider issues and it is not just about great power rivalry
4
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and military conflict. But there remain elements of institutional resistance that influence
defence policy and associated spending through a prism based on military dominance
focused on conflict and war scenarios within a national security context.

A New Cold War?
In recent times the notion of a return to the Cold War era or ‘new’ Cold War has surfaced.
While this might be a form of shorthand to refer to posturing by certain nation-states and
their bellicose leaders, it does not reflect those times which were a period of tense nuclear
stand-offs, proxy wars, internal repression and which were ideologically grounded—
basically communism versus democracy.
Conflict continues in Afghanistan with an increased mix of actors, and Russia and
China have both behaved in a much more assertive and threatening manner in recent
years. Yet their behaviour, the ongoing Afghan conflict and the humanitarian tragedy
in Syria do not constitute a return to the great power clash of the Second World War or
subsequent existential risks of the Cold War period. Nor do they reflect the reality of
today’s geostrategic environment. Talk of a new Cold War and that way of thinking is
“imprecise at best, dangerous at worst”.9
Our world is vastly different from the Cold War of the last century. Today, there is no
single ‘threat’, instead the threat is multidimensional. The strategic order and the nature
of conflict have changed, the world is a place of geostrategic complexity and dynamic
change, and globalisation underscores that such changes occur in an interlinked way.
This is not to diminish the challenges posed by China’s global economic ambition and
expanding soft power or Russia’s influence over its neighbours, its engagement with
the West and involvement in regional conflicts, but to highlight that other factors and
actors require attention.
Also, Australia and its role are vastly different now from that of the Cold War era of last
century. Such differences need to be reflected and strengthened in Australia’s defence
policies; the shift in priorities by Australia’s allies also must be recognised. For example,
the concept of securing allied support through the contribution of armed forces has long
endured within Australia’s strategic thinking and been reflected in past Defence White
Papers. But this support can no longer be guaranteed and any such future contributions
by Australia must be reassessed critically and objectively. The shift in priorities by
Australia’s most prominent ally is set out in US Defense policy regarding the Indo-Pacific.10
To some extent that policy document is based on the former US administration’s ‘pivot’
or ‘rebalance’ to Asia initiated by President Obama. Of particular significance is that
the policy also emphasises a change in relationship by the United States with its allies.
It highlights burden-sharing in the pursuit of Indo-Pacific security noting “the U.S. offers
strategic partnerships, not strategic dependence”.
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Shifting Norms
In the twenty-first century, evolving transnational norms demand a broader conceptual
framework than that offered by the realist definition of security which by itself is too
limited to analyse or assess novel security issues. Further, the realist approach does not
allow for appropriate consideration of gender or human rights perspectives which are
relevant to critical security. Much of Australia’s defence policy has been based on the
realist approach which favours a military perspective and accompanying big spend on
equipment. Notwithstanding that Australia is committed to maintaining a credible hard
power deterrent, a narrow realist approach is not a justifiable basis to analyse risks and
threats in the geostrategic environment faced by Australia today.
Institutional norms and assumptions have been based on what our ancestral history has
prepared us to fear: what we cannot control; the immediate; and what is most readily available
in memory.11 If this continues as the foundational basis for security and defence policy, it
means that in the current and future geostrategic environment Australia is at risk of selecting
particular risks for attention with the result that some risks are “exaggerated or minimised
according to the social, cultural, and moral acceptability of the underlying activities”.12
In the past, those underlying activities were the ones that suited preconceived notions about
security policy that preferenced defence capabilities and equipment. That approach is not
relevant for any planning about future capabilities and force structure because it does not
include sufficient capacity to deal with contemporary transnational security challenges and
non-geographic threats that fall outside conventional war fighting doctrine.
As subnational agencies, Australia’s defence organisations effectively use soft
power rather than relying solely on coercive means. Australia’s defence forces have a
well-established reputation regarding the work done, particularly in military to military
education and training, the provision of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and its
peacekeeping efforts. But within an institutional defence context, these roles are not
generally seen as ‘core’ business. This bias needs to be counteracted so that appropriate
weighting is given to these important activities that enhance Australia’s ability to influence.
Australia’s defence forces have become and continue to be involved in these ‘soft’ or
tangential areas. Correspondingly, there has also been a shift in norms where the use
of military hard power and their coercive effects have also been applied outside stateon-state conflict. Such hard power has been utilised in areas outside traditional military
engagement to achieve political objectives, such as irregular migration.

Irregular Migration
For several decades irregular population migration has been increasingly identified as a
security issue for Australia and used for political leverage. Since the beginning of the twentyfirst century, irregular population migration has incrementally shifted from a domestic policy
issue and been reframed as one of national security and sovereign defence, resulting in
11
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the involvement of military personnel and equipment. In 2001 the Australian Government
introduced its Border Protection Act, the Prime Minister arguing that the legislation was
focused not only on preventing refugees entering Australian territorial waters but also
on protection of sovereignty. In support of his argument, Prime Minister Howard stated,
in part, that the legislation was “essential to the maintenance of Australian sovereignty,
including our sovereign right to determine who will enter and reside in Australia”.13 Although
the Bill was defeated and the Opposition challenged the government’s approach, which
it described as alarmist, the government of the day framed the issue in a way that both
responded to, and played on, public perceptions of uncertainty and fear of asylum seekers.
That fear was generated by the events which preceded the proposed legislation with the
rescue of asylum-seekers by a Norwegian cargo ship, the Tampa, in late August 2001. In
the subsequent months leading up to the Australian federal election in November 2001,
the government continued to exploit and to frame the subjective perceptions of risk and
uncertainty associated with prospective asylum seekers. The statement “we will decide
who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come”,14 was used by
Prime Minister Howard in his election campaign launch speech and it was a main campaign
platform for the government, which was subsequently re-elected.
The apparent success of framing the issue of refugees and asylum seekers in this way was
used again in the lead-up to the 2013 federal election. Then Leader of the Opposition, the
Hon Tony Abbott, announced sweeping plans to fast-track the deportation of unsuccessful
asylum seekers and declared, “this is our country and we determine who comes here. That
was the position under the last Coalition government, that will be the position under any
future Coalition government”.15 The Coalition was duly elected to government by framing
the issue as a security one which demanded military involvement as part of the response
to the perceived threat. The elected government subsequently introduced ‘Operation
Sovereign Borders’—a military-run, border security operation led by a three-star general
aimed at stopping maritime arrivals of asylum seekers to Australia.16
This example demonstrates the way perceptions of risk, together with risk’s implied
uncertainty and association with threat, are influencing factors that shape public policy
across a spectrum of issues including broader security ones. It also demonstrates the
way in which certain risks are downplayed while other perceived risks are emphasised as
a means of maintaining and controlling the group—in this case, the voting public. Further,
it demonstrates the way an issue is reframed from a domestic policy one to a security
one, and then reframed further to demand military involvement. Such reframing in 2013
held implications for the future role of the military and associated defence capabilities
and force structure. Today, Australian military forces and other agencies continue to
be involved in migration issues because it has been framed as a defence and security
matter. Indeed, the 2016 Defence White Paper used ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ as a
platform to acquire more offshore patrol vessels for its maritime surveillance capabilities
including manned and unmanned aircraft.17
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Framing
The framing process is a critical, if invisible, element of the policy process influenced
by several different actors and changing variables, and it is particularly important in the
development and implementation of security and defence policies. The way issues are
framed and reframed is not value-neutral; rather, the way an issue is framed reflects
cultural contexts and the socio-political construction of security issues. The way issues
are framed can also change because there is rarely just one way of stating a problem,
examining it, or working out its resolution—although governments are often reluctant
to consider options that do not support or promote their political agenda.
The policy and security environments since the end of the Cold War have been reframed,
and that has led to the development of different ways to analyse defence and security.
This reframing extends to overarching global and national security policy where security,
economics, trade, technology and human rights are interwoven, and which influence and
shape Australia’s geostrategic environment. But the way these issues are weighted often
reflects inherent biases that are perpetuated in government policies.
The framing of risks, threats, problems, their causes, and potential solutions is of vital
importance in policy decision-making. Australia’s defence personnel are well versed in
risk analysis, using it daily to assess every aspect of procedural, tactical and operational
engagement and in other areas of their responsibilities. Yet, within a policy context
oversimplification and mischaracterisation can lead to poor quality policy.18 The equal
weighting of the three Strategic Defence Objectives set out in the 2016 Defence White
Paper could be cited as such an example. Those objectives do not adequately reflect the
risks and threats posed by new, complex non-geographic security challenges arising
from non-state actors or from non-human sources.
An added challenge found in inherent bias is that risks and threats can be framed to fit a set
of predetermined constructs or issues—including institutional concepts of force structure
and capability. This is particularly evident when past actions and institutional biases lean
towards continuing the status quo. For example, in the past, the military dimension was used
to differentiate between defence and security activities. In many instances that approach
continues to be used to distinguish between perceived traditional risks and threats and
those arising from contemporary non-traditional sources. Yet that distinction is not always
mutually exclusive as demonstrated through the military-led border security operation
where irregular migration is being addressed with a military response.

Infectious Diseases
The use of rape in war to spread infectious disease links a non-traditional security
issue—infectious disease—with a traditional security issue—war. This reframing was
recognised by the United Nations Security Council which voted unanimously for a
resolution describing rape as a tactic of war and a threat to international security.19
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This example further demonstrates an important distinction about global and national
security today which has been reframed to include non-traditional contemporary risks
and threats of a transnational nature—namely, infectious diseases. Such shifts in focus at
a global level hold implications for defence priorities and its spending at a national level.
The nexus between disease and security is founded in the relationship between disease
and warfare.20 Disease among armies has long been a contributing factor to military
outcomes,21 and warfare has contributed to the spread of disease. Infectious diseases have
the potential to be existential risks to a nation-state and the well‑being of its civil‑society
and therefore affect the levels of resilience and human security. Australian defence
policy does, to some extent, recognise the significance of risks arising from non-human
sources, such as infectious diseases, but usually in the context of the effect of health on
military success. For example, discoveries made near the turn of the twentieth century,
including the tracing of the natural history of diseases such as yellow fever and malaria
were studied initially in an effort to protect military forces.22
The end of the twentieth century saw increased momentum to reframe infectious
diseases from purely public health issues to those of security concern. These related
to the spread of new and existing infectious diseases, the continued growth of the HIV/
AIDS pandemic, and bioterrorism. It has been argued that three viruses—HIV, SARS and
H5N1—have “done most over the past decade to place infectious disease issues firmly
on the international security agenda”.23 Infectious diseases do not recognise sovereign
borders and a traditional military response would be futile. These factors and others were
relevant and continue to be relevant to defence personnel and demand explicit action
within future defence policy.
While the inclusion of non-traditional risks and threats may not suit those commentators
and proponents eager to engage in a quasi-Cold War scenario, it is a more accurate
reflection of the contemporary geostrategic environment. Today’s scenario is one where
Australia’s future defence must work on the assumption that it will have to do more for
its own security—including dealing with contemporary transnational risks and threats
which were referred to as “problems without passports” by former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan.24 In the current and future geostrategic environment, Australia as a middle
power, has a role to play supporting its Indo-Pacific partners and neighbours to maintain
security and harmony in the region by addressing these problems directly. This also
includes maintaining democratic principles and the rules based international order.
This scenario which includes contemporary security challenges does not necessarily
equate to, or indeed justify, the purchase of more military equipment.
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Climate Change
Among the most pressing challenges that have security as well as social, economic
and political implications is climate change. It also has global, regional and national
consequences that affect Australia, including its ability to exert influence and shape the
region. Climate change is a strategic issue that must be a critical factor in reassessing
Australia’s defence and security policies in the context of its geostrategic position and
relationships with neighbours and allies.
The 2018 Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration on Regional Security25 identified
climate change as the number one existential threat to the region, yet Australia has yet
to acknowledge explicitly or consistently that climate change and Australia’s national
security are inextricably linked. As a result, Australia has a diminished reputation globally,
and particularly in the Indo-Pacific region because of perceived climate change inaction,
and this is reflected in the strained relationships with its regional neighbours.
Australia has recognised, but has not always acted on, climate change as a threat
multiplier notwithstanding that there have been occasional reference and some public
policy rhetoric about climate change in past Defence White Papers. In 2007 Chief of
Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, noted that the Australian Defence Force
faced security challenges that it had not previously considered, naming climate change
as one such challenge.26 This was at a time when the United Nations Security Council held
its first debate on the impact of climate change on peace and security. Over fifty delegates
spoke on the issue including a representative from the Pacific Islands Forum who noted
that the Pacific Islands were already impacted by climate change citing the example of
Cyclone Heta that had left one-fifth of the population of Niue homeless in 2004.27
The 2009 Defence White Paper optimistically mentioned that the likely strategic
consequences of climate change would not be felt until 2030. Consequently, the White
Paper did not include explicit policy action. The 2013 Defence White Paper was widely
regarded as a continuation of the 2009 Defence White Paper, while the National Security
Strategy 2013 noted climate change was part of “broader global challenges with national
security implications”.28
There was some progress in the subsequent 2016 Defence White Paper; it acknowledged
climate change related disaster relief will increase demand on Defence resources
particularly in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), but this
was set within the context that the force is not structured around such tasks. That is,
HADR is not identified as core business for the ADF because its primary role is conducting
military operations. It is noteworthy that in August 2018, the Australian Chief of Army,
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26 A. Houston, Speech to RUSI Conference, 16 May 2007. Media Release CPA 70515/07 Department of Defence,
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Lieutenant General Rick Burr, issued his futures statement entitled ‘Accelerate Warfare’29
focused on how the Army should prepare for war.30
The 2016 White Paper identified the risk that climate change would drive natural
disasters and political instability in the Pacific. It further acknowledged that a rise in
global temperatures would likely put more pressure on the Australian Defence Force’s
ability to respond. While HADR is not warfare, it can be argued that HADR responses
contribute to Australia’s strategic environment which is subject to natural disasters—with
associated food and water shortages and displaced people urgently in need of assistance.
As the Indo-Pacific region is one of the worst affected by natural disasters, the capacity
to respond to regional disasters is a key role in how Australia influences the region.
This is of particular importance given the increased attention the Indo-Pacific region
is receiving from other nation-states and from non-state actors. There are implications
for Australia, including its ability to provide support and aid during times of duress for
its neighbours. These developments in the Indo-Pacific are of key strategic importance
to Australia and are compounded because the region is among the worst affected both
directly and indirectly by climate change. As such, Australia has the opportunity to extend
its existing activities and engagement to support its regional neighbours.
Australia itself is experiencing increased climate related natural disasters in the form
of cyclones, bushfires and flooding. As the numbers of disasters increase, so does the
number of disaster relief missions that are likely to involve the Australian Defence Force.
In fact, there have been occasion when more defence personnel have been deployed to
assist with disaster relief missions than deployed at its height to Afghanistan. For example,
Australia despatched 1,000 troops to support Operation Fiji Assist in 2016, about 1,600
to help after Cyclone Debbie hit Queensland in 2017, and almost 3,000 to help North
Queensland clean up after floods in early 2019.31 But, HADR is not seen as core business
within defence and security policies although its effect is extensive.
Climate change itself does not cause conflict, yet extreme weather damage to electricity
transmission infrastructure, transportation, communication and offshore installations
not only impact affected communities but also are areas where Australia’s defence and
security are vulnerable. Climate change also puts pressure on natural resources which
are critical to human survival. Food and water become scarce, basic health and shelter
are jeopardised, populations migrate in search of safety and security, and conflict can
occur as people struggle for limited resources. Such factors can drive political, economic,
trade and cultural instability.
As noted above, climate change can act as a threat multiplier and can lead to transnational
security risks and threats. It is directly linked to drivers of instability and strains already
weak institutions, undermining post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts32.
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While there has been some acknowledgement in the 2016 Defence White Paper of
some effects of climate change, more explicit recognition of the risks associated with
climate change is imperative. These factors need to be central considerations of future
defence policy.

Problems without Passports
The 2016 Defence White Paper recognises that Australia’s first basic strategic Defence
Interest could be subject to “unexpected shocks, whether natural or man‑made” and
there is a need to be resilient to them. While the supporting Strategic Defence Objective
notes terrorism in its various forms, other types of natural and man-made risks and
threats are not identified.33
Contemporary security challenges can take several different forms: they are transnational
in effect; often occur with short lead-times; and their effects are not always immediate.
Consequently, they are “more intimidating than the traditional ones”,34 and generally
negate the use of a traditional military response. Many such issues can move along a
continuum from one requiring priority attention to a tipping point where they become
a matter of security concern and subsequent drivers of instability. This stretches the
options available to deal with these forms of risks and threats, and it challenges the
effectiveness of traditional decision-making and the role of defence personnel and
resources. Transnational risks and threats are novel in the way they are perceived and
therefore framed and treated as issues requiring security attention by nation-states and
international institutions.35
Myriad issues have been identified under the broad umbrella of transnational challenges
to security, and to a large extent they reflect and have been framed by the changing
geopolitical environment. Changing environmental and climatic conditions, disaster
management, food and water scarcity, unreliable energy, and the spread of infectious
diseases can all contribute to instability and conflict. Other factors include man-made
stresses such as civil conflict, fragile and unstable governments, growing interest from
external actors, and organised crime. Where several factors converge, they act as a
multiplier causing instability among nation-states as affected populations seek other
sources of food, resources, stability or safety.36 All these factors must be included as part
of any strategic analysis of Australia’s operational environment.
In policy terms, contemporary transnational non-traditional security challenges tend
to be considered as outlier issues that do not demand immediate policy attention.
However, such issues do not occur in isolation, instead they are interconnected and
demand attention in future defence policies. In a region like the Indo-Pacific, a lack of
understanding of the interrelationships of specific drivers of instability can lead to poorly
constructed policy responses and wasted resources.

33 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016), pp. 69-73
paras 3.6-3.19.
34 S. Chaudhuri, Defining Non-Traditional Security Threats (New Delhi: Global India Foundation, 2011).
35 D. Caldwell and R. E. Williams, Seeking Security in an Insecure World (MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2006).
36 Parker,’ Unregulated Population Migration’.
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As noted above, many contemporary risks and threats arise from non-military sources;
that is, non-state actors and non‑human sources. Identification of the source of a
contemporary non‑traditional security threat or risk in this way distinguishes it from
traditional ones—which are usually responded to militarily—and this helps to clarify the
target or referent object. Many of these threats such as terrorism and cyber‑attacks by
non-state actors threaten a nation’s sovereignty. For countries like Australia, these are
real threats to the liberal democratic model and rules based international order. But these
transnational threats are not in a mould best suited to a traditional military response.
Instead, to address these issues Australia needs to reconsider a whole‑of‑government
approach that will support it playing a stronger leadership role in the region, without
relying on the US alliance to effect action against contemporary security challenges.
Addressing these issues is more relevant to Australia’s future strategic role as a middle
power than attempts to become involved in a pseudo-Cold War environment at the
behest of traditional allies.

Conclusion
As noted at the outset, security policy has changed from the Cold War era of the last
century and so too has Australia’s role. It is now a middle power in a strategically significant
part of the globe. As noted by the Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds,
“the Indo‑Pacific is dynamic, evolving, growing, prospering. It is at the heart of the
global economy. It is home to more than half the world’s population”. She also noted that
while the opportunities are great, so are the challenges that have “brought uncertainty
and complexity to our region”.37 There are now more challenges arising from non-state
actors such as terrorism and violent extremism, and attempts by non-state actors to
undermine sovereign interests have become more prominent as the century progresses.
Transnational issues that do not recognise sovereign borders such as infectious diseases
and irregular population migration also present geostrategic challenges. Actions by
state actors operating in the Indo‑Pacific also now require Australia to manage growing
strategic competition for influence where democracy and the rules based international
order are being challenged.
Australia’s contested strategic environment requires different thinking and ways to
address and counter challenges arising from non‑state actors and natural sources.
As noted by the Minister for Defence, “The Indo‑Pacific is being contested in ways
that go well beyond the conventional military terms”.38 While Australia is committed to
maintaining a credible hard power deterrent, its future defence policies need to reflect
that hard power is not always the most appropriate response for all future challenges,
particularly those arising from non‑state actors, nature, and complex high-tech conflicts.

37 Linda Reynolds, ‘ASPI-FPCI 1.5 Track Dialogue 2019’, Speech by Minister for Defence, 23 July 2019,
Department of Defence, <www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/speeches/aspi-fpci-15-trackdialogue-2019>.
38 Linda Reynolds, ‘Keynote Address, Hudson Institute, Washington DC’, 2 November 2019, Department of
Defence, Canberra, <www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/transcripts/keynote-addresshudson-institute-washington-dc-0>.
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Defence policies also need to reflect accurately the changing nature of alliances,
particularly relating to developments of strategic concern in the region, as well as the
concerns of neighbours and partners in the region. Explicit account of regional sovereign
aspirations and interests is vital for Australia’s ongoing relationships and future in the
region. Australia’s future defence must be based on the assumption that it will have to
do more for its own security based on strategic partnerships including with regional
neighbours.
To meet the contemporary and likely future geostrategic environment, it is imperative
that future policies address entrenched institutional norms and assumptions that have
previously shaped past capability investment. To some extent these inherent and often
unintentional biases continue to frame policy formation and perceptions of the appropriate
future role of Australia. There is an urgent need for an integrated and strategic perspective
to achieve comprehensive and cohesive policymaking and implementation to enhance
security and stability as a strategic priority for Australia. Such an approach needs to
recognise that deliberate actions that aim to bring about change in a specific area often
lead to unanticipated and potentially unwanted consequences elsewhere. This has been
keenly demonstrated by Australia’s past overall climate change inaction and reduction
in development aid in the Pacific region which has led to tensions between Australia and
its neighbours and partners. An unexpected result of Australia’s inaction has enabled
other nation‑states to fill the void.
From a defence perspective, climate change can affect how it operates with changing
threats and missions, particularly in geographic environments subject to more severe
aspects of climatic conditions. The impact of sea level rises and flooding, ocean
acidification, increase in extreme temperatures and extreme weather events directly
impact Defence capabilities, personnel and equipment. A secondary level consideration
to be taken into account is the impact Australia’s defence operations have on the climate
through deployment decisions and the use of its equipment and personnel. The impact
of climate change on defence force structure is a necessity whereby decisions reflect
environmental considerations as well as producing benefits in terms of cost and capability.
Therefore there is an imperative for environmental costs to be given more emphasis
during the policy development and decision‑making phase as well as in the subsequent
design, procurement and operation of equipment, and decisions concerning deployment.
Australia has an opportunity to focus on, and to be a leader in, environmental security
associated with the climate related impact on national and regional security. Demonstrable
actions of leadership include acting to mitigate climate change by ensuring the Paris
Treaty is implemented properly so that real efforts are made to limit global warming.
The effects of climate change in the Indo‑Pacific have a real potential to destabilise
the region. As such, the impacts of climate change need to be factored at the highest
level—that is, in its strategic defence interests and objectives, as well as in all future
military plans as part of core business, not only in the context of HADR. Future defence
policy should reflect strategies that recognise climate change and utilise technologies
that support mitigation strategies.
While Australia has an established record of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
in the Indo‑Pacific, there is a growing requirement for it to increase its capacity to assist
before, as well as during, times of duress. This includes increasing existing actions that
assist island nations develop capacity and capabilities to strengthen their resilience.
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During times of duress the provision of timely food, water, and shelter as well as access
to other resources and infrastructure will minimise the need for affected communities
to seek these elsewhere.
Australia’s leadership and reliable assistance in this way will alleviate pressure on
communities, reduce the likelihood of conflict and lead to increased stability and resilience
thereby enhancing security in the region. While Australia has an established role in HADR,
and welcomes other nations providing assistance, it needs to ensure its position and
role are not diminished by other nations seeking to replace it as an ally of Indo‑Pacific
neighbours. This can be achieved by maintaining and expanding defence cooperation
with regional countries, through capacity building, infrastructure development,
and support for governance arrangements that enhance the rules based international
order and economic growth.
Australia’s defence personnel are well positioned to maintain good relations with our
neighbours but policy actions in these areas must be supported by a whole‑of‑government
approach and not be the sole responsibility of defence. A holistic and integrated policy
approach would facilitate overall security and stability in the region, an area of strategic
importance to Australia and its allies. These issues and the changing geopolitical
challenges in the Indo‑Pacific region require Australian defence and security policymakers
to focus jointly on drivers of instability and actions by powers outside the region.
This broader policy approach will ensure defence capabilities are adequate to address
these challenges, and Australia’s role as a middle power is meaningful. A comprehensive
national security strategy that moves beyond tactical and operational issues, and takes
a holistic and whole-of-government view, is necessary now more than ever.

Dr Rita Parker is Jean Monnet Research Fellow at the Australian National University
Centre for European Studies (ANUCES).
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Better ways to defend Australia
Stephen Bartos

Australia’s national security conversation is often framed around Defence procurement.
At the most basic level, such discussions might address the merits of different platforms; at
a higher level, the debate might be about the relative merits of different sorts of capability
or the best mix of capabilities to acquire. Rarely, however, is security discussed more
broadly in the context of economic, cultural, trade or other national policy considerations.
This leads to significant gaps in our thinking, and perpetuates ineffective policy responses.
As Joyobroto Sanyal recently noted,
while defence of territorial sovereignty is fundamental to national security, it is
not sufficient … it is worth asking if a somewhat exclusive focus on hard security
makes the country exposed to greater strategic vulnerabilities and also stands in
the way of deeper strategic international engagement.1
A recent contribution to the security debate, How to Defend Australia,2 while covering
a wide scope, nonetheless errs on the side of the hardware rather than the more
comprehensive social and economic perspective on security. Its author, Hugh White, a
former Defence Department deputy secretary and now Emeritus Professor of Strategic
Studies at ANU, is an influential voice in Australia’s national security policy community.
He argues that Australia faces a choice: without a very large increase in Defence spending
our future will be less secure. It is a contestable position.
Indeed, given White believes Australia should have more extensive and rigorous debate
on the issues, it is possible some of the argument (including a speculative chapter about
Australia acquiring nuclear weapons) is deliberately provocative precisely for the purpose
of engendering debate.
In that spirit, this article questions the proposals advanced and their underlying
assumptions. Many of the propositions advanced by White are well founded and important.
They include an assessment that the international environment in which Australia is
located poses significant security challenges, and a case following logically from this
proposition that current spending is not consonant with meeting these challenges.
There are suggestions as to how existing Defence spending programs could be cut
back. To this point the propositions are consistent. The weakness is the presumption
that if current spending is not working, additional spending (far more than that which it
replaces) will improve Australia’s national security; and the specific items White proposes
be purchased from the increased spend are themselves highly questionable.

1

Joyobroto Sanyal, ‘Shaping Australian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Thoughts on a Reflective
Framework of Analysis’, Security Challenges, vol. 15, no.1 (2019).
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Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe University Press with Black Inc., 2019).
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If Australia does face a choice about future security, there is a prospect that a more
effective choice would be to cash in the savings proposed by White (primarily, a significant
reduction in the number of surface ships and a different type of army) without substituting
new spending in the form of the expensive alternatives he proposes. These savings
would be available for other more strategic uses. For example, they could potentially
deliver more effective security improvements if applied to initiatives in connectivity,
cyber security, regional linkages and Pacific alliances.
This article takes an economic perspective rather than the Defence or international
relations view. French President Clemenceau is reputed to have said war is too important to
be left to the military. Whether or not apocryphal, the saying continues to have resonance
with democratic governments worldwide. National security requires wider perspectives
than those from Defence. Defence, intelligence and international relations are of course
important, but contributions to the discussion from economic, infrastructure, information
technology and industry policy positions are equally relevant and need to be considered.

Real Options
Economics asks key questions about security: does our national investment represent
value for money, and is it maximising national welfare. In addressing these questions, new
analytical tools have the potential to provide more thorough answers than a simple tabular
approach ranking cost against capacity. Traditional discounted cash flow analysis, or
analysis of a project’s or portfolio of projects’ net present value, are poor aids to decisionmaking under uncertainty.3 Faced with an uncertain future, creation of options—allowing
future investments to be adjusted to meet future needs, which may not be known or even
foreseeable at present—is a better approach. Applying this to Defence, investments in
large and complex platforms (generally, ones that require a long lead-time and heavy upfront commitments) are less preferable to smaller investments or investments staggered
over time and flexible in commitments—these create options, and options have values
that can be measured and analysed.
Real options4 theory has developed over the past two decades in finance and economics.
It has immediate application to the security environment. Real options related to security
could be physical assets such as specific platforms, collections of assets and supporting
infrastructure, or more broadly the capacity to take action in the future. Real options are
particularly applicable to capability. As Kulgat and Kulakilata note, “capabilities, or core
competencies, are strategic options that provide platforms for the exploration of market
opportunities … Investments in these capabilities have an irreversible character because
of the complex interdependencies among organizational and technological elements”.5
Substitute ‘strategic opportunities’ (or ‘strategic challenges’) for “market opportunities”
and the article could as easily have been written about national security.
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An analysis of the proposed White options and alternatives based on real options would
be possible, albeit that such work would require extensive data collection. The advantage
would be a firmer base on which to make an informed choice. What discussion there
has been to date on How to Defend Australia has been in essence about questions of
judgement. For example, a critique from the head of the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute notes the book is “fundamentally wrong on just about every judgement it
contains”—acknowledging that the difference in perspective is one of judgement rather
than data.6 One judgement, White’s eagerness to write off the United States and its
capacity to remain engaged with Asia, seems strikingly at odds with the United States’s
ability, demonstrated repeatedly over history, to rejuvenate and innovate. Jennings
effectively skewers two central planks of the White thesis—arguments for the inevitability
of China’s rise and America’s fall—as lacking evidence; those arguments will therefore
not be canvassed here. Notably though, Jennings’s contribution does highlight that a
prevailing feature of this debate is lack of evidence: suggesting a concerted effort to
build the evidence base would be desirable.
Despite its prima facie applicability to security questions, there are few instances in
the public domain of application of real options theory to Defence questions. This is
possibly because they can be conceptually challenging; it may also be due to lack of
data. In practice, development of real options is a data hungry process, and may require
computational techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation to make sense of the data.
As an article in the Harvard Business Review observes, “many companies hesitate to apply
options theory to initiatives such as R&D and geographic expansion, partly because these
‘real’ options are highly complex”.7 A real options approach is also significantly different
to other forms of analysis, in that it can be used to construct a portfolio of different options
so as to create future value at lower risk—that is, options are considered interactively
rather than in isolation. While a more strategically useful approach, it is again more
difficult, which is perhaps why it has not been widely applied.
There is, however, one notable example of use of real options in the Defence context,
a report prepared for the Australian Industry Group on naval shipbuilding.8 The report
drew on real options theory, amongst other things, to recommend continuous build
and identified the option value in naval patrol boats that could be shared with Pacific
neighbours. It also identified the large option value provided by Australian-based
sustainment of naval capability, noting that the value of options changes according to
circumstances. The report observed that although in most years repairs, maintenance
and refits could be performed more cheaply and quickly overseas, the time when it would
be most needed (wartime) coincides with the circumstances in which access to overseas
ports would most likely be to be compromised.
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How to Defend Australia (or Not)
The options considered in How to Defend Australia are of a different kind. The discussion
is not about creating a portfolio of options values but whether some kinds of expenditure
are better than others: a traditional and not particularly accurate way of determining
future spending, given its reliance on judgement over data.
White observes that current spending on new, large warships is likely a mistake: they
are “very vulnerable and very expensive … we cannot rely on them in a major conflict”.9
His alternative is much greater investment in submarines. Despite their limitations (“slow
… less versatile and flexible than warships … complex to build and very demanding to
operate”)10 their advantage lies in their stealth, which gives them superior capacity to
support “sea denial”—that is, the ability to prevent a possible enemy from landing forces in
Australia. He argues for a fleet of twenty-four or thirty-two,11 based on an updated version
of the design of Australia’s current Collins class submarines, to be built in Australia.
At present the plan for future submarines is for an Australian-built fleet of twelve based on
a French design. A French nuclear design, the Barracuda, is to be modified for conventional
power and known as the Shortfin Barracuda. As White points out, this modification itself
involves considerable technical challenges, creating the largest and most expensive
conventionally powered submarine anywhere in the world. The project is fraught with
risk. The Hugh White alternative does however involve its own project and delivery risks,
given the scale of build he envisages.
It is open for any future Australian government to examine whether an updated Collins
design or the Shortfin Barracuda best meets our needs. At that point, the relevant frame
for analysis is not the investment already made in the French design, but future costs and
benefits. Sunk costs are not relevant to the analysis—that is, no matter how many billions
have at the time of the analysis been spent on the current project, the key question is
future costs (and in consideration of the benefits, as discussed previously, what kinds
of option values an alternative could create). Nevertheless, awareness of the sunk cost
fallacy should not bias analysis in favour of rejecting the current project out of hand. Insofar
as previous spending may make the future acquisition cheaper than any alternative, it
can affect future costs and benefits. That is, analysis should be based not on the total
cost of a project since inception but the future costs, compared to the future alternative:
comparing like with like. The longer it takes analysts to get to asking the question, the
more likely it will be that a current project will have lower future costs (even if much higher
historical costs) than the alternative.
Before we get to the point of such analysis, however, we need to consider whether Australia
needs a very large number of additional submarines, and the very real question of whether
we could find crews for them should we decide on such an investment. Submarines are old
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technology, arguably already less relevant even for the purpose that White envisages, sea
denial, than options such as drones and missiles. As an article in the The Strategist notes,
technology is changing, and manned submarines are no longer as important … small
unmanned surface vessels (USVs) like Boeing’s Liquid Robotics Wave Glider and
Ocius’s Bluebottle are perfectly capable of transiting to, and then keeping watch
for months at a time over, submarine and surface ship routes.12
Cheap and operationally effective unmanned underwater vessels are both feasible and
available. White himself notes (p. 189) missiles and anti-ship mines are a much cheaper
way to achieve sea denial. White estimates “a thirty-two boat fleet would cost a total
of $64 billion to build …[and maintenance] would cost $5.4 billion a year” (p. 188 xx).
A combination of missiles and drones (both air and underwater) would deliver a different
but comparable capability at fraction of that cost.
Just as importantly, if Australia were to invest in a much larger submarine fleet, could it
find the crew? White dismisses this problem without evidence or analysis. He observes
that we have a population larger than the crew required, asserts “it cannot be impossible
to find 480 of them willing to serve in submarines, if the pay and conditions are appealing”
and concludes “if Australia cannot crew the submarines we need, it will simply be a failure
of management” (p. 189). This is a cavalier and mistaken conclusion. Labour markets are
unlike other markets for goods or products. It is sometimes, but by no means always, the
case that labour shortages can be solved simply by better pay and conditions. There are
some jobs to which job seekers are not attracted no matter what the wages. Conceivably
even if submariners were paid more than the Chief of Navy (and the Chief of Navy might
have some objection to this) there could still be a shortfall in crew numbers. If pay and
conditions were the only variables, the current problems with finding submariners would
have been solved long ago.
A useful comparison is Australia’s efforts to find doctors for rural areas. Australia has
experienced labour shortages with rural medical practitioners for many decades—it has
proven extremely difficult for health systems to find doctors prepared to move to small
rural towns (and even more difficult for remote areas). The reasons are highly complex.13
The Australian Government’s Health department has under successive governments of
all persuasions introduced a variety of regulatory and monetary incentive measures14 to
try to address the problem, including special visas for overseas trained doctors prepared
to work in rural Australia, bonds, payments, encouragement of medical graduates from
rural backgrounds, restrictions on licences and many others. There remain problem
areas, and the Health department continues to work on policy to improve the situation.
In some ways the labour market for submariners is similar: requiring highly trained
people with strong technical and personal skills. Such people generally can (like doctors)
find alternative high paid employment elsewhere. Some doctors are not motivated by

12

Geoff Slocombe, ‘Hugh White Needs to Revisit His Submarine Numbers’, The Strategist, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, 2 August 2019, <aspistrategist.org.au> [Accessed 28 August 2019].

13

Hays, RB, Veitch, PC, Cheers, B, Crossland L. Why doctors leave rural practice. Australian Journal of Rural
Health 1997;5:198-203

14

For a recent iteration of policy changes in this area see Department of Health, ‘Stronger Rural Health
Strategy: Overseas Trained Doctors in Areas of Doctor Shortage’, <www.health.gov.au> [Accessed 3
September 2018].

Better ways to defend Australia

51

financial incentives—they prefer a rural to a city practice. Similarly, some people will
have an inherent attraction to becoming a submariner and will undertake the intensive
training required and then serve as a submariner out of their love for the job. These are
people for whom the level of pay (provided it is commensurate with the training and skills
involved) is not the main concern. For others, no level of pay would compensate for the
dangers and difficulty of serving underwater. There are some in between for whom pay
is important but is balanced against other considerations. Finally, a minority, are job
seekers motivated solely by dollars. The labour market issues involved are not as simple
as better pay and conditions.
It is thus by no means clear that the difficulty the Australian Navy has experienced in
finding crews for submarines is simply “a failure of management”. Determining what
would be required to attract more applicants to crewing either the current fleet or a larger
fleet in the future will require better data, to enable analysis of not only on what factors
attracted successful applicants (a cohort to which the Defence department has access
and from which it can obtain data relatively easily) but also on what deters people who
might otherwise be qualified from applying in the first place. Gathering data from that
latter group is more difficult, but not impossible. Until that data has been assembled and
analysed, it would be irresponsible for Australia to commit to a large fleet of submarines
destined to sit idle for want of crews. Moreover, while in port a submarine is particularly
vulnerable, losing all its stealth advantages and making that home port a more attractive
target for a possible adversary—a further reason why it would be foolish to invest in a large
number of additional submarines unless we were certain we had properly researched
the labour market for their crews.
White does not depart as radically from current planning in relation to the army and is
almost status quo in relation to the air force. He (rightly) notes the impossibility of Australia
mounting high-intensity expeditionary operations against major Asian powers (p. 197),
leaving the army today in a difficult position. His alternative is a large light army able to
“undertake peacekeeping and stabilisation in the immediate neighbourhood …[and] fight
invading forces on our own territory” (p. 198). It is not clear what White considers the
neighbourhood. If it is South-East Asia, Australia will not be welcome interventionists
in an emerging future where Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are all larger
and more capable than Australia. This scenario is close. Indonesia already has a larger
economy, measured in terms of purchasing power parity, than Australia, and Vietnam
has a vastly larger army. If the neighbourhood is the Indian Ocean, the obvious country to
undertake stabilisation operations is India. If the neighbourhood is the South Pacific, then
a much smaller and more flexible army is appropriate given the size of other countries in
this neighbourhood (ruling out the extraordinarily remote possibility Australia would seek
to undertake stabilisation in New Zealand). In the event of civil unrest in a Pacific nation
it is far from obvious that Australia would or should intervene; but if it did, stabilisation
operations can be undertaken more effectively by police forces, trained in civilian policing.
It is also worth noting that a force capable of “peacekeeping and stabilisation” is much
more likely to be seen regionally as a force prepared for aggressive war fighting and
territorial encroachment.
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There is a strong argument that prevention is preferable to intervention. A key means of
ensuring that the neighbourhood is peaceful is through integration of military and civilian
capabilities directed to the common good. A current example is how Australian Defence
forces can assist with integration in the neighbourhood by sharing small, light patrol
boats with a shallow draught, used interchangeably with Pacific countries for operations
such as enforcement of fishing rights or prevention of smuggling.
On the second half of the equation, fighting invading forces, White concludes “the best
and perhaps only way to disrupt an adversary’s landing would be air or missile strikes
rather than land operations” (p. 204)—which, peacekeeping aside, suggests we need
a much smaller army than at present.
In relation to the air force, White thinks current capabilities are “not badly matched
to Australia’s operational priorities” (p. 225), although arguing for a large increase in
purchases based on comparisons with the “number of aircraft that a major power like
China could credibly bring to bear against us” (p. 226). It is a stretch: if China were to
launch major hostilities in earnest against Australia, air defence would be the least of
our troubles. More interestingly, White notes all aircraft are vulnerable, and identifies the
possibility that any future investment in aircraft is a poor bet compared with surveillance
and surface to air missiles.
A striking gap in the White analysis is cyber capability. It is considered briefly, then
dismissed. Although White admits that asking whether the new domain of conflict is
cyber is a “reasonable question” (p. 27) he assertively rejects it, arguing that
attack is relatively easy and defence very hard—which seems precisely the reason why
it will become predominant—and a cyber attack would not work strategically because
societies would “keep calm and carry on” (p. 28). This seems implausible: populations
are unlikely to remain calm when deprived of food (contemporary food supply chains are
highly dependent on IT), water and electricity (utilities likewise are vulnerable),
communications, transport, or entertainment. Notably, in the cyber realm the sorts of
capabilities which help preparedness in a military context are equally helpful in dealing
with other day-to-day threats such as hacking or viruses—which gives them a much
better option value than purely military hardware capabilities. Conversely, countries with
a strong coding workforce are extraordinarily well placed to dominate in any cyber conflict.
The millions (literally) of coders employed in the major Chinese internet firms such as
Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba or Xiaomi are a strategic strength. They are subject to Chinese
security laws,15 and in extremis would be able to redirect resources to assisting the state
in a conflict (or, given the Chinese system, could be directed to do so). Australia has
nothing remotely approaching that capability; we could, however, with appropriate
investments, create a capability sufficient to protect against major threats for a long
enough period to retaliate and cause significant damage to any potential cyber adversary:
that is, create a plausible deterrent capability. If we are looking for security investments
to create options at relatively low cost, then cyber capabilities fit the bill precisely.
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The Nuclear Fallacy
The most disappointing aspect of the White thesis is the section on nuclear weapons.
He argues, without evidence and without naming the countries concerned, that there
are likely to be more nuclear powers in Asia in the years ahead. Which are they? China
and India are not going anywhere; North Korea is more likely to be induced to leave the
nuclear club than to expand; Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons only due to its rivalry
with India,16 and could conceivably abandon them in future should India offer concessions
(noting there is an alternative scenario of escalation, a worrying prospect outside the
scope of this article). Among other Asian countries, the ones most likely to seek to acquire
nuclear weapons in future would be those threatened by Australia doing so. Notably,
Indonesia would undoubtedly see development of an Australian nuclear capability as a
direct threat and seek to develop a retaliatory capability; White does acknowledge this as
a likely consequence. In other words, acquisition of nuclear weapons would significantly
reduce Australian security in the region, not enhance it.
Then there is the question of cost. White suggests the cost of Australia acquiring a
nuclear capability “could very easily be $20 billion a year”. That represents the cost of
a stockpile of nuclear weapons and a platform on which to deploy them—that is, direct
costs. The full costs would almost certainly be more than double the direct costs. Nuclear
weapons need to be transported and stored; the costs associated with security measures
around transport and storage would be higher than any other weapons Australia might
acquire by several multiples (how many depends on the location chosen at which to base
the weapons). Once acquired, nuclear weapons need to be managed over the whole of
their life up to and including decommissioning. A Brookings Institution study found the
costs of decommissioning and clean up comes close to equalling the costs of acquiring
the weapons in the first place (with the proviso that secrecy around costs of nuclear
weapons and clean up made this of necessity a rough estimate).17 Add to that figure
further unknowns: possible costs in the event of an accident,18 recovery costs should a
nuclear weapon be stolen or mislaid, loss of opportunities with countries reluctant to
trade with a nuclear power, and the costs of conducting a national debate around such
an unpalatable policy. Relations with Pacific neighbours, not always friendly, would
become much more difficult should Australia acquire nuclear weapons—for historical
reasons, nuclear weapons are highly unpopular among the island nations of the Pacific.
Finally, should Australia acquire nuclear weapons it would also need a platform on which
to deploy such weapons. White argues this would at a minimum require “a fleet of at
least four ballistic missile-firing submarines (which would have to be nuclear-powered to
ensure their survival)” (p. 245). This is in direct contradiction to his section in an earlier
chapter which effectively demolishes the case for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered
submarines: cost, technical difficulty, and the risk that were we to rely on America or
France for support our capability would be hostage to their strategic priorities (p. 186).
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Due to their technical complexity it would be prohibitively expensive to acquire a domestic
capability to undertake major maintenance or rebuilding of nuclear submarines. As can
be deduced from the ACIL Allen study mentioned previously, this would imply a huge
real options cost.19 At the time we most need maintenance—wartime—an overseas
country would have other priorities and our access to ports in distant countries likely
to be barred. Nuclear powered submarines thus make neither strategic nor economic
sense. White recognises this in his chapter on submarines only to forget it when it comes
to the chapter on nuclear weapons.
As with conventional submarines, we would still face the challenge of finding crew for
nuclear submarines. If crewing remained a problem, nuclear submarines would spend
more time docked—making them an obvious target for any future adversary and putting
nearby Australians at risk not only of direct damage from conventional weapons but of
radioactive contamination from nuclear submarine wreckage.

Better Ways to Improve Security
In the modern world economic links are more important guarantors of security than
military hardware. It is no coincidence that the nations of Western Europe experienced
war of some sort, in some location or other, on an almost continuous basis in the period
from the birth of the nation-state up until economic union—and have had none since.
The European Union, with free movement of goods, people, ideas and cultures, and
integration of national economies, has made war in Western Europe inconceivable.
A holistic approach to national security, seeing trade, education and communications
as fundamental components, delivers better results than focusing on Defence alone.
Timing of the next Defence White Paper is not certain. The Defence Department’s
website indicates: “The development of a new Defence White Paper has commenced
and will be finalised by mid 2015.”—obviously not a current notification.20 Whenever
it happens, the next Defence White Paper should include perspectives from outside
Defence—economists, international relations, social policy or trade expertise.
Trade-offs and alternatives outside of traditional Defence spending can then be considered
and analysed properly.
One of the most important issues to be considered in that analysis is the importance of
regional linkages in ensuring security. One of Australia’s closest geographical neighbours
is also one of the world’s largest by population and soon to become one of the largest
economies: namely, Indonesia. It already has an economy twice the size of Australia’s
measured in purchasing power parity terms21 and is in all probability, due to population
and ongoing economic growth, destined to become the world’s fifth largest economy
within the next twenty years. It is a vibrant democracy, conducting fair and free elections
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regularly since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 at both national and provincial
level. Australia should have close ties with Indonesia but inexplicably has kept itself at
a distance. It is one of the most popular tourist destinations for young Australians, but
according to a report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs, a third of Australians
did not know Bali is part of Indonesia22. Teaching of Bahasa Indonesia has been in decline
in Australian schools and universities for many years.23
In strategic terms Indonesia is vital to Australian interests. Hugh White’s essay in
Australian Foreign Affairs makes a solid case for why Indonesia can and should be a
powerful ally: “[Australian] perception of Indonesia as a potential danger has not been
offset by any real sense that it could also be a major strategic asset to Australia, helping
to shield us from more-distant threats”.24 In any future conflict with a larger power like
China or India, unlikely as that is, a combined Australian and Indonesian force would
be likely to prevail against any conceivable military incursion into our region. Alliances
do not flow easily from military cooperation (although that is a helpful adjunct to other
ties, as is the current strategic partnership agreement).25 Past Defence White Paper
assertions that Indonesia is already an important strategic partner do not stack up
against the evidence of low levels of trade and technological cooperation; as an Indonesia
based strategic researcher observes, “these indicators suggest that Australia has more
important security partners than Indonesia”.26
As the European experience shows, enduring cooperation arises through social, cultural
and economic interaction. In the case of Indonesia, this will require a considerable
expansion of people-to-people contacts outside of tourism, greater business ties
including joint ventures and shared Australian/Indonesian ownership of leading
corporations, and cultural understanding. We have not demonstrated to date much
understanding of the potential of Indonesia as an ally. A case in point was a decision to
lease the port of Darwin (one of the closest major ports to Indonesia, and therefore a
logical trading hub) to Chinese interests. White asserts “a well-armed Australia would
be both a more formidable adversary, and more valued ally for Indonesia” (p. 45).
This seems improbable. The kinds of forces White proposes would be highly unlikely
to be seen by Indonesia as anything other than hostile and aggressive.
Similar considerations apply throughout South Asia and the Pacific. Although Australia
has had a tradition of cleaving to a single great power ally, first Britain and then the
United States, multiple relationships will serve us better in the future. The ‘great power’
notion derived from European expansionism in the nineteenth century. It was specifically
enunciated at the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna,27 which set the scene for the next two
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centuries of great power diplomacy. Today, the notion of what constitutes a great or
a small power is rather murkier; and the notion of a ‘middle’ power (something White,
p. 297, argues Australia should endeavour to remain) is not only undefined and
unrecognised internationally, it is arguably irrelevant in a world where some non-state
actors, including large corporations, have as much economic and political power as
countries in the middle. In a multi-polar world, Australia does not need a military capable
of ‘standing up’ to a great power. Our interests would be better served by economic,
social, and cultural integration with neighbouring countries. There is a real trade-off.
Expanding traditional military power will discourage that kind of engagement. From an
economic perspective, the advantages of better social and trading links are self-evident;
but from a strategic perspective they also create better real options, and therefore deliver
greater strategic value.

The author Stephen Bartos is a former Deputy Secretary of the Commonwealth
Finance department.
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Strategy at Sea: A Plan B for
Australian Maritime Security?
Rebecca Strating

In 2004, a Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry report
into Australia’s Maritime Strategy recommended the Australian Defence Force (ADF)
implement a “modern maritime strategy”. Chairman of the Defence sub-committee, Bruce
Scott, wrote that the committee was “convinced that an effective maritime strategy will
be the foundation of Australia’s military strategy, and serve Australia well, into the 21st
century”.1 Written at a time when the focus of the ADF was on the ‘war on terror’ and the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the 151 page report highlighted gaps in
Australia’s maritime strategic thinking. Defining maritime strategy as one that involves
“air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with
traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control”, the report listed
three elements: sea denial, sea control, and power projection.2 Experts argued that
Australia’s existing strategy constituted mere ‘sea denial’—effectively a continentalist
approach with maritime dimensions, designed primarily to prevent adversaries from
attacking territory.3
More than a decade later, little appears to have changed. The 2013 Defence White Paper,
for example, summarised Australia’s maritime strategy in one page.4 It stated that
“Australia’s geography requires a maritime strategy for deterring and defeating attacks
against Australia and contributing to the security of our immediate neighbourhood and
the wider region”.5 Defending Australia required: deterring attacks and coercion against
Australia from adversaries; achieving and maintaining air and sea control; protecting
key sea lines of communication (SLOC); denying access to forward operating bases
by adversaries; and deploying joint task forces in support of the operations of regional
partners and projection objectives. It emphasised the role of conventional land forces
in controlling approaches, protecting bases, defeating incursions and securing offshore
territories and facilities. The summary did not, for example, reveal how sea power would
be mobilised in the defence of Australia’s national interests. Nor did it grapple with the
full suite of interests that may be encompassed by the term ‘maritime security’. More
recently, in the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper the term ‘maritime strategy’ did not
appear despite a strong focus on modernising maritime capabilities, and the procurement
of submarines and other naval surface combatants.6
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The maritime domain is increasingly at the frontline of emerging challenges to Australia’s
national interests, regional stability and the liberal international order that successive
governments have sought to defend. In particular, the oceans have become an important
theatre for emergent great power rivalry between the United States (US) and a rising
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Australia needs to develop, as Dean, Frühling and Taylor
put it, “a new strategic policy for a world in which Britannia and its offspring cease to
rule the waves”.7 As part of a more independent approach to defence and foreign policy,
this paper argues that Australia needs to develop a coherent maritime strategy that can
effectively cope with traditional and emerging maritime security challenges.
Developing a maritime strategy requires a clear-eyed assessment of Australia’s maritime
security interests. As Rothwell and Klein note, ‘maritime security’ in law of the sea has
conventionally been understood through a “national” lens, primarily concentrating
“upon the protection and integrity of the nation state and the repelling of hostile states
such that territorial integrity was maintained and that maritime threats were capable of
being thwarted at sea”.8 However, new threats from non-state actors—such as piracy,
terrorism and illegal fishing—have necessitated the broadening of traditional maritime
security concepts. Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Commander Alistair Cooper usefully
distinguishes between national maritime strategy and military maritime strategy:
National maritime strategy incorporates all arms of government and is usually
focused on marine areas out to the edge of the exclusive economic zone or the seabed
boundary. Military maritime strategy denotes the involvement of all arms—sea, land
and air—which can influence operations or activities in the marine environment.
That strategy is concerned more with the implementation of government policy
wherever it is deemed that Australia’s interests lie: for example, in waters adjacent
to Australia, throughout the region or indeed throughout the world.9
Such an expansive concept of national maritime security incorporates a vast array of
interests and actors from a range of Commonwealth and state departments, including
the Royal Australian Navy, the ADF, Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Force
and customs.
This article focuses on contemporary challenges to maritime order and the implications
for an Australian national maritime security strategy. Maritime re-ordering dynamics cut
across traditional and non-traditional security concerns, involving as they do changing
patterns of power and relative capabilities, shifting alignments among states, and, in
some cases, the use of military and civilian actors in the articulation and defence of
national interests. Australian strategic thinking tends to employ a conventional security
lens, yet non-traditional maritime security threats—particularly to resources such as
fish, and oil and gas—are prominent in current contests over the seas. It first examines
contemporary challenges to the maritime order. It then articulates what is at stake for a
middle-sized power such as Australia that has vast oceanic resource entitlements under
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international law. Finally, it argues that as it is surrounded by three oceans—the Pacific,
Indian and Southern—an Australian maritime strategy needs to more fully account for
the rapid transformations of power in the region, and how power is exerted in traditional
and non-traditional domains.

Challenges to Maritime Order
Australia’s region is increasingly unsettled. A new period of explicit competition between
the United States and China has emerged, necessitating new thinking about Australia’s
efforts to negotiate complex relationships with and between the great powers. Viewing
the PRC as a “revisionist power”, the 2018 US National Defense Strategy argued that
“[w]e are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing
rules-based international order”, with great power competition replacing terrorism as the
preeminent concern for national security.10 The adoption of the maritime ‘Indo-Pacific’
construct by a number of regional states including the so-called ‘Quad’11 states—US,
Australia, Japan and India—is emblematic of the growing significance of the maritime
domain in the changing regional security order. According to the 2019 US Indo-Pacific
strategy report, high profile maritime disputes, for example in the South China Sea,
provide evidence of Beijing’s desire to “reorder the region”.12 These ‘reordering’ dynamics
are evident in the changing naval balance of power, strategic efforts to control sea space
and access denial capabilities, normative contestation and challenges to international
law, and the pursuit of military and economic influence in other regional states through
bilateral and multilateral means, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite a
rapidly changing landscape, Australia’s strategic orientation—including its maritime
thinking—has remained geared towards the US alliance, relying upon a belief that the
US will continue to be present and engaged in the region. While debates exist around
the contours of engagement—such as whether the US should contain China or constrain
its influence—there is little doubt that key actors increasingly view rising powers as
a threat to the post-World War Two liberal international order. At the same time, the
Trump administration has undermined US credibility through a transactional approach
to international affairs that has emphasised the primacy of US sovereignty at the expense
of key international rules and norms.
The maritime domain has become a primary theatre of great power rivalry. Historically,
this is not surprising given that control of the seas—through naval supremacy and capacity
to ensure maritime commerce—is an enduring source of state power. As Bekkevold and
Till argue, the sea has long been viewed by naval strategists thinkers as a “medium
of dominion”: it “is a strategic highroad, a medium by which one group of people can
come to dominate the affairs of another”.13 Control of the seas has been critical for the
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creation of empires, for changing international political orders and enabling the rise of
new powers to supplant the old. It is little wonder, then, that the PRC has engaged an
ambitious strategy to become a naval power. In 2012, President Xi Jinping declared the
PRC’s intentions to become a great maritime power by developing “a large and effective
coast guard; a world-class merchant marine and fishing fleet; a globally recognized
shipbuilding capacity; and an ability to harvest or extract economically important maritime
resources, especially fish”.14 It is not just the PRC that has been embarking on a problem
of naval power enhancement; in the region more generally, naval militarisation projects
have been advancing over the past decade, including in Australia. Naval supremacy and
sea control are hence key sites in the changing balance of power in Asia.
In contemporary maritime disputes in Southeast and Northeast Asia, disputes tend to
revolve around three centres of control: the first pertains to strategic control of sea lanes.
In the South China Sea (SCS), for example, the PRC has rapidly built its naval capability
and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, raising concerns that this crucial strategic
waterway has or will become a ‘Chinese lake’. China’s territorial and maritime claims and
the ‘grey zone’ tactics used to defend them has raised considerable consternation in the
West among strategists and international lawyers alike. China’s strategic primacy in this
domain has been asserted through artificial island building, naval militarisation and the
rapid increase of the number of blue and white hulls (maritime militia and coastguard)
active within the first island chain. While some view China’s strategy as defensive, with
military installations used primarily for surveillance and patrolling purposes, others view
the militarisation efforts as signifying its desire to pursue regional hegemony by pushing
the United States out of maritime Southeast Asia and providing a base for projecting power
elsewhere in the region. The geostrategic value of the SCS lies in its potential to transform
into a deep-sea bastion for basing nuclear-attack submarines capable of launching missiles
with nuclear warheads, and useful for forward deployments into other areas, such as the
Indian Ocean. There are widespread concerns that China’s sea control in the SCS threatens
freedom of navigation (FON) in terms of the transit rights of warships, acceptable military
activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the commercial passage of merchant
ships. In this example, the critical interest of the United States and allies such as Australia
are expressed in ensuring FON because it is vital for open, maritime trading nations.
The second centre of control in contemporary maritime dispute is sovereignty over land
features, particularly in the East and South China Seas. While material factors provide
potential flash points for conflict, sovereignty claims over islands, rocks and low-lying
elevations have become linked to historical grievance and ideational ‘symbolic’ politics
that link national identity, status and prestige to the defence of maritime possessions.15
What these features are and who possesses them matters for determining maritime
jurisdictions over such territorial seas and EEZs, and can have implications for the
capacities of states to exercise their (limited) rights to strategic control in maritime areas.
The third centre of control is of maritime resources, particularly in terms of fish and
oil and gas. Under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the
land determines sea, which means the issue of maritime entitlements can be tied to
recognition of sovereignty of land features. As important is the classification of land
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features: whether they are islands, rocks or low-lying features determines rights to
maritime zones, including whether states receive a 12 nautical mile territorial zone and/
or 200 nautical mile EEZ. Given that maritime boundaries are yet to be determined in
some crucial waterways, contests over maritime resources, and activities such as illegal,
unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU), are straining the capacities of the international
rules to establish maritime order.
In the legal domain, the seas are increasingly subject to ‘norm contestation’, which
refers to struggles between actors to define the rules and norms that govern interactions
and behaviours. Some Chinese policy analysts consider these “sea domains under
Chinese jurisdiction … [as] the overlaying area of China’s national sovereignty”.16 In the
South China Sea, for example, a key puzzle is whether China views its ‘near seas’ as
unique or a testing ground for revisionism on a broader scale. There have been a number
of positive outcomes with respect to the role of UNCLOS in resolving maritime disputes,
including in the Timor Sea dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste, and the India
and Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute in 2014. In both cases, the bigger ‘powers’—
Australia and India—participated in the processes in good faith, with Australia negotiating
an acceptable deal with its smaller neighbour in the world-first United Nations Compulsory
Conciliation processes under annex VII of UNCLOS, and India accepting the decision
of a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that largely favoured Bangladesh.
These examples demonstrate that the UNCLOS-led maritime order is by no means dead.
However, the concern that other disputes raise is how the PRC, as an emergent great
power, has used its growing power to defend its interests and cast aside UNCLOS, what
this might mean for how it will seek to project its rising naval power in other domains,
and consequences for smaller powers in the Indo-Pacific.

What’s at Stake for Australia?
Challenges to international law and maritime order in the Indo-Pacific have potential
security implications for regional states, including Australia. In 2017, former Chief of Navy
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett argued that, owing to “the increasingly aggressive actions
taken by some nations to assert their claims over disputed maritime boundaries, there is
the increased risk of a regional maritime dispute escalating and the potential for armed
confrontations at sea”.17 Historically, Australia’s maritime security interests have been
framed around defence of territory and the security and safety of maritime trading
routes, given its economic reliance on seaborne exports. At the same time, destabilising
conditions in the Asian maritime domain are viewed as inimical to open and secure SLOCs,
which as a trading nation, Australia has vital interests in maintaining. Indeed, successive
defence white papers have identified maritime security and unfettered access to shipping
lanes as integral to Australian security and prosperity.18 SLOCs are vitally important
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for Australian security and prosperity as it relies upon the sea for over 98 per cent of
exports by volume (more than 75 per cent by value) and 95 per cent of data is transmitted
through undersea cables.19 It adopts a similar position to the United States on freedom
of navigation, and global threats to commercial transit, particularly in crucial Southeast
Asian chokepoints connected to Australia’s northern maritime approaches, or legitimate
navigation of warships are also viewed as antithetical to Australia’s security interests.
Australia’s geography renders maritime security a crucial interest. Surrounded by
three oceans, it has one of the largest coastlines in the world with more coast per capita
than any other continent.20 Australia is a largely coastal society: over 85 per cent of the
population live within 50 kilometres of the coastline.21 With vast entitlements generated
under international law, Australia has one of the largest maritime jurisdictions in the
world. In accordance with UNCLOS, Australia claims an EEZ of over 10 million square
kilometres, the world’s third largest. Offshore territories—Heard and McDonald Islands,
Macquarie Island, Christmas Island and Norfolk Island—generate maritime jurisdictional
entitlements of more than 400,000 square km, and the contentious EEZ claimed off
Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) adds over 2 million square kilometres to the 8 million
square kilometres generated by the mainland. In 2008, the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf confirmed its rights to an extended continental shelf (beyond
200 nauticla miles) of 2.56 million square kilometres—larger than the size of Western
Australia—taking its continental shelf to over 12 million square kilometres.22 Australia’s
maritime search and rescue area under the SOLAS convention23 stretches out across
continental Australia, the Indian, Pacific and Southern oceans and Australian Antarctic
territories, constituting around 53 million square kilometres or around one-tenth of the
Earth’s surface.24 As Rothwell and Moore argue, these new maritime zones established
“new resource rights for Australia but also carried with it new responsibilities such as
environmental management”.25 The legitimacy of international law—primarily UNCLOS—is
important for the preservation of the regime of maritime jurisdictions and the sovereign
rights that flow from it, particularly for middle- and smaller-sized states.
Despite these sea-bound geographical realities, culturally, land forces have tended to
feature more prominently in Australia’s national war psyche than the Royal Australian
Navy. For example, while Gallipoli and Kokoda are central to Australian national mythology,
the battle of Coral Sea—fought off the north-east coast near Papua New Guinea during
World War Two—receives less recognition. It is often observed that land forces have
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tended to capture the national imagination more than the navy. Australia’s forward
operations since Federation have largely been land-based, deployed to support a
favourable international order. This has led some to remark that Australia is “not culturally
a maritime nation”.26 While attack and invasion are embedded in Australia’s strategic
culture, contemporary maritime disputes highlight emerging trends in non-conventional
threats and challenges to international law that run contrary to Australia’s material and
legal sea-based interests and its vision of a favourable international order.

What’s Plan A?
Unlike other regional states, Australia does not produce a standalone maritime strategy
document.27 While specific issues, such as the purchase of submarines or the political role
of shipbuilding, receive attention in public and policy discussions and federal parliament,
these rarely provide a broader concept of maritime strategy. As Andrew Carr points out,
while the 2016 Defence White Paper articulated Australia’s future submarine project and
the costs of these acquisitions,
little public strategic justification has been provided for this decision since it was
first announced in 2009. Submarines are of course very important for an island
nation. But why 12? Why diesel? Where does Australia want them to go? And most
importantly, what does Australia actually want them to do?28
In the scholarly and policy literature, various models of maritime strategy are offered,
including sea denial and those driven by technological capabilities. As Peter Layton
argues, there are “several alternative maritime strategies in play”, but more thinking is
required to link a coherent maritime strategy to an overarching grand strategy.29
Despite rapid transformations of the regional security environment, the alliance with the
United States remains central to Australia’s approach to maritime security. Rod Lyon
observes that Australia is more a “strategy-taker than a strategy-maker”.30 Historically,
it has been the case that Australia has come to depend upon US naval might for its own
security. Rothwell and Moore suggest that World War Two and the fall of Singapore had a
significant impact on Australia’s strategic outlook when it came to maritime vulnerabilities,
encouraging it to adopt an alliance with a great naval power, an arrangement “which has
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remained steadfast ever since”.31 Australia’s commitment to the US alliance is reinforced
in the political rhetoric around the continuing importance of ANZUS as the ‘cornerstone’
of Australian foreign policy. This reliance is also observable in spending and policy
initiatives. Recent policy initiatives, such as the Pacific ‘step-up’, have seen Australia
undertake a number of specific actions in conjunction with the US, including plans to
reopen the Lombrum naval base in Papua New Guinea. The US is critical to Australia’s
defence capabilities in the maritime domain, even when RAN vessels are not sourced
from the US. For instance, Brabin-Smith argues that “Australia relies very heavily on
the United States to maintain its capability edge, with the overwhelming majority of
Australia’s high-end maritime equipment being American in origin” including AP-3C
Orion and AP-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.32
Conventional debates in Australian defence policy have centred around the balance
between two paradigmatic positions: the ‘Defence of Australia’ policy that focused on
defending continental Australia—including protecting Australia’s northern maritime
approaches (the ‘sea-air gap’) from external attack—and the policy of forward defence
requiring a force capable of deploying overseas that defined Australia’s defence
engagements in the 1950s and 1960s. Such decisions have consequences for maritime
strategy, including the ‘ways and means’ required for achieving objectives. This is evident
in debates about naval procurements. Australia’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept
signifies that policymakers conceive of Australia’s primary strategic domain as maritime,
and Canberra has invested significantly in the high-profile procurement of naval assets.
The 2016 Defence White Paper outlines Australia’s biggest asset regeneration plan
since World War Two, providing for twelve new submarines, and nine frigates and patrol
vessels. The purchase of two Landing Helicopter Docks and the Australian Army’s 2011
restructure—Plan Bersheeba—further developing amphibious capability; for example,
by the establishment of specialist amphibious infantry battalion.33 Yet there is still an
awareness among strategic experts that Australia’s air and naval forces remain too
small, particularly given technological developments in land-attack cruise missiles
and the potential need to respond to nuclear submarines in its maritime approaches.34
There are concerns that Australia remains ‘undergunned’ in surface warfare capabilities
as the technological capabilities of the rising powers grows in areas such as supersonic
and hypersonic speed and greater range.35 The time is ripe for developing a coherent and
long-term maritime strategy that addresses contemporary sea-based challenges and
those that are likely to become more prominent in an increasingly contested security
order that can no longer rely upon American primacy.
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Maritime Strategy and Contemporary Security Challenges
Much of conventional strategic thinking positions China as a threat to the defence of
Australia. Hugh White’s recent contribution, How to Defend Australia, is critical of
Australia’s reliance on the United States in the context of a changing order:
our political leaders and policymakers have more frankly acknowledged both
China’s ambitions and America’s uncertain response, and the need for Australia
to do something about it. But the consensus response has been to double down
on our support for, and dependence on, America.36
Essentially employing an updated Defence of Australia (DoA) policy, White suggests that
Australia needs to invest much more in defence—including significant spends on naval
procurements such as submarines—in order to become self-reliant. This ‘plan B’ remains
tied to a sea denial approach to maritime strategy, however there are other challenges
that threaten Australian maritime security as it is broadly conceived.
Conventional thinking of maritime security account less for new non-conventional
security challenges. Much of the contemporary concern with the PRC’s actions in the
South China Sea, for example, is over the use of ‘grey zone’ tactics: operations short
of war that employ non-naval vessels to intimidate and harass other maritime actors.
These tactics are aimed at preventing smaller Southeast Asian states accessing and
exploiting maritime resources, such as fish, oil and gas, that they are entitled to under
international law. These are not abstract concerns for Australia. Joanna Vince, for
example, has written about IUU fishing activities in the region, stating that in 2005
alone, 13,018 illegal fishing vessels were sighted in the northern part of Australia’s Fishing
Zone (AFZ), with only 600 apprehended.37 Jade Lindley, Sarah Percy and Erika Techera
demonstrate in the Australian context how illegal fishing activities overlaps with other
non-conventional security threats, including drug and human trafficking, piracy and
irregular maritime arrivals.38 These issues should be integral to an Australian maritime
security strategy, particularly as UNCLOS—which provides these entitlements—is coming
under challenge in other areas.
As Sarah Percy convincingly argues, the deep focus of defence thinkers on conventional
war in Asia “assumes that the threats Australia faces are primarily conventional in nature
… [yet] the vast majority of day-to-day activity by Australia’s military, particularly the
navy, focuses on unconventional threats”.39 This is a key problem with a maritime strategy
that is primarily engaged with sea denial. Non-traditional maritime security threats
encompass a range of different areas: transitional crime, such as the importation of
illegal substances via seaborne vessels; environmental and climate change dilemmas,
including effects of rising sea levels on international legal entitlements; maritime piracy;

36 Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2019).
37 Joanna Vince, ‘Policy Responses to IUU Fishing in Northern Australian Waters’, Ocean and Coastal
Management, vol. 50 (2007), p. 685.
38 Jade Lindley, Sarah Percy and Erika Techera, ‘Illegal Fishing and Australian Security’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 73, issue 1 (2019), pp. 82-99.
39 Sarah Percy, ‘A World Transformed: A Need for New Defence Approaches?’, in P. J. Dean, S. Frühling and
B Taylor (eds), After American Primacy: Imagining the Future of Australia’s Defence (Carlton, Vic.:
Melbourne University Press, 2019), p. 213.
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IUU fishing; emergent, technological developments; and the growing importance of deep
seabed mining. The challenges to UNCLOS in the South China Sea, for example, have
potential implications for the application of international law in other domains, such as
the Indian and Southern Oceans. Domestically, the 2019-2020 bushfire season raised
new questions about the contemporary nature of ‘threats’ and whether climate change
should be considered a security issue. If so, to what extent does or should the military –
including the navy - have responsibilities to protect communities and how should scarce
resources be allocated and deployed? Several naval vessels – including HMAS Choules
and MV Sycamore – as well as RAN helicopters, were used to rescue people stranded
on the beaches of Australia’s southeast coast and to support firefighting crews on the
ground. This highlights the challenges in developing a twenty-first-century maritime
strategy fit for a middle-sized power that can address the full complement of traditional
and non-traditional security threats.
Contemporary maritime challenges also provide opportunities for cooperation with
regional states.52 Australia could take the lead on coordinating instruments that could
work on developing collective interpretation of specific laws among ‘like-minded’ regional
states, conducting joint patrols in contested areas, and concentrating on capacity building
and partnerships, particularly in areas like fishing and maritime domain awareness.
Indeed, over recent years, foreign and defence policy initiatives have emerged to address
regional maritime security issues. These speak to the importance of the maritime domain
in Australia’s international affairs, but they also reflect the ongoing significance of subregions within the overarching Indo-Pacific construct. These include Australia’s Pacific
Maritime Security Program (PMSP), which emphasises regional cooperation to support
the stability and security of the South West Pacific. In 2017, the Australian Government
initiated the PMSP, a $2 billion commitment over 30 years to provide twenty-one Guardian
class patrol vessels to assist Pacific Island states to protect their sovereign rights and
maritime security. The program also includes Integrated Aerial Surveillance, training
and advisory support, and regional coordination efforts.41 It succeeded the Pacific Patrol
Boats Program that was implemented in the 1980s following the establishment of EEZs
of Pacific Island states, which presented new maritime security requirements for the
region. The focus of the new program is largely on non-traditional threats, particularly
IUU fishing, but it also accords with Australia’s Pacific step-up program which has been
implemented in response to China’s growing influence in the region. In 2010, for example,
it was reported that the Pacific loses around A$1.7 billion a year worth of fish due to IUU
fishing.42 Fishing is a significant industry and source of food security for Pacific Island
societies, which also renders it an area of vulnerability.
Arguably the most significant undertaking as part of Australia Indo-Pacific concept
has been the Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE), a defence diplomacy initiative. Beginning in
2017, the defence activity has seen a joint task force command a naval flotilla that has
travelled each year to selected partner states in the Indo-Pacific for several months to
conduct security cooperation activities. The first (2017) and third (2019) centred largely
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upon Southeast Asia, including transit through the South China Sea, while the second
(2018) travelled to the South Pacific. In 2019, US Marine Rotational Forces stationed
at the Darwin base joined HMAS Canberra for part of the transit. Australian Defence
Personnel worked alongside “partner security forces to support the development of
regional maritime security capacity” and “rules-based global security”.43 The IPE has
focused on military-to-military and governmental relations, grassroots engagement and
public diplomacy, presenting Australia as a ‘partner of choice’ in the region. It is concerned
with upholding maritime rules, including the ‘rules of the road’, more formally known as
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). As the heart
of Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it highlights the importance of the maritime domain
for Australia’s sense of regional order, and Australia’s efforts to defend the rules-based
status quo.
While the Indo-Pacific is a maritime concept, it is not a maritime strategy. It does not
reveal much about which maritime theatres Australia is likely to prioritise, how this feeds
into the balance between DoA and forward defence objectives (including defending a
favourable international order), or the specific choices that Australia must make about
how to deploy its naval assets. Australia’s announcement of its limited contribution
(one frigate and a P-8A Poseidon) to the US-led ‘International Maritime Security
Construct’ operating in the Strait of Hormuz is a pertinent example. This mission
purports to defend freedom of navigation in the Gulf region. According to Australia’s
Prime Minister, 15 per cent of crude oil and 30 per cent of refined oil destined for Australia
transits the Strait, which means “destabilising behaviour is a threat” to Australian
interests.44 This issue is reflective of Australia’s broader issues with fuel supplies. A
Department of Environment and Energy report recently revealed that Australia had
net fuel imports in reserve of fifty-three days, far less than the International Energy
Agency (IEA) obligations of ninety days.45 It also demonstrated that while Australia’s
biggest sources of refined products are Korea, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia and China,
these states rely heavily on oil from the Middle East. Yet, the only other states to join
the United States is the United Kingdom (who originally supported Gibraltar in the
seizure of an Iranian tanker believed to be headed towards Syria) and Bahrain. How
does this fit operations with Australia’s Indo-Pacific emphasis? The Strait of Hormuz
does not fall within Australian and US conceptions of the boundaries of the IndoPacific, essentially framed as ‘Hollywood to Bollywood’, or ‘Asia-Pacific plus India’.
Some strategists have criticised the operation as being beyond Australia’s Indo-Pacific
strategic purview. It should instead be scaling back its commitments in the Middle
East and focusing on the Indo-Pacific as America’s regional edge is in decline and has
it “ill-prepared for a confrontation with China”.46 What it does highlight is Australia’s
preparedness to conduct operations in support of alliance burden sharing outside the

43 Australian Department of Defence, Annual Report 2017-2018, p. 20.
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Indo-Pacific, but not always within it. Compare this example with Australia’s reluctance
to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) within 12 nautical miles of
Chinese claimed features in the South China Sea. This reticence is at least partly driven
by an unwillingness to risk Beijing’s disapprobation. Yet, these challenges to freedom
of navigation, and to the rules protecting and the rights of smaller states, are critical
drivers of the increasingly contested character of the Indo-Pacific.
Evans and Bibbington emphasise the need for a maritime strategy narrative.47 Indeed,
central to Australian defence and foreign policy discourse over recent years has been the
‘rules-based order’, a term employed fifty-six times in the 2016 Defence White Paper.
This rhetorical commitment to the ‘rules-based order’ serves as a proxy for a US-led
order.48 Yet, even if the meaning of the phrase is accepted on face value, Australia’s own
compliance with maritime law has been questioned in a number of settings, undermining
its legitimacy as a defender of the UNCLOS-led maritime rules-based order. One of the
most visible examples of Australia’s realpolitik approach to international law of the sea
was its maritime boundary with Timor-Leste in the Timor Sea. Ultimately, public pressure
coupled with Canberra’s own rules-based rhetoric—specifically its criticisms of the
PRC’s rejection of the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in the case against the Philippines—
led Australia to alter nearly five decades of foreign policy on the Timor Sea. There are
other examples: following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Howard government
announced a controversial ‘Maritime Identification Zone’ extending up to 1,000 nautical
miles from Australia’s coastline, in which the government would institute a ‘surveillance
or interception zone’ that would run into the maritime zones of its neighbours.49 The
proposal raised compliance issues with law of the sea, and despite adjusting the policy
after complaints, the replacement ‘Australian Maritime Identification System’ (AMIS) was
also problematic in terms of legal consistency and its own attempts to limit the freedom
of navigation of other states.50 Australia’s compulsory pilotage system over the Torres
Strait in 2005 also raised questions about Australia’s compliance with international
law.51 Given these issues with interpretation of law and potentially excessive maritime
claims across a number of fronts, developing an Australian maritime strategy narrative
requires more than a rhetorical appeal to the rules; it requires a deeper commitment to
the international laws and conventions that underpin maritime order. A coherent, whole
of government maritime strategy must connect the rhetoric with operations, policies,
behaviours and relations.
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Conclusion
In Australia, maritime security is typically enmeshed within broader conversations about
defence and security interests. It is suggestive of the physical and geographical realities
that as an island continent ‘girt by sea’, reliant on sea-borne trade and faraway great
and powerful friends, the maritime cannot easily be bracketed out from broader defence
interests and objectives. One interpretation for Australia’s approach to maritime strategic
thinking is that the naval dominance of Britain and the United States in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries led to a “two century long adolescence in appreciating the
significance of the ocean in strategy”.52 Yet, an approach that privileges the continental
over maritime defence diminishes the importance of developing a coherent strategy to
protect against the broad range of maritime security challenges Australia, as a middlesized Indo-Pacific country, faces.
Australia has a military strategy with maritime dimensions. In an age where great
power rivalry, and challenges to regional stability and rules in the maritime domain are
contributing to a rapidly transforming regional security order, it is time for Australia
develop a standalone maritime strategy. A national maritime strategy requires not just
defending territory, but recognising the broad sweep of Australia’s maritime security
interests, and building on opportunities for regional partnerships and cooperation in the
maritime domain. Further, it requires adopting a more flexible and independent stance
that befits its status as a ‘regional power’. Currently, Australia’s ‘rules-based order’
rhetoric is more about power than rules, as it serves as a proxy for its desire to uphold the
US-led ‘status quo’. However, there already is a new status quo in Asia, and it is defined
by dynamism, uncertainty and revisionism, particularly in the maritime domain, and the
decline of US power. This is not a security environment that is viewed as amenable to
Australian interests, so it is understandable that policymakers remain bent on defending
the dying vestiges of an outmoded order. Nevertheless, that the maritime domain is
frontline of the revision of rules raises new dilemmas for regional states and presents new
challenges for foreign and defence policy. How should Australia apply bigger questions
about Asia’s power shift to the maritime domain? Should it, for example, double-down on
the existing maritime ‘rules-based order’, or accommodate the great power prerogatives
of rising powers in developing new norms, rules and patterns of behaviour? Given UNCLOS
provides Australia such vast marine entitlements, maritime strategic thinking requires
grappling with how regional, middle-sized states can employ all elements of statecraft
to defend maritime order and the international law that supports it. Further, maritime
strategy encompasses more than sea denial and continentalist thinking: it requires a
systemic, whole of government approach to the full range of traditional and non-traditional
security threats that emanate in and from the seas.
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Pursuing the Total Force: Strategic
Guidance for the Australian Defence
Force Reserves in Defence
White Papers since 1976
Mark Armstrong

Recent events including the re-election of the Morrison government in July 2019 and
speeches from the new Minister of Defence, Senator Linda Reynolds, and the Chief of
the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, have added to the discussion on a new
Australian Defence White Paper (DWP)1. Proponents argue that a new DWP is required
for reasons including a changing strategic situation, emerging interstate conflict short of
war (called grey zone operations), great power tensions and the diminishing power of the
United States. Furthermore, new technology including Artificial Intelligence, autonomous
systems, hypersonic missiles and cyber weapons may change the character of the next
war from those fought in the past. These factors support a rethink on Defence policy and
the force structure and capability development priorities that flow from it.
A significant portion of the uniformed personnel serving in the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) are part-time, traditionally referred to as ‘Reserves’. These personnel serve the
three Services—the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Army and Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF)—in several different or ‘less than full-time’ arrangements, now known as Service
Categories. Australia has a rich history of citizens participating in part-time military service,
particularly the Army which was, prior to 1948, predominantly part-time, apart from the
World War periods when large volunteer expeditionary forces were raised separately and
served overseas. Part-time force elements remain in most Western defence forces due
to cost effectiveness and the strategic flexibility they can provide. Since 1999 Australian
Reserves have been utilised at an unprecedented level to support the ADF’s operational
deployments; about 18 per cent of ADF forces on operations have been Reservists.
Despite the recent prominent employment of Reservists at home and overseas, and
their excellent performance, the number of Reservists declined to an all-time low in 2016
due to slackening recruitment and high turnover. These trends suggest that Defence is
not according sufficient priority to the Reserves. There is also evidence that Defence is
uncertain about the utility of the Reserves. For example, the most recent Army Research
Development Plan poses the question: “Are the Reserves being used efficiently? Is the
existence of Reserves contrary to the notion of military professionalism?”2 Implicit in this
two-part research question is a condescending attitude to the Reserves.
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Strategic guidance should specify employment and set priorities for generic force
preparation of the Reserves. This paper examines contemporary strategic guidance
in DWP 2016 and analyses earlier DWPs to discern the nature and character of present
and past guidance. The purpose is to discover if there are legacies and lessons from
past and contemporary strategic guidance that impact on Australia getting the best
from its Reserves.
The paper makes a number of telling observations. These include: strategic guidance
related to the Reserves has shifted over time; paradoxically more has been demanded from
the Reserves in every DWP as resources for the Reserves have dwindled; the Reserves
content in DWPs peaked in DWP 1994 and has steadily diminished to its lowest level in
the most recent DWP in 2016. What are the implications of shifting guidance? Is there
an explanation for the peak of Reserves content in DWP 1994 and then a steady decline
in guidance for the Reserves over the next twenty years? How might future strategic
guidance for Reserves be recast to optimise the contribution Reserves can make to the
defence of Australia and its national interests?
The paper will discuss strategic guidance provided for the ADF Reserves in the seven
DWPs since 1976, with emphasis on the most recent, DWP 2016. It will conclude by making
some observations about how the Reserves might be better represented in the next DWP.

Intentions of DWPs
Since 1976, Australian governments have developed and published seven DWPs to
explain Australia’s rationale and priorities for the defence of Australian sovereignty and
national interests.3 Typically, DWPs articulate each government’s strategic assessments
based on an analysis of international relations, and derive three priorities for Defence,
namely, national sovereignty, regional security and supporting a rules-based global
order. Prominence is given to the US-Australian alliance as well as aspirations for
self-reliance. Each DWP is used to justify capability development and major military
equipment acquisitions; usually acquisitions focus on principal weapons platforms such
as naval vessels for RAN, armoured vehicles and artillery for Army and aircraft for RAAF.
These platforms are a major determinant of the composition of Australia’s military forces.4
DWPs are not the definitive source or basis of all military force structure decisions. As
Defence Minister Linda Reynolds noted in 2015, Defence and the ADF conduct frequent
institutional reviews that drive changes to force structures, resource allocation and
priorities.5 History also reveals that federal, state and territory politics play significant
roles in the location of military bases, Army Reserve depots, shipbuilding, small arms
and spare parts manufacture and other capability development projects.
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Frequency
DWPs are intended to be timely and responsive. Accordingly, there is no set cycle for
developing and publishing them. In 2009 the Rudd government did propose a five-year
cycle, but this did not last beyond the following DWP.6 One or more factors have triggered
the timings of their development: a change of government, a significant change in the
economic outlook, a significant shift in strategic circumstances and/or the need for a
large-scale capability investment (such as a new submarine fleet or aircraft type). In the
forty years between DWP 1976 and DWP 2016 the average time was 5.7 years but was
greater in the earlier years and more frequent since 2009.

Content
In simple terms, the better the strategic guidance from government the better Defence
understands what it is expected to be ready to do. Taken together, DWPs should show how
capability development and force structure decisions, as well as expenditure estimates,
connect to strategic objectives.7 DWPs should also guide levels of force preparedness,
training regimes and force generation cycles.8
In order to achieve their objectives, each DWP generally consists of four core sections,
although these may consist of multiple chapters. The first is an assessment of the national
strategic context with a focus on international relations; the second is an overview of
Australian military strategy; the third section provides a framework of a future force
structure; while the final section relates to funding.9

The Place of Reserves in DWPs
This paper will focus on the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve make up the largest
proportion of ADF Reserves. RAN and RAAF Reserves have a different model of service
compared to the Army Reserve. Both are small and are less likely to be a significant
expansion base for either Service. They consist predominately of ex-regular personal
and specialists, as opposed to the Army Reserve for which the majority are career parttime members.
For several reasons, the Army Reserve features independently in every DWP. The first
reason is cultural. There is a deep culture of part-time military service in Australia dating
back to Federation as well as to earlier colonial times. Contemporary land force reserve
units maintain traditional historical and close ties with urban and rural communities
and can be conduits for recruitment to regular forces. The second reason is that the
Reserves are a core mobilisation force for national defence. They are comprised of
uniformed, trained military personnel available for call up for full-time military service.
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They also contain pools of specialists, such as engineers, logisticians, surgeons, doctors
and anaesthetists. Though there is an ongoing debate, Reserves are a cost-effective
supplement and expansion base for Australia’s military capabilities and capacities.10
Typically, DWPs highlight territorial and infrastructure defence including home guard
and disaster relief roles and mobilisation that includes supplementation of regular units
and augmentation through provision of specialists.
In anticipation of a strategic or operational emergency or at the onset of a strategic
surprise or disaster, the Reserves can accelerate the specific force preparation of existing
and newly formed units, mainly land forces, and release regular land force elements for
immediate employment while raising and mobilising follow-on forces for rotation to and
from theatres of operation. Reserves can be deployed immediately to defend important
infrastructure and/or population centres with well-led personnel trained in the disciplined
use of weapons. For partial mobilisation to meet specific threats, Reserves can supplement
regular forces to bring them up to strength and form a reinforcement echelon for replacing
casualties in regular forces. In practice these contributions to Australia’s military
capabilities and capacity can overlap and are often made simultaneously, interchangeably
or are implied. No DWP has ruled out the traditional immediate supplementation or
anticipatory mobilisation roles for the Reserves.

The Strategic Guidance for the Army Reserve Over Time
Overview
The table in Figure 1 summarises the number of references to Reserves in each DWP,11 the
number of paragraphs dedicated to Reserves,12 percentage change since the last DWP,13
number of references to RAN/RAAF Reserves and key strategic guidance for Reserves.14
This table reveals a number of trends. The first is that while the length of DWPs have
increased over time, the number of references to the Reserves peaked in 1994 and has
decreased for every subsequent DWP. Specific mention of RAN and RAAF Reserves
disappeared in 2013. The number of paragraphs focused on the Reserves has followed
the same trends as single references to the Reserves.
Figure 2 summarises the elements of strategic guidance contained in DWPs categorised
according the traditional roles outlined above.

10 M. Smith, ‘Focusing the Army Reserve: Force Structuring as an Operational rather than Strategic Reserve’,
Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 193 (2014), p. 44.
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Figure 1: Textual Analysis of DWPs 1976-2016
%
Changes
Reserve Part time
% Changes
in
Total mentions mentions Paragraphs in mention dedicated
number (military (military dedicated since last para since
of pages staff)
staff)
to Reserves
DWP
last DWP

Mentions
specific
to Navy/
Air Force
Reserves

Primary Reserve Strategic Role
Statement

DWP 1976

38

25

0

4

NA

NA

3

No discernible specific statement

DWP 1987

65

51

0

8

104%

100%

9

...major roles in northern defence,
logistic support, surveillance,
protection of key installations, and
maintenance of expansion base skills
in armour, artillery, air transport, and
mine countermeasures. ..... Reserves
to play the fullest possible role in the
defence of Australia by enabling them
to be used in the sort of low level threat
which could emerge with relatively little
warning. pp. 92-93)

DWP 1994

93

229

13

47

375%

488%

39 (2 x
para for
Navy 5 x
para for
Air Force)

Reserves now have specific roles in
defending Australia in short-warning
conflict, both as individuals and as
formed units. In peace, they perform
a number of essential tasks on a
permanent part-time basis. (p. 73)

DWP 2000

142

58

3

20

-75%

-57%

0

Henceforth their (Reserves) clear
priority will be to provide fully-trained
personnel to our ready frontline forces
deployed on operations (p. 84)

DWP 2009

144

21

33

11

-11%

-45%

DWP 2013

148

30

2

8

-41%

-27%

0

Operational reserve (p. 40) Typically,
Reserves provide lower-end and longer
lead-time capabilities, and those
that are related to the civilian skills of
reservists. (p. 45)

DWP 2016

191

12

0

4

-63%

-50%

0

…deliver defence capability (p. 148)

7 (1 x full (main aim) improve the Army’s overall
para each) ability to sustain prolonged operational
deployments and to provide additional
capability when the regular Army is
facing concurrency challenges. (p.75)

Figure 2: Summary analysis of strategic guidance for DWP 1976-2016
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ME (p. 84)

SE (P. 65)
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X
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DWP 2013

SE (p.46)

X

ME (p. 40)

SE (p. 45)

X

SE (p. 46)

X

DWP 2016

X

X

ME (p. 148)

SE (p. 148)

X

X

X

Legend

ME- Main
Effort

SE - Supporting
Effort

P - Potential

R - Ruled out

X - No specific
mention

Strategic guidance in DWPs for the traditional roles for the Reserves is fragmented and
imprecise. There is no primary or consistent guidance except for highlighting supporting
efforts for the Reserves in mobilisation. This guidance disappeared in DWP 2016.
The subordination of the Reserves as an immediate supplement to top up regular units
is a strong trend after the turn of the century. However, DWP 2016 mentions this role as
an afterthought late in the text.
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More specifically, guidance changes over time. The Reserves were mentioned explicitly
and primarily in DWP 1976 as an expansion base for mobilisation with potential for
supplementation. From DWP 2000 until DWP 2016 supplementation of Regular forces
becomes the main effort for the Reserves. A couple of categories for employment
disappeared after DWP 2009, namely domestic support operations and maintaining
traditional military-community links. More broadly, the Reserves appear to have been
dismissed as a unique contributor to Australia’s military capabilities and capacities and
demoted to be a source of supplementation for Regular forces.
Alan Dupont, an expert in the analysis of DWPs, points out that they have failed to
articulate strategic guidance more generally and that the Reserves should not assess that
they are the only component of Australia’s defence structure that receives fragmentary
and imprecise guidance:
Given the number of defence white papers that have been published since the first
appeared in 1976, finding a clear statement of Australia’s defence strategy would
seem a straightforward task … Even the most determined and forensically inclined
reader will struggle to find a simple, clear statement of Australia’s defence strategy
and objectives. They frequently must be inferred, or extracted piecemeal, from the
voluminous pages of recent white papers.15
Mindful of Dupont’s dismal assessment, discussion will now turn to discussing each
DWP individually in order to identify trends in guidance for the Reserves in more detail.

DWP 1976—Australian Defence
The Fraser government tabled the first DWP in 1976. Previously, Defence had issued a
document entitled, ‘Australian Defence Review’ in 1972 as a way of articulating strategic
guidance. DWP 1976 came in the aftermath of the end of the Second Indochina War,
a strategic humiliation for Australia’s major ally, the United States, and the recognition
of China in 1972. The Whitlam government had ended national service for Australia’s
participation in operations in Vietnam in 1972. Since taking office in controversial
circumstances in 1975, the Fraser government had conducted a number of Defence
reviews that informed DWP 1976. By this time controversial former diplomat and Defence
bureaucrat Arthur Tange had spearheaded a restructure of the higher management of
Defence that disempowered the Services in order to facilitate civilian control of capability
development.16
For the Army Reserve the key review before DWP 1976 was the ‘Committee of Inquiry
into the Citizen Military Forces’. This report, known as the ‘Millar Report’, made
a series of recommendations designed to be implemented over the following ten
years.17 Essentially, the strategic rationale proposed was one of a ‘Total Force’ with the
renamed Army Reserve (ARES) performing the role of an expansion base that would
be structured and employed in the same way as the Regular Army (ARA) but on longer
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Alan Dupont, Full Spectrum Defence: Re-thinking the Fundamentals of Australian Defence Strategy,
Analysis (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2015), p. 2.
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Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army: A History (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 248-50.
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T. B. Millar, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Services, 1974), p. 2.
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lead times for specific force preparation for operational employment. The Millar Report
recommended the disestablishment of traditional but now obsolete complementary
capabilities such as Forestry, Water Resource and Railway operations. Other significant
recommendations included the amalgamation of some ARES units and amendment of
the Call Out legislation to allow call out of Reserves without a new Act of parliament.18
Amalgamations, more streamlined call-out arrangements and an emphasis on selfreliance did not prompt specific guidance for the Reserves. The strategic threat concerns
were the reduction of US and British forces in Australia’s near region, an increase in
Russian military activity and potential instability in the Pacific Islands. There was a focus
on $12 billion for major acquisitions for the three Services, theoretically in response to
these strategic trends, namely, new RAN frigates, new Army battle tanks and new RAAF
PC3 long range surveillance aircraft.
DWP 1976 mentioned Reserves twenty-four times and devoted four paragraphs to
discussion of roles for Reserves. The Millar Review in 1974 gave the ARES context for
DWP 1976. However, it contained little specific strategic guidance. One theme was the
desirability of a greater peacetime role for Reserves in the context of one Total Force.
The emphasis moved from employment of Reserves for war or in a defence emergency,
to employment during “international situations” or for “short-term assistance to the civil
authorities during a natural disaster”.19
Without a connection to strategic guidance, DWP 1976 forecast an increase of 5,000
ARES personnel from a current strength of about 20,500 over the next five years
and longer-term relocations and rebuilds of ARES depots after wide consultations.20
Within one year the disconnect between promised DWP 1976 funding and acquisition
targets was apparent.21

DWP 1987—The Defence of Australia
The Dibb Review released in 1986 strongly influenced DWP 1987.22 Paul Dibb, a senior
Defence official, was critical of many parts of the ADF’s force structure, including the
Reserves for which he could not identify the official strategic rationale for a 30,000-strong
Army Reserve. It also did not reference an Army review of the ARES that identified a
decline in capacity and capability since 1974 as a result of ageing facilities, understaffed
units and recruiting deficiencies.23
DWP 1987 reaffirmed the focus on self-reliance and eschewed forward defence, favouring
the notion of a defence in depth of an area of strategic interest ‘radiating’ in circles
around Australia. The strategic plan was for the RAN and RAAF to engage forces intent
on invading Australia in the ‘air-sea gap’ forward of the Australian homeland. The Army’s
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20 Ibid.. pp. 38-46.
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<press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p346293/pdf/ch09.pdf> [Accessed 25 July 2019].

22 Paul Dibb, Review of Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Australian Government, 1986), p. vi.
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role was to deploy to defend key infrastructure and defeat enemy raiders in the north
and north-western areas of the Australian mainland. Without explicitly mentioning
Reserves, DWP 1987 called for a better balance of forces and the development of Australian
defence industry.24
DWP 1987 mentions Reserves fifty-one times and devotes eight paragraphs to discussion
of roles, a 100 per cent increase on DWP 1976. Guidance was vague and possibly
patronising. The ARES would be “required to contribute to operations which might arise
in the shorter term as part of the total Army, at a level commensurate with achievable
degrees of training and readiness”.25 The ARES was assigned the principal role of ‘vital
asset protection’ within the context of ‘Territorial Defence’ thus freeing up ARA combat
units for mobile offensive operations.26 The separate ARES role of Territorial Defence was a
departure from the Total Force concept articulated in the Millar Report and reemphasised
in DWP 1976.27 Instead of being employed in a similar way to the ARA, the bulk of the ARES
would conduct specific but limited tasks separate from the ARA.
In some ways DWP 1987 created unrealistic expectations and made a number of imprecise
generalisations. Repeating DWP 1976, there was mention of the ARES as an expansion
base that included an unrealistic possibility of the ARES being issued battle tanks.28
Another unrealistic expectation was advice that ARES units would ‘integrate’ with 1st
Division and the Logistic Support Force.29 A commitment to legislation for a restricted call
out of Reservists for full-time service was not attended to until 1988, fourteen years after
the Millar Report and commitments in DWP 1976.30 Aspirations for 6th and 7th Brigades
to provide individuals and groups to ‘round out’ ‘higher priority elements’ of the ARA
was fanciful. In contradiction, DWP 1987 offered that other ARES formations than the
theoretical “higher priority elements would be staffed and equipped at a level suitable
for training but not operations”. They would be ‘rounded out’ by another element of the
ARES if mobilised.31 Once again, without connection to strategic guidance, DWP 1987
stated there would be an increase of ARES strength to 26,000.32
In a rather disingenuous way DWP 1987 declared that its prescriptions, “will make our
Reserves a much more effective element in a self-reliant Australian defence force”.
The end of the Cold War made DWP 1987 obsolete, but its prescriptions echoed
through the 1990s as Australian governments once again renewed strategic traditions
and despatched land forces overseas to support a rules-based global order. Australia
committed relatively significant forces to peace support operations in Namibia, Cambodia,
Somalia and Rwanda. DWP 1987 also contributed to increasing risk. The organisational
muscle groups for force projection were neglected. An ADF response to a coup on Fiji in

24 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, 1987 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1987); (DWP
1987), pp. 8-9.
25 Ibid, p. 58.
26 Ibid, p. ix.
27 M. Mumford, ‘History of the Reviews into the Army Reserve’, supporting Annex to the 2nd Division
Transformation Project Directive (Canberra: Australian Army, 2017), p. A-6.
28 Department of Defence, DWP 1987, p. 60.
29 Ibid, p. 60.
30 Ibid, p. 59.
31
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1987 and subsequent force projections to Somalia and closer to home in the near region
highlighted systemic problems.33
The Wrigley Review of 1990 titled The Defence Force and the Community and Force
Structure Review of 1991 both promoted the cost effectiveness and potential of the
Reserves, on condition that there would be enough strategic warning time to increase
their readiness for operations.34 Indeed, Wrigley proposed nearly doubling the Reserves
and a much greater role for RAN and RAAF Reserves and noted the likely resistance from
regular officers for this scheme for reasons including “professional military prejudice”.35

DWP 1994—Defending Australia
Mentions of the Reserves increased significantly in DWP 1994 with 229 instances, a 350
per cent increase compared to DWP 1987 and forty-seven paragraphs devoted to the
Reserves, an increase of 488 per cent. Indeed, Chapter 7 was dedicated to Reserves.
The term ‘part-time’ in the context of military forces appeared thirteen times for the
first time in a DWP.
A focus on cost effectiveness and utility is one possible cause of this new emphasis.
The Hawke government’s priorities were economic in face of the initially slow recovery from
the recession of 1990-92.36 There was post-Cold War optimism for US President Bush’s
‘New World Order’ and a relatively benign strategic outlook for Australia’s near region.
The Defence Minister, Robert Ray, delivered a reduced Australian Defence budget in the
context of pursuing a ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the Cold War and dominance of
the United States in a unipolar world order.37 The role of the Reserves received particular
attention to soften criticism of a reduction in the size of the full-time forces, especially in
the Army. The issue of balance (regular/reserve) within the ‘Total Force’ was mentioned
no less than seven times.38
Despite the additional content focused on the Reserves, DWP 1994 contained little
in the way of new or specific strategic guidance from DWP 1987. New content focused
on a new part-time force called the Ready Reserve. This scheme was based on recruiting
individuals for a year of full-time training followed by a period of part-time service with
annual training obligations. The Ready Reserve Scheme rounded out the 6th Brigade in
Brisbane along with smaller Ready Reserve elements for the RAN and RAAF. Robert Ray
touted the Ready Reserve as a force that would bolster the ADF to meet the challenge
of “short warning conflict”.39 This term was introduced to describe the contingencies
that might arise inside strategic warning times and therefore require the “forces in
33 Bob Breen, Struggling for Self-Reliance—Four Case Studies of Australian Regional Force Projection in the
late 1980s and the 1990s (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), p. 40.
34 Alan K. Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defence (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990), pp. 500-2.
35 Ibid, p. 364.
36 David Gruen and Glenn Stevens, ‘Australian Macroeconomic Performance and Policies in the 1990s’, In David
Gruen and Sona Shrestha (eds), The Australian Economy in the 1990s, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin,
Oct 2000. P. 32.
37 John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
2014), p. 95.
38 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 (Canberra: Commonwealth of
Australia, 1994) (DWP 1994), pp. 48-49.
39 Ibid., p. 49.
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being” to deploy for employment initially to allow time for specific force preparation of
rotation forces.40
The ‘big idea’ in DWP 1994 that would have ramifications for the following decades was
that “the distinction between Regular and Reserve personnel must be greatly reduced”
and therefore Reserves would have a “similar level of individual training [as Regular forces]
with the difference being the level of experience and availability”.41 This new concept of
standardising individual training for the full-time (ARA) and part-time (ARES) components
of the Army effectively left ARES personnel at basic training levels because all of their
annual training allocations would be consumed by entry level and initial employment
training. In order to facilitate an increase in training time, DWP 1994 outlined an initiative
to engage with the civilian employers of Reservists to encourage giving Reservists more
time off to train and protecting their employment in order to encourage taking time off for
training.42 In effect, the ARES was destined to become a pool of trained personnel that
could contribute effectively to operational activities.43 Notably, DWP 1994 included for
the first time an explicit intention for the federal government to facilitate the employment
of the Services in disaster relief activities, domestically and internationally.44
Significant force structure changes affecting the Army Reserve occurred without warning
after DWP 1994. Newly appointed Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General John Sanderson,
introduced the Army in the 21st Century (A21) and Restructure of the Army (RTA) programs.
Sanderson envisaged integration of ARA and ARES units, reallocation of equipment
and introduction of Common Induction Training. The Ready Reserve Scheme was also
discontinued despite its promise.45
In 1999 the ADF faced a moment of strategic truth when called upon to project a
substantial land force into the near region and lead an international force into East
Timor. The Army was stretched to its limits to sustain this commitment.46 The A21 and
RTA initiatives foundered on the rocks of necessity as ARA companies were stripped
from ARES battalions with scores of trained reservists, many taking demotions in rank,
to reinforce 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (6 RAR), for a tour of duty in
East Timor in 2000.47 The rapid reinforcement and deployment of 6 RAR in four months
at least proved that standardising basic and initial employment training for ARA and
ARES infantrymen paid off when additional manpower was needed urgently for overseas
operations. Notably, scores of Reservists rallied and made themselves available at short
notice for service in East Timor. Specialist ARES personnel, such as logisticians, doctors,
surgeons, engineers as well as communications and sanitary technicians were crucial
to the success of the intervention.48
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DWP 2000—Our Future Defence Force
DWP 2000 came in the aftermath of the intervention into East Timor. There were many
lessons from this unexpected high-risk force projection. The Reserves had played an
important role. More Reservists had been employed on full-time duty in the two years
prior to DWP 2000, mostly in East Timor, than in the previous fifty-four years combined.49
Many Reservists volunteered and took time off from civilian employment to round out
deploying ARA units. The regular 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment could not have
deployed on time and fully trained without Reservist reinforcements who became the
riflemen and machine gunners in the frontline of operations.50 Reservists also played an
important role domestically with many volunteering for full-time service to do the jobs
of deployed ARA personnel.
DWP 2000 ended the Defence of Australia doctrine in favour of a small, high readiness
ADF configured for force projection. While Reserves content was down, the clarity of
guidance for the future of the Reserves was up:
The strategic role for the Reserves has changed from mobilisation to meet remote
threats to that of supporting and sustaining the types of contemporary military
operations in which the ADF may be engaged.51
The key to our sustainment capability in future will come from our Reserve forces. In
line with the new emphasis on a small, high-readiness army ready for deployment,
the role of our Reserve forces will undergo a major transition … Henceforth their
clear priority will be to provide fully trained personnel to our ready frontline forces
deployed on operations.52
DWP 2000 went on to highlight the role of the Reserves in disaster relief both nationally
and internationally.53 The significant initiative in this DWP was a more sophisticated
approach to skilling the Reserves and having Reservists at different levels of readiness
on stand-by for operations. Standardised training for the ARA and ARES, aligned to the
new National Training Framework, facilitated recognition of civilian and military skills.54
Selected individuals and units would be held at higher levels of readiness and have higher
training obligations.55 These would be the High Readiness Reserve (HRR) and the Reserve
Response Forces (RFF) that were introduced in subsequent years.
There was a restated commitment (from DWP 1994) to legislate measures to protect the
jobs of Reservists and provide support for employers.56 The Howard government passed
legislation to formalise these arrangements in 2001. Less successful was a proposal for
an online database of Reservist’s military competencies, accessible by employers but

49 Department of Defence, Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000); (DWP
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never implemented.57 Returning from absence in previous DWPs was mention of the value
that Reserves provided through provision of a link with local communities.58
DWP 2000 represented an important milestone for the Reserves. Participation in
operations in East Timor during the nation’s time of need for trained military personnel
renewed interest in including the Reserves more meaningfully in Australian defence.
There was now clear guidance on transitioning the ARES to be a fully trained and
operational reserve for the ARA.
Over the next nine years until the next DWP the Army Reserve stepped up to reinforce
units deployed overseas. For the first time ARES rifle companies served as garrison forces
in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Reservists served with their ARA compatriots in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Reservists also took part in Border Protection operations, domestic
event security operations and disaster response, such as to support ARA units cleaning
up after Cyclone Larry in north Queensland in 2006.

DWP 2009—Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030
The Rudd government’s Defence Minister, Joel Fitzgibbon, released DWP 2009 in
May 2009. The mentions of the role of the Reserves were only slightly down on
DWP 2000 with numerous references calling for a greater contribution from Reserves.59
The RAN and RAAF each had a paragraph devoted to their reserves.60 This would be the
last mention of either in a DWP.
Echoing DWP 2000, the “main aim” for the Army Reserve was, “to improve … overall
ability to sustain prolonged operational deployments and to provide additional capability
when the Regular Army is facing concurrency challenges”.61 Necessity had been
the change agent. Reservists and ARES sub-units had enabled the ARA to sustain
overseas deployments and achieve reasonable rotation schedules. Reserves proved
essential through this period to maintain the tempo of operations while allowing rest
and reconstitution for ARA units.
In several ways DWP 2009 marked a peak in guidance to the Reserves for backing up
deployed regular units. There were numerous mentions of the value of part-time forces,
but it would be last time that a DWP used the nomenclature ‘part-time’. It would be the
last time that High Readiness Reserve (HRR) and Reserve Response Force (RRF), as
well as proposals for different part-time service models such as ‘Focused contributions’
and ‘Sponsored Reserves’ would be mentioned.62 The notion of the ARES backing up the
ARA with trained personnel was dampened by an observation that the ARES contribution
would be constrained by, “the complexity of the tasks performed by the ADF and the
sophisticated and intensive mission preparation required”.63
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As an afterthought, DWP 2009 directed the Army to review its mix of full and parttime elements to achieve a number of goals including increasing the utility of Reserves
and improving community links. It affirmed that the ARES should retain its divisional
structure with six brigade-sized formations across the nation to recruit and train
part-time personnel.64

DWP 2013—Defending Australia and its National Interests
DWP 2013 was largely a continuation of DWP 2009 with reduced guidance for the
Reserves. Australia’s strategic objectives and capability priorities were largely consistent.65
The mentions of the Reserve were down on DWP 2009 by about 40 per cent and there
were less paragraphs devoted to discussing the roles of the Reserves, down 27 per cent.
Echoing DWP 2000, DWP 2013 acknowledged explicitly that ADF Reserves had
transitioned from a ‘strategic reserve’ (i.e. mobilisation/expansion base for defence
of Australia’s territorial sovereignty), to an ‘operational reserve’ (i.e. round out and
supplementation for deploying and deployed forces).66 It stated that the “Reserve
component is an integral part of ADF capability”.67
DWP 2013 contained a succinct and informative paragraph that listed the type of
capabilities that Reserves provided: complementary and supplementary sub-units,
specialist personnel and a surge of trained and partially trained personnel. The context
was an accurate and realistic description of reserve capabilities: “Typically, Reserves
provide lower-end and longer lead-time capabilities, and those that are related to the
civilian skills of reservists”.68
The Army’s Plan Beersheba changed expectations of the place Reserves would take in
the Order of Battle. Principally, DWP 2013 prescribed that Reserve Brigades would ‘pair’
with Regular Multi-Role Combat Brigades (MCB) and generate a Battlegroup and range of
other small elements to supplement each MCB in each three-year Force Generation Cycle
(i.e. reset, readying and ready).69 This expectation represented a significant challenge
because for more than a decade the ARES had focused on training individuals and groups
up to company size for Stabilisation Operations in the near region. Now they had to train
three headquarters and three Battlegroups capable of operating within the framework
of each regular MCB during the annual major conventional war-fighting exercise of
Hamel/Talisman Sabre.
The Reserve ‘Reinforcing Battlegroup’ has been successfully raised each year since
2014. Tasked predominantly with Rear Area Security Operations, it adds important
mass to the MCB, but significant effort is required to train, equip and integrate each
Reinforcing Battlegroup which is made up of personnel from many different ARES units.
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Communication equipment, protected mobility vehicles, some weapon systems and
items such as body armour need to be shifted around 2nd Division, at significant cost,
to train and equip the Battlegroup just in time for exercises. The process has improved
relationships and interoperability with the MCB but there is still discussion about the cost
of generating a unit- level Headquarters, the handover point to the MCB and whether the
Battlegroup can be considered a ‘manoeuvre group’ capable of offensive missions. The
ultimate test will be whether the complete Battlegroup ever gets deployed on operations.

DWP 2016
A change in government and pressing capability acquisition decisions prompted DWP
2016 three years after DWP 2013.70 Despite it being an even longer document than its
predecessor the Reserves hardly featured. There were only twelve references, down
60 per cent from DWP 2013, and four paragraphs, down 50 per cent from DWP 2013.
Absent were mentions of ARES Battlegroups and joining the ARA in Force Generation
Cycles. Guidance focused on the Total Workforce Model implementation (Plan Suakin)
and a Reserve Assistance Program that provided counselling support for Reservists.71
There was a statement affirming the government’s commitment to “maintaining the role
of the Reserves” but no summary of the strategic rationale for Reserves. The closest
statement resembling strategic guidance was, “The ADF is increasingly drawing on the
skills and expertise of Reservists to deliver defence capability.”72
DWP 2016 provided much less detail on ADF force structure than previous DWPs.
This had the effect of lessening mentions of the roles of the Reserves. This was a
significant break with the past. Less guidance increased the likelihood of the Services
making autonomous decisions about force structure. However, commentators such as
Ergas and Thomson considered the absence of force structure guidance as a potential
‘moral hazard’ for the Service Chiefs.73 They recommend that government take more
interest in specific force structure. There was a risk of ARA officers favouring full-time
forces in force structure discussion rather than ‘growing’ part-time forces, a bias noted
by Wrigley in his review in 1990.74
There are three other possibilities for the scant mentions of Reserves in DWP 2016.
The first is that the organisation was satisfied with what the Reserve were delivering.
After all, the DWP acknowledged that around 18 per cent of all ADF personnel deployed
on operations (1999-2016) were Reserves.75 Another possibility is that this reduction in
specific mentions of the Reserves was as the logical consequence of higher integration
of Regular and Reserve elements. A third, more likely but negative possibility could be
that the Reserves were seen as largely irrelevant in the DWP discussion. In this period,
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the ARES was declining in numbers and at its lowest strength ever at around 13,500.76
Whatever the basis of the absence of direction regarding Reserves, there was nothing
in DWP 2016 that would compel Defence to change its approach to Reserves.

Changes in DWP Guidance to the Reserves
An analysis of strategic guidance to the Reserves across seven DWPs from 1976 until
2016 reveals an evolution of roles and a trend in expectations ranging from those based
on reality to those founded on aspirational platitudes. Apart from the three-year period
between DWP 2009 and DWP 2013 there were significant evolutionary changes that
reflected evolutions of Australia’s strategic posture. There was a shift from the traditional
strategic rationale of the Reserves in the early 1970s, then called the Citizen Military
Forces, as a mobilisation base to the Reserves training for territorial defence of Australia’s
sovereignty (DWP 1987/1994) to an operational reserve of basically trained military
personnel (DWP 2000 onwards).
Guidance in DWPs for the structure of the ARES reflected the evolution from mobilisation
base to a part-trained personnel pool with one major contradiction. Initially, ARES brigades
and units were mentioned as a ‘percentage’ of the ‘Total Force’. The assumption appeared
to be that the ARES 2nd Infantry Division in Sydney and 3rd Training Group in Melbourne
were there to mobilise with the ARA 1st Division on a longer lead time after war was
declared or the threat of invasion became probable. In DWP 1987 there was a notion that
Australia would receive sufficient strategic warning time for this mobilisation timetable
to be effective.77 DWPs fell silent about 2nd Division and its brigades after DWP 2000,
but 2nd Division and its brigades continued regardless. Indeed, the structure of the
major parts of the Army Reserve is largely consistent with that described in DWP 1976.
There have been changes such as consolidation of units, changes in command status
and the disestablishment of Headquarters 3rd Division to become 3rd Training Group,
but the organisation is more similar than dissimilar to the one of forty years ago. Despite
the advances in land forces technology, changes in Army force structure, lessons from
contemporary operations and the emergence of new capabilities, the ARES remains
Infantry-centric with most resources devoted to generating a light Battlegroup each
year. These are historical echoes from the halcyon years of the militia in the twentieth
century but they have questionable operational relevance in the twenty-first century.
The term of ‘Total Force’ that was prominent in early DWPs disappeared and was replaced
with the notion of an integrated force in DWP 2009. The context was that the Army was
comprised of an integrated workforce of full-time and part-time personnel. However, the
term ‘integrated’ was also used frequently in other contexts, such as joint operations or
logistics. This created some ambiguity about the use of the term to describe the ADF’s
new future as a joint force that integrated the three Services in common operational
effort and a new way of thinking about the relationship between the Reserves and their
full-time compatriots.

76 Porter, S. 2018, Commander 2nd Division Brief to Royal United Services Institute Queensland,
17 October 2018.
77 Department of Defence, DWP 1987, p. 29.
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The value of the Reserves as a military force ‘of the people’, with close community ties,
especially in rural areas where traditional militia depots and historical unit names were
retained, disappeared after DWP 2009. The context of mentioning the Reserves’ links
with the community echoed the legends and cultural myths of the First World War and
Second World War that sturdy men left work on the land, many of them already members
of the Reserves, then called militia, to enlist in their thousands for overseas service.
The readiness of the Reserves has been a theme in most DWPs. Initially, there was
a traditional but unspecified notion of readiness embodied in the more general term
‘mobilisation’. Over time, readiness levels became more specific as categories of Reserves
with specified training competences were introduced. The Ready Reserve and High
Readiness Reserves were the peak of this readiness regime. Common Induction Training
set a shared training regime between ARES and ARA recruits and for initial employment.
A Reserve Response Force had the intention of giving the ARA an immediate injection of
trained personnel for operational service. Categories such as Sponsored Reserves and
Focused Reserves were mentioned in one DWP and never effectively implemented, as
was an aspiration for a central database of ARES members civilian skills that could be
utilised on operational service.
There were innovations and enhancements for the Reserves in various DWPs.
There were amendments to legislation to allow callout of Reserves in situations less than
war or for a declared defence emergency. Conditions of Reserve service were enhanced
through employment protection and employer support legislation. Despite the absence
of a central database, the Total Work-Force model, expressed in slightly different ways,
endured through the past four DWP and appears to be the most enduring concept for
expressing the relationship between Reserves and full-time personnel.

Consistent Themes, Aspirations and Realities
An overview of all DWPs reveals a number of consistent themes and enduring realities
about the Reserves. There have always been mention of the cost effectiveness of
maintaining the Reserves and calls for more to be gained from employing the Reserves
in the ADF. Another consistent theme is the value of applying civilian skills in the ADF,
especially specialists such as surgeons, doctors and other niche specialist medical staff.
In this context there has been an ambition for some specialist capabilities to reside largely
or completely in the Reserves. There has always been a notion that trained and specialist
Reserve personnel could ‘round out’ or supplement Regular forces having to mobilise
quickly for operations. One consistent aspiration has been for more ARA personnel
with skills and experience transitioning to the Reserves to enhance the competence of
Reserves and continue to be of service to the nation. Akin to this idea of retaining and
maintaining a skilled workforce for military service has been the concept of the ADF and
corporations sharing workforces. Finally, the Reserves have largely been comprised of
Army personnel. RAN and RAAF Reserves have been proportionally much smaller than the
Army Reserve, possibly a combination of continuing traditions and the more specialised
nature of training and employment in operational service at sea and in the air. However,
considering the contemporary challenges of crewing vessels and maintaining airpower,
the RAN and RAAF could potentially benefit from greater and different uses of Reserves
than their current service paradigms.
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Conclusion
DWPs guide ADF force structure and capability investment priorities for Australia’s
defence. It would then be reasonable to presume that they would clarify the strategic
rationale for part-time forces which represent both a significant proportion of the ADF and
a significant ongoing cost. However, an analysis shows that the guidance for the Reserves
has been generally fragmented and shifts from DWP to DWP in terms of quality and
quantity. The content devoted to the Reserves peaked in DWP 1994 and has been declining
in every DWP since. In the most recent DWP released in 2016 there are only twelve
mentions of the Reserves and four paragraphs that discuss the roles of the Reserves.
The elements of strategic rationale for the Reserves is broadly one of cost effectiveness.
Reserves cost less than full-time forces through reduced fixed costs and leverage of skill
sets maintained in civil employment. What the Reserves are used for, as articulated in
DWPs, can be categorised into the elements of a mobilisation base; territorial defence;
supplementary capability, specialists; link to the civil community, complementary
capability and domestic support operations. In practice these may not be exclusive and
represent what Reserves have been used for rather than as a result of design.
The guidance for Reserves has shifted over time from an expansion base to territorial
defence and then to an operational reserve. The shift to an operational reserve has been
successful if one considers the statistic that about 18 per cent of the ADF personnel
deployed on domestic and overseas operation have been Reservists. However, there have
been other consequences. The Reserves are now more capable, but smaller. Recruiting
and retention challenges persist. The ARES remains Infantry centric with substantial
resources invested in generating a Battlegroup for exercises each year. Transfer rates
to the Reserves of discharging Regular personnel remain stubbornly low.
The cold calculation for the ADF of meeting demanding strategic tasks and limited
budgets mean that Reserves have a place in the Total Force structure. However, the role,
disposition and tasks for the Reserves may be suboptimal resulting in force and resource
misalignments. This presents an opportunity for Defence to think differently about how
Reserves are organised and managed. Having said this, reforming the Reserves has
proved markedly more difficult than reviewing them. The next DWP is an opportunity
to recast the value proposition of the Reserves and direct Defence to think beyond the
traditional paradigms to engage more of the potential of the national human resource
base in a way that contributes to national security.

Mark Armstrong has served as an Army Reserve officer for over 28 years.
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A Natural Partner? Intelligence
Cooperation with India and
Australia’s Regional Interests
Martin White

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s recent description of India as a “natural
partner” in “the top tier of Australia’s partnerships”1 emphasises the continuing
emergence of India as a key strategic partner. Although its strategic culture has historically
led India to shun ‘natural partners’, mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (the ‘Quad’) are gradually strengthening to provide some evidence of converging
Australian-Indian geostrategic interests.
There are many possible aspects that this relationship can build upon, although
India’s independent outlook means that its position cannot be taken for granted.
Seemingly, as any strategic partnership grows, attention soon turns to intelligence
sharing. Indeed, recent Australian-Indian intelligence sharing has occurred,2 and other
relevant multilateral forums have also sought greater intelligence sharing.3
Rudyard Kipling’s famous novel Kim portrayed British Empire spying efforts to prevent
Russian expansion into India as part of the ‘Great Game’. Kim characterised this espionage
as offering shared benefits—or indeed, the same benefits—to the British Empire and to
Indian nationals, despite the anachronistic nature of the relationship and the lack of Indian
agency in the matter. In comparison, contemporary international intelligence sharing
generally only occurs if the nations involved have a common view of the need—although
a common view is not, in itself, sufficient to prompt intelligence cooperation.4
There are numerous contemporary Australian-Indian shared security concerns, commonly
portrayed in Australian strategic commentary, that may demand an intelligence dimension.
These include: the growth in Chinese military capability and regional ambition;5 Indian
Ocean security;6 and terrorism.7 Indian policymakers have shared intelligence with other
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countries in the past, where they perceived a common interest, although consistently
in a transactional way with no firm commitment to enduring arrangements.8 Further,
India’s self-view as a superpower-in-waiting may affect its contemporary approach to
intelligence sharing.
At face value, Indian intelligence9 is capable of performing well in the contemporary
strategic environment, developing capacity to compete with technologically sophisticated
nations. However, India does not greatly value Joint (inter-service) military operations;
it has not dismantled barriers between its intelligence agencies; and, its intelligence
organisations are considered to be poorly structured for contemporary operational
demands10 and for its own emerging doctrine.11 There are conspicuous organisational
and technical limitations and risks for India as it undertakes intelligence operations.
These risks could also be carried by an intelligence sharing partner, and Australian
policymakers and intelligence actors will be aware of the possible risks as impetus is
generated for greater intelligence sharing.
Using the February 2019 Indian attack on Balakot, Pakistan, as an intelligence frame of
reference,12 this paper will: outline Australian strategic interests vis-á-vis India, highlighting
reasons that intelligence cooperation could become important for the relationship;
summarise the known and inferred Indian intelligence capability, identifying strengths
and weaknesses and analysing the risks that may arise for Australian policymakers if
intelligence cooperation grows; and, identify policy considerations for Australia.

Seas of Misunderstanding
The Indian Air Force conducted missile strikes on a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist
training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, in February 2019, retaliating to an attack on Indian
security forces. Precision munitions fired from multiple Indian combat aircraft probably
narrowly missed their target.13 If the Indian Air Force was indeed attempting to strike the
target, the multiple narrow misses are a somewhat concerning validation of India’s military
8
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‘precision targeting’ capability. However, other concerning aspects of the mission—
relating to intelligence—merit further consideration.
Two features underscore the gravity of the Balakot mission. First, in issuing direction
for the strike, Prime Minister Modi ordered the avoidance of “any collateral damage to
civilians and military targets”, as he was concerned about conflict escalation.14 Second,
the Balakot mission saw a nuclear state using strategic air power against another nuclear
state. It is difficult to imagine any greater brinkmanship. Given these circumstances, it is
reasonable to expect that the Indian Air Force would take all necessary actions to ensure
mission success within the Prime Minister’s parameters.
In the aftermath of the strike, inaccurate information was publicly proffered by Indian
political figures. By way of explanation for the strike, the Home Affairs Minister emphasised
that “300 mobile phones were active there” prior to the mission.15
The ‘300 mobile phones’ statement raises more questions relating to Indian use of
intelligence than it answers. Indeed, a question absent from the subsequent media and
commentary is: who was using the 300 mobile handsets?
On learning about the 300 mobile handsets in the location, adhering to the Prime
Minister’s direction to avoid collateral damage with any degree of certainty would
have become extremely difficult. Confirmation that all 300 of those mobile handsets
belonged to terrorists would have required Indian intelligence to positively identify the
user of each handset. This implies that India: had excellent signals intelligence (SIGINT)
coverage of the mobile networks being used; was translating and monitoring the content
of all 300 handsets; and, had recent verification that each handset was being used by
a JeM member. Further, given that the Balakot site was said to comprise “97 fidayeen
… undergoing training” and another “150 recruits”,16 the effort required to identify,
translate and monitor these presumably newly selected JeM members through their
mobile handsets (that is, without historical evidence of the handset use) is beyond the
capacity of most intelligence agencies.
SIGINT alone could not have confirmed who was onsite at Balakot. For example,
comprehensively monitoring 300 mobile handsets still could not have identified any
people on the site who did not have mobile handsets (such as children). Other sources
would be necessary. For example, airborne video surveillance could be very effective in
this situation, providing a greater understanding of the target before and after the strike.
Applying the most generous interpretation from the available information, one could
assess that Indian policymakers accepted a particularly low threshold to validate the
handsets of the intended targets, had other effective intelligence sources that accurately
identified the absence of non-combatants on the Balakot site, and provided intelligence
estimates of the post-strike situation for briefing into the public domain in good faith but
with inaccurate information.
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Plainly, there are other possibilities. For example, the Indian Air Force: assumed that
all individuals at the site were terrorists despite no intelligence source providing this
verification; relied upon human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, superseded photographic
imagery of the site and a mobile telephone usage snapshot that did not validate the
user of any of the proximate handsets; fired on a target with incomplete understanding
and no direct visibility of what was going to be struck; and, made inaccurate post-strike
claims about the outcome of the targeting mission in the absence of tangible evidence.
Moreover, the Indian Air Force probably missed the target despite using multiple,
sophisticated munitions, inspiring little confidence in the Indian use of intelligence for
precision targeting.
It may be somewhat unfair to take this single recent example of how Indian intelligence
has been practically applied. Further, the Balakot strike does not represent a strategic
mission of direct Australian-Indian shared interest. However, given the paucity of public
information on Indian intelligence, instances where there is some understanding of how
Indian policymakers have received and applied intelligence must be considered, and
Balakot portrays a view of current intelligence shortfalls. Further, the lack of questioning
in the media and Indian strategic commentary of the ‘300 mobile phones’ statement is
indicative of an intelligence enterprise that has not been subject to close scrutiny.
With this context in mind, this paper will now consider the Australian-Indian shared
interests that could warrant intelligence cooperation.

Great Games, Old and New
While no fait accompli, the future could see India as the world’s third largest economy
assuming a mantle as “the primary power to Australia’s west”, much as China is now
the key actor to the north.17 India is slowly emerging, economically and militarily, with
growing influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and a desire to be recognised for
what it sees as its inevitable future as a global superpower.
Australian policymakers have consistently viewed Australia’s security and prosperity as
being inextricably tied to global events and great powers. Actions taken within this frame
of reference have mostly been calculated and pragmatic, with policymakers seeking
security through a predictable and global rules-based order and from the longstanding
US alliance.18 The potential emergence of India as a greater power in the Indian Ocean
region and beyond, and the potential for India’s relationships with other major powers
to influence global security, is viewed in Australia through the same pragmatic lens,
and is reflected in defence policy.19 Importantly, there is little evidence that Australian
policymakers have accepted any suggestion of a US decline in relative influence in the
Indo-Pacific.
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The expanding interests of democratic India in the Indo-Pacific; the US views on India as a
critical regional actor; and Australia’s continuing view of its prosperity being tied to regional
security have therefore made a closer Australian-Indian relationship appear (to some) as a
natural fit. Already, bilateral actions taken outside the Quad framework have demonstrated
the shared desire for a closer security relationship.20 At this point, it remains difficult to
view this strengthened relationship outside the prism of the Australia-US alliance and
continued US engagement in the region, but the increase in combined military activities
speaks to the growing sense of Australian-Indian shared strategic interests.
Shared interests have been regularly identified in Australian strategic commentary. Some
of these interests, such as the maintenance of a strong US presence in the Indo-Pacific
region, are longstanding features that both nations consider fundamental to ongoing
stability; albeit with India’s view of the desirability of US pre-eminence subject to change
if India’s strategic weight continues to grow, and a risk that India and the United States
view China’s Indo-Pacific ambitions differently.21
This paper will focus on shared interests that have been commonly highlighted in
the literature, and which have a potential or actual intelligence-sharing component.
They are: China’s growing geostrategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific; Indian Ocean
security; and terrorism.
These are not new issues for India. China is geographically immutable, and particularly
since the 1962 border war, Indian policymakers have viewed China with suspicion. The
Indian Ocean is also geographically immutable, and the “Super Power naval build-up in
the Indian Ocean” which poses “a serious threat to peace and tranquillity” is not a novel
concept for India.22 India has lived with terrorism for decades, and has fostered some
complex and often severe forms of suppression.23
However, all three issues have been lower order issues for India, subordinated to its
decades-long preoccupation with Pakistan and Kashmir.
The situation differs somewhat for Australia. These three issues barely featured on
Australia’s strategic radar prior to the new millennium.24 First, China has been identified
as a potential strategic competitor and emerging Asian power for decades,25 but has only
recently materially influenced Australian defence policy. Some have suggested that the
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closer Australia-India relationship mostly reflects an evolving ‘exclusive’ view of China
in the region (that is, with an aim to reduce or obstruct China’s influence),26 although
this is not reflected in Australian policy.
Second, Australian policymakers have only recently prioritised the Indian Ocean. While
policymakers now argue that Australia has important Indian Ocean equities (and view
India as a key Indian Ocean actor),27 the Indian Ocean has rarely had policy prominence.
Nonetheless, the maintenance of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and rules-based order,
for countries that both predominantly rely on Indian Ocean ports for their trade, is now
considered a shared interest.
Finally, the 2000 Defence White Paper framed terrorism as no more than a potential
problem for Australia.28 The strategic risk associated with terrorism was elevated in
Australia after the 2001 World Trade Centre attacks.
Prior to 2000, none of these three issues had the same urgency for, or proximity to,
Australia as they had for India. But India also did not elevate their priority above Kashmir
and Pakistan. Therefore, although these three issues have been described as ‘shared
interests’, a more accurate description is that they have become more proximate issues
for Australia’s security in the twenty-first century, and it is conceivable that India will
have sufficient capacity to think more about these issues in the future.
To be sure, Pakistan and Kashmir insatiably subsume India’s ‘strategic bandwidth’. Indian
policymakers may well try to situate their strategic priorities ‘east’, but this declared
pivot risks magnifying a considerable existing disjunction between Indian declared policy
and operational practice. There is every chance that India will remain mired in conflict
with Pakistan (and will be forced to expend significant intelligence resources on tasks
such as monitoring Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities),29 and this will dictate the effort
allocated to other strategic issues. For example, equivocation in India about its ‘no first
use’ nuclear strike doctrine is firmly related to ongoing tensions with Pakistan; yet the
considerable implications of such ambiguity for India’s relationship with China appear
to be a secondary consideration.30
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The Strength of the Wolf is the (Indo)-Pac
From an intelligence perspective, Kashmir (and the related “menagerie of Pakistansponsored Islamist military groups”)31 has almost fully occupied military and civilian
intelligence resources for decades. Australian-Indian intelligence cooperation must be
contextualised within the reality of competing, immediate demands facing India. What may
be important for Australia has previously proven less critical for India, given the immediacy
of the Kashmir security requirement and the enormous intelligence demands conferred
by such endeavours as India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine or other Balakot-like missions. India
has had little choice but to adopt a higher risk acceptance threshold for China, the Indian
Ocean and terrorism, because none of them pose the same proximate threat as a nuclear
first-strike from Pakistan or a mass-casualty terrorist attack in India.
Nonetheless, each of the identified Australian-Indian shared interests have intelligence
dimensions that would benefit from collaboration, and intelligence cooperation is realistic
given the steady increase in ‘strategic trust’ between the nations.32
First, it may not yet be a new great game, but China’s growing ambition in the IndoPacific region is influencing the security and intelligence planning for many nations.
China is the most challenging intelligence mission of the three identified shared interests.
Historically, India has accepted that China is a difficult intelligence target, and has not
prioritised intelligence resources against China. For example, India has not achieved
notable results from HUMINT missions in China (when compared to the effectiveness
of HUMINT in Pakistan). This has resulted in India having less understanding of Chinese
military capability, intentions and culture than one would expect, given the shared border
and regular conflicts.33
India’s proximity to China offers some unique intelligence collection opportunities.
This includes the ability to access SIGINT on tactical Chinese capabilities; HUMINT
in border regions; and air intelligence through relatively sophisticated Indian radar
systems. The growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region will also allow maritime
collection of electronic intelligence. Given the enormous number of possible intelligence
collection targets in China, the ability to collaborate on China may be desirable for India.
Some commentators have warned that containment of China should not become the
only driver of Australian-Indian engagement.34 Indeed, other factors are motivating
closer cooperation. Intelligence sharing may also grow to support security outcomes in
the Indian Ocean. Covering 20 per cent of the earth’s surface, wide area surveillance is
required to offer a persistent view of this expanse. Electronic intelligence from satellites,
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aircraft and maritime vessels, including technology such as change detection algorithms,35
contribute to wide area surveillance. While intelligence in this region will often relate to
the growing Chinese maritime activity, Australia and India must also address issues such
as piracy; people smuggling; and illicit flows of drugs and money.36
Many wide area surveillance systems, such as electronic intelligence receivers, do not
have onerous security and classification requirements. Wide area surveillance therefore
offers a low ‘barrier to entry’ for intelligence sharing. With the enormous quantities
of unstructured data that will be collected in the region,37 such surveillance must
be supported by data analytics tools—another function that could be undertaken at a
low classification.
Other intelligence capabilities relevant to the Indian Ocean region may include HUMINT,
and aircraft or satellite video and imagery intelligence, for missions such as countering
piracy. These intelligence capabilities can be used to identify maritime piracy bases,
or support threat vessel boarding. Sharing of data with private companies operating in
the Indian Ocean has also been historically important (to avoid hostage situations), as
has the collection of financial intelligence.38 Australian-Indian sharing of this intelligence
is realistic.
Third, India and Australia have agreed to “deepen counter-terrorism cooperation”,
including through intelligence sharing.39 India broadly classifies many domestic groups
as ‘terrorists’, most of which are not directly relevant to Australia. To be of mutual benefit,
counter-terrorism intelligence sharing would address transregional threats such as
Al Qaeda.40
The intelligence required for counter-terrorism is widely understood but demanding, with
signals, human, imagery and finance intelligence all regularly shared between nations
for specific missions. Over time, technologies such as predictive artificial intelligence
may be useful areas of collaboration.41
Nascent Australian-Indian intelligence sharing is occurring, and the scope for greater
cooperation is growing as shared interests develop. As such, Australian policymakers
should understand the structure, strengths and weaknesses of Indian intelligence.

35 IANS, ‘Indian Army Plans to Procure Drones to Counter Enemy Threats’, The Economic Times, 16 October
2019, <economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-army-plans-to-procure-drones-to-counterenemy-threats/articleshow/71612264.cms?from=mdr> [Accessed 8 December 2019].
36 United Nations, ‘High Seas Crime Becoming More Sophisticated, Endangering Lives, International Security,
Speakers Tell Security Council’, press release, 5 February 2019, <www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13691.doc.
htm> [Accessed 6 December 2019].
37 Department of Defence, Wide Area Surveillance Activity Based Intelligence (Fact Sheet, DSC 1757,
Australian Government, 2017), p. 1.
38 United States National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan
(December 2008), pp. 1-2, 12.
39 News Services Division, ‘India, Australia Agree to Further Deepen Counter-Terrorism Co-operation’, All India
Radio, 4 May 2019, <www.newsonair.com/Main-News-Details.aspx?id=362996> [Accessed 7 December
2019].
40 Carin Zissis, ‘Terror Groups in India’, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 November 2008, <www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/terror-groups-india> [Accessed 7 December 2019].
41

Kathleen McKendrick, Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism, Research Paper, (London:
Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2019), <www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
default/files/2019-08-07-AICounterterrorism.pdf> [Accessed 7 December 2019].
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The First Condition of Understanding a Foreign Country
is… Effective Intelligence
Like many nations, numerous organisations (more than twenty) comprise Indian
intelligence. The main strategic agencies are the Intelligence Bureau and the Research
and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The Intelligence Bureau, which resides within the Ministry of
Home Affairs, is responsible for internal security and has a major role in counter-terrorism.
R&AW reports to the Prime Minister (and resides under the cabinet secretariat) and is
responsible for external intelligence.
The military is also a significant intelligence actor. The three military services maintain
intelligence organisations. The Defence Intelligence Agency coordinates military
intelligence and controls many signals, cyber and imagery intelligence capabilities.42
Other organisations, such as the National Technical Research Organisation, perform
technical intelligence functions. Coordinating groups, such as the Technical Coordination
Group, were established after a series of classified reviews through the 2000s.43
Some have argued that Indian intelligence is best understood by categorising different
capabilities as either ‘strategic’ or ‘tactical’.44 This approach tends to constrain the
view of intelligence to a ‘wartime’ prism where strategic and tactical intelligence may
have greater delineation. In situations short of declared major conflict,45 all intelligence
resources contribute to the same information pool, and all are used in emerging methods
of data analysis. Therefore, this paper does not segregate Indian intelligence into tactical
and strategic groupings.
Unlike in other nations, and despite the tens of thousands of personnel employed in
the area, Indian intelligence is not a frequent topic for strategic commentators. Partly,
this is because intelligence is often classified, and obsolete intelligence is declassified
less frequently in India than in Western nations.46 Further, when Indian intelligence is
publicly discussed, most commentary has focused on single intelligence capabilities, so
a synopsis of the range of Indian intelligence capabilities is rarely presented.47 An overall
view is important, because it demonstrates the capabilities that could have been used at
Balakot (but were not); and Australian policymakers should understand the breadth of
Indian intelligence to determine how to optimise cooperation. Consequently, this paper has
triangulated a range of commentary and policy to outline Indian intelligence capabilities.

42 Vikram Sood, ‘The Indian Intelligence System: Meeting the Challenges of a New World’, in Harsh Pant (ed.),
Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines (India: Routledge, 2016), p. 340.
43 Shrivastava Manoj, Re-energising Indian Intelligence (India: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Vij Books,
2013), pp. 17-19.
44 Prem Mahadevan, The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in
South Asia (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 2-3.
45 Some have described this as ‘grey zone’ warfare, which is more common than declared conflict. For example,
Angus Campbell, Speech, Australian Strategic Policy Institute International Conference ‘War in 2025’,
Canberra, 13 June 2019, p. 9.
46 Janani Krishnaswamy, Why Intelligence Fails, Policy Report No. 3 (Chennai: The Hindu Centre for Politics
and Public Policy, 2013), p. 12.
47 This is not to imply that Indian intelligence capabilities operate as a unified entity, but it is important to
understand the scope of the resources available.

96

Martin White

No Sin So Great as Bad Intelligence
The key Indian intelligence capabilities span all normal security-related domains—space;
air; maritime; land and informational.
India has developed satellites relevant to military intelligence, managed through the Indian
Space Research Organisation and the Defence Research Development Organisation.
The military has reported operational use of imagery derived from its Cartosat satellites
for ‘surgical strike’ operations. Image resolution is reported to have improved with India’s
newer satellites,48 although satellite imagery could not be obtained after the Balakot
strike.49 Further satellite launches may establish an electronic intelligence and radar
surveillance capability,50 although some commentary still assesses intelligence derived
from satellites to be nascent.51
Drones feature prominently in Indian intelligence, although they appeared to play no direct
role in Balakot. The high organisational priority for drone technology suggests a likely
near-term capability improvement. Basic drone intelligence collection capabilities are
used (such as the Israeli-designed Heron),52 in a large fleet, with further procurements
planned.53 Previous problems associated with imagery and SIGINT drones could be
overcome.54 India’s incorporation of drone technology is likely to be an important
determinant of its future intelligence capacity.
Manned aircraft also collect intelligence, and some of these aircraft reside within
R&AW’s Aviation Research Centre.55 Joshi summarised the extent of the modest fleet
of surveillance aircraft, which includes aircraft capable of collecting basic electronic
intelligence and imagery.56 Combat aircraft are also fitted with radar detection equipment.
48 Chethan Kumar, ‘Surgical Strikes: First Major Use of Cartosat Images for Army’, The Times of India,
30 September 2016, <timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Surgical-Strikes-First-major-use-of-Cartosatimages-for-Army/articleshow/54596113.cms> [Accessed 1 November 2019].
49 Vishnu Som, ‘What Happened at Balakot? Unreleased Satellite Pics May Prove India’s Case’, NDTV,
3 March 2019, <www.ndtv.com/india-news/what-happened-at-balakot-unreleased-satellite-pic-mayprove-indias-case-2002060> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
50 Narayan Prasad, ‘Recent Developments and Trends in India’s Space Missions and Industry’, in Marco
Aliberti, Narayan Prasad and Sara Hadley (eds), Europe-India Space Cooperation: Policy, Legal and Business
Perspectives from India, ESPI Report no. 69 (Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, 2019), 14; Surendra
Singh, ‘DRDO Satellite That Will Sniff Out Enemy Radars to be Launched on April 1’, The Times of India,
25 March 2019, <timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/drdo-sat-that-will-sniff-out-enemy-radars-to-belaunched-on-april-1/articleshow/68551896.cms> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
51

Manoj Joshi, ‘India Has a Long Way to go Before It Can Use Space for Modern Warfare’, Observer Research
Foundation, 17 June 2019, <www.orfonline.org/research/india-has-a-long-way-to-go-before-it-can-usespace-for-modern-warfare-52106/> [Accessed 10 November 2019].

52 Waquar Haider, ‘Surgical Strike 2.0: Five Aerial Vehicles Which the Indian Armed Forces Can Call up if
Needed to Protect the Borders’, News 18, 26 February 2019, <www.news18.com/news/tech/surgicalstrike-2-0-five-aerial-vehicles-which-the-indian-armed-forces-can-call-up-if-needed-to-protect-theborders-2049069.html> [Accessed 1 November 2019].
53 For example, Greg Waldron, ‘AERO INDIA: IAI Launches New Mini Harpy Loitering Munition’, Flight Global,
21 February 2019, [Accessed 1 November 2019], highlighted new electro optical and radiation detection
capabilities to be employed by the Indian Air Force.
54 Robert Beckhusen, ‘Every One of India’s Nishant Drones Has Crashed’, War is Boring, 10 December 2015,
<warisboring.com/every-one-of-indias-nishant-drones-has-crashed/> [Accessed 1 November 2019].
55 One commentator accused R&AW of often misusing these aircraft for senior official travel rather than for
intelligence collection. See V. K. Singh, India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of the Research & Analysis Wing
(New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007), pp. 164-65.
56 Shashank Joshi, Indian Power Projection: Ambitions, Arms and Influence, Whitehall Paper no. 85 (Abingdon:
Routledge for RUSI, 2017), pp. 103-5.
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India is acquiring similar Boeing P8 maritime patrol aircraft to those used by Australia,
suitable for wide area surveillance.57
The procurement of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, with associated
S-Band radars capable of detecting aircraft and missiles out to 600 kilometres, offers a
formidable air intelligence capability,58 which some fear could alter the strategic balance
vis-à-vis Pakistan.59
The maritime environment may be considered the weakest of India’s intelligence domains,
with gradual improvements planned. In addition to the integral surveillance capabilities
in an almost 200 vessel Navy (such as the air- and surface-search radar systems on
Talwar-class frigates),60 India is introducing specific intelligence collection vessels.61
Enhancing maritime surveillance, an X-Band and S-Band ‘Integrated Coastal Surveillance
System’ has been deployed in several coastal locations,62 and may offset the coastal
surveillance gaps highlighted by the 2008 Mumbai attack.63 Also, India has foreshadowed
the development of Over-The-Horizon radar to detect aircraft and missiles at distance.64
This will be complemented by enhanced Automatic Identification System access.65
Sub-surface intelligence is also less capable, with new submarine progression “particularly
weak”, with “long delays and cost over-runs”.66 The continued delay to the Scorpene-class
submarine fleet is an indication of the lower priority for maritime platforms in the Indian
budget,67 and this will limit its intelligence collection capacity and potential in the maritime
and littoral environments. The sixteen-vessel submarine fleet appears predominantly
focused on the weapons systems (particularly relating to nuclear deterrence) that can be
57 Manu Pubby, ‘India to go Ahead with $3.1 bn US Deal for Maritime Patrol Aircraft’, The Economic Times,
5 September 2019, <economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-go-ahead-with-3-1-bn-usdeal-for-maritime-patrol-aircraft/articleshow/70986634.cms> [Accessed 15 November 2019].
58 V.S. Chernyak and I. Ya. Immoreev, ‘A Brief History of Radar in the Soviet Union and Russia’, IEEE A&E
Systems Magazine, September 2009, p. B20.
59 Ayaz Gul, ‘Pakistan Blasts India Over Purchase of Russian Air Defense System’, Voa News, 19 October
2018, <www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-blasts-india-over-purchase-russian-air-defensesystem> [Accessed 8 December 2019].
60 Naval Technology, ‘Talwar Class Guided Missile Frigate, India’, <www.naval-technology.com/projects/
talwarclassfrigate/> [Accessed 15 November 2019].
61

Shiv Aroor, ‘REVEALED: India’s Next “Advanced Technology Vessel”’, Live Fist Defence, 19 January 2017,
<www.livefistdefence.com/2017/01/revealed-indian-navys-next-advanced-technology-vessel.html>
[Accessed 15 November 2019].

62 Defence Research Development Organisation, Coastal Surveillance Radar (Delhi, 2015), pp. 1-2, highlighted
the detection range of 50 kilometres. Saurav Jha, ‘India Beefs Up Coastal Security, But there is More to be
Done’, Delhi Defence Review, 28 January 2017, <delhidefencereview.com/2017/01/28/india-beefs-upcoastal-security-but-there-is-more-to-be-done/> [Accessed 15 November 2019], identified that there may
be up to eighty-four fixed and eight mobile radar sites established in the near-term.
63 Angel Rabasa, Robert Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian Jackson, Brian Jenkins,
Seth Jones, Nathaniel Shestak and Ashley Tellis, The Lessons of Mumbai, Occasional Paper (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 9.
64 Kalyan Ray, ‘We’ll Become Self-Reliant in Radars, Sonars in 5 Yrs’, Deccan Herald, 9 September 2019,
<www.deccanherald.com/national/we-ll-become-self-reliant-in-radars-sonars-in-5-yrs-760227.html>
[Accessed 8 December 2019]. This capability was foreshadowed by the Chairman of the Defence Research
and Development Organisation.
65 Jha, ‘India Beefs Up Coastal Security’.
66 Satu Limaye, Weighted West, Focused on the Indian Ocean and Cooperating across the Indo-Pacific:
The Indian Navy’s New Maritime Strategy, Capabilities, and Diplomacy (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017), p. 25.
67 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup’, Observer Research Foundation,
5 October 2019, <www.orfonline.org/research/trouble-india-slow-naval-buildup-56188/> [Accessed 15
November 2019].
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employed from submarines, rather than on intelligence.68 The establishment of underwater
acoustic sensors for surveillance purposes, aimed at countering Chinese submarines in
areas such as the Bay of Bengal, has recently progressed.69
Given the Army’s primacy in Indian security matters, and the capabilities resident within
strategic intelligence agencies, India’s land intelligence capability is relatively strong.
SIGINT is heavily relied upon, with effective strategic and military SIGINT organisations.
India has historically maintained strong radio and telecommunications intercept
capabilities.70 The military’s tactical ‘Wireless Experimental Units’, strategic collection
agencies and permanent SIGINT collection sites provide an extensive and enduring
SIGINT focus on Pakistan. A good mobile telephony interception capability exists, both
through intercept equipment positioned within domestic service providers,71 and also
in neighbouring countries. India has previously installed software on mobile handsets
to track the movements of individuals.72
India has also proven its ability to intercept basic satellite communications. Famously,
India publicly released recorded voice from then-military chief Pervez Musharraf after
Pakistan occupied Kargil in 1999, identifying Pakistan as the aggressor in that situation.73
India has collected cyber intelligence for more than a decade. Internet collection capability
in India was considered ‘virtually non-existent’ in 2000, but has improved substantially.
Internet collection is undertaken through numerous methods, including monitoring of the
Internet Service Provider gateways in India.74 The recent establishment of the Defence
Cyber Agency will add more structure around cyber collection.75
India’s HUMINT capability is experienced, and heavily committed against Pakistan. India
has extensively used interrogation techniques to gain intelligence, although regular
accusations of human rights violations have been made.76 Due to ethnic and language
similarities, India more easily establishes and maintains HUMINT networks in Pakistan
68 Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘India Submarine Capabilities’, 11 October 2019, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/
india-submarine-capabilities/> [Accessed 15 November 2019]. This relates to the need to maintain India’s
submarine-borne nuclear deterrent.
69 Abhijit Singh, ‘India’s “Undersea Wall” in the Eastern Indian Ocean’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 June 2016, <amti.csis.org/indias-undersea-wall-easternindian-ocean/> [Accessed 15 November 2019]; Peter Coates, ‘Japan-US-Indian IUSS Cable Link Completed
across Bay of Bengal’, Submarine Matters, 11 September 2018, <gentleseas.blogspot.com/2018/09/usindian-iuss-link-completed-from-port.html> [Accessed 15 November 2019].
70 This includes combined operations, at various times, with Britain, the United States and Russia. See Desmond
Ball, ‘Signals Intelligence in India’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 10, no. 3 (1995), pp. 377-88.
71

Sflc.in and World Wide Web Foundation, India’s Surveillance State (New Delhi: Sflc.in and World Wide Web
Foundation, 2014), pp. 3-5.

72 Neha Alawadhi and Jochelle Mendonca, ‘Wikileaks Reveals Indian Security Agencies Using Little-Known
Firms to Obtain Spying Technology’, The Economic Times, 16 July 2015, <economictimes.indiatimes.
com/tech/ites/wikileaks-reveals-indian-security-agencies-using-little-knowºn-firms-to-obtain-spyingtechnology/articleshow/48091679.cms?from=mdr> [Accessed 1 December 2019].
73 B. Raman, ‘Release of Kargil Tape: Masterpiece or Blunder?’, Rediff India Abroad, 27 June 2007,
<www.rediff.com/news/2007/jun/27raman.htm> [Accessed 8 June 2007.
74 Singh, India’s External Intelligence, pp. 129-35.
75 ‘India is Quietly Preparing a Cyber Warfare Unit to Fight a New Kind of Enemy’, The Economic Times,
14 July 2018, <economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-is-quietly-preparing-a-cyber-warfareunit-to-fight-a-new-kind-of-enemy/articleshow/61141277.cms> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
76 Jason Burke, ‘Wikileaks Cables: India Accused of Systematic Use of Torture in Kashmir’, The Guardian,
16 December 2010, <hwww.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/16/wikileaks-cables-indian-torture-kashmir>
[Accessed 1 December 2019].
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and Sri Lanka, but China has been more difficult. Remote intelligence collection devices
are widely used.77
Domestically, India has honed its video surveillance technology, with millions of ClosedCircuit Television cameras in operation. The addition of facial recognition applications
has troubled privacy advocates, but can improve foreign intelligence collection.78
A synopsis of Indian intelligence capabilities is at Figure 1.
Figure 1—Indian intelligence capabilities79
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India has the basis of a sophisticated intelligence capability that could effectively
share intelligence. Indian intelligence can generate data from a large number of
sources, although its analysis and fusion capacity will need to develop in time. Balakot
demonstrated that India’s intelligence potential has not yet been realised in a more
challenging operational setting where internal coordination is essential. This is partly
due to strict compartmentalisation of information within each intelligence organisation.

Forty Million Reasons for (Intelligence) Failure
Balakot highlighted shortfalls that have been ascribed to Indian intelligence, but this
puts undue blame on intelligence capabilities. Balakot mostly exposed shortfalls in
how intelligence is used for operational purposes. Some commentators astutely argued
that political shortcomings lead to outcomes that are labelled as ‘intelligence failures’,
77 Sayantan Chakravarty, ‘Security Agencies Encroach on Privacy Using Surveillance Technology’, India Today,
17 November 2003, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/technology-innovation/story/20031117-security-agenciesuse-cutting-edge-technology-to-track-terrorists-791487-2003-11-17> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
78 Paul Bischoff, ‘The World’s Most-Surveilled Cities’, Comparitech, 15 August 2019, <www.comparitech.com/
vpn-privacy/the-worlds-most-surveilled-cities/> [Accessed 16 November 2019].
79 Compiled by Author.
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but these outcomes are better described as ‘leadership failures to act on intelligence’.
Further, commentators have argued that generations of political leaders have encumbered
the intelligence agencies with difficult organisational structures and incentives.80
This suggests that political decisions (or political inertia) have directly and indirectly
contributed to intelligence problems.81
It is unreasonable to expect public commentary to widely and favourably endorse Indian
intelligence; exceptional performance rarely inspires commentary on intelligence matters.
Therefore, the tone is unsurprisingly disparaging. Further, much of the commentary on
Indian intelligence has its own limitations and its validity can be difficult to judge,82 and
can even deviate into ‘spy fiction’ presented as fact.83 The commentary also often unfairly
conflates (legitimate) whistle-blower complaints with criticisms of actual technical capacity.
Nonetheless, Indian intelligence commentary can be triangulated with the Balakot
example, and the outcomes of intelligence reviews (where outcomes have not remained
classified), exposing some trends. These trends can predominantly be categorised into
organisational shortfalls and capability shortfalls, and both types of shortfalls may be
relevant to Australian-Indian intelligence sharing.
Organisational criticism often relates to instances of corruption and rampant parochialism,
mostly within R&AW and the Intelligence Bureau, although the military is not immune.84
Singh argued that many R&AW operations do not have sufficient legal basis; the rivalry
with the Intelligence Bureau is extreme; and, corruption and internal subversion is
rampant.85 Yadav highlighted further corruption examples.86
These organisational limitations have been verified in other credible reports. Consequently,
it has been common for official reviews and other commentary to make recommendations
relating to the need for greater parliamentary oversight and a clear legal framework for
intelligence operations.87
Inadequate deconfliction of intelligence assets is another regular criticism, and India has
not made significant breakthroughs in facilitating a joint or whole-of-government concept
for intelligence when compared to other countries.88 To be sure, intelligence coordination

80 Mahadevan, The Politics of Counterterrorism in India, p. 2; Krishnaswamy, Why Intelligence Fails, pp. 1-2.
81

Other evidence suggests that R&AW, in particular, had significant political influence, and appears to have
influenced major Indian foreign policy decisions such as its intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s including
the provision of support to Tamil militants. See Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role
of India’s Intelligence Agencies (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), p. 5.

82 For example, one commentator was clearly a poor cultural fit for service within R&AW, and much of his
criticism of R&AW was based on his perception that the Army was a superior organisation. See Singh,
India’s External Intelligence. Manoj tenuously linked British colonialism as the key reason for contemporary
organisational shortfalls. See Manoj, Re-energising Indian Intelligence, p. 4.
83 Ryan Shaffer, ‘Indian Spies Inside Pakistan: South Asian Human Intelligence Across Borders’, Intelligence
and National Security, vol. 34, no. 5 (2019), p. 727.
84 Pradip Sagar, ‘I Gave My Life to Army, in Return I Got Taint, Says MI officer Acquitted of Graft Charges’,
The Week, 26 November 2018, <www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/11/26/I-gave-my-life-to-Army-inreturn-I-got-taint-says-MI-officer-acquitted-of-graft-charges.html> [Accessed 10 December 2019].
85 Singh, India’s External Intelligence, pp. 13, 44.
86 R. K. Yadav, Mission R&AW (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014), pp. 433-35.
87 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, A Case for Intelligence Reforms in India (New Delhi: IDSA Task
Force Report, 2012), pp. 7-9.
88 China’s 2016 establishment of its Strategic Support Force as a service-level equivalent within the People’s
Liberation Army is a good example of other, more Joint efforts in Asia.
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has been a longstanding problem in Western nations, subject to countless inquiries;89
but the Indian interagency barriers to sharing and coordination seem particularly acute.
Many intelligence deconfliction problems can be traced to the Army’s continued
predominance within the military,90 and intelligence resourcing reflects that—for example,
in the relatively limited submarine intelligence capability; and in the priority of provision
of change detection capability on drones for operations in Kashmir (rather than the Indian
Ocean where it may be more effective).91
Manoj argued that different intelligence agencies are “stumbling over each other”
in border regions rather than deconflicting effort, and policymakers had little appetite to
investigate deconfliction failures such as those relating to the 2008 Mumbai attacks.92
Numerous others made similar contentions about poor coordination.93 Intelligence
sharing between strategic agencies and counter-terrorist forces (including police) is an
identified weakness,94 as is intelligence for special operations.95
Ball described the ‘considerable overlap’ in Indian SIGINT tasks and responsibilities
twenty-five years ago,96 and it appears that little has changed.
Australian-Indian intelligence sharing may not be directly affected by Indian domestic
intelligence actions, but considerable and longstanding evidence of misuse of Indian
intelligence resources may encourage Australian policymakers to progress steadily,
and to avoid situations where Australia could be implicated in any irregular situation.
Illegal spying on politicians,97 use of torture to extract information from detainees98 and
misuse of intelligence aircraft for personal use are some of the alleged irregularities.
The sheer weight of examples of intelligence corruption, oddly downplayed in one
publication as “Bizarre R&AW Incidents”,99 presents some uncertainties about the
efficacy of Indian intelligence.
Intelligence capability criticism was less frequent than organisational criticism (in the
literature), partly due to the potential legal risk of divulging too much detail on specific
intelligence capabilities. However, the Balakot example shows that levels of intelligence
capability can at least partly be inferred.

89 For example, United States Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,
December 2002).
90 Joshi, Indian Power Projection, pp. 22-23.
91

IANS, ‘Indian Army Plans to Procure Drones’.

92 Manoj, Re-energising Indian Intelligence, pp. 4, 11, 20.
93 Manoj Joshi and Pushan Das, ‘India’s Intelligence Agencies: In Need of Reform and Oversight’, ORF Issue
Brief, no. 98 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, July 2015), 2; Manoj, Re-energising Indian
Intelligence, p. 4.
94 Mahadevan, The Politics of Counterterrorism in India, p. 11.
95 Joshi and Das, ‘India’s Intelligence Agencies’, p. 2.
96 Ball, ‘Signals intelligence in India’, p. 387.
97 Maria Xynou, ‘Spy Files 3: WikiLeaks Sheds More Light on the Global Surveillance Industry’, The Centre
for Internet & Society, 25 October 2013, <cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/spy-files-three>
[Accessed 1 December 2019].
98 Burke, ‘Wikileaks Cables’.
99 Yadav, Mission R&AW, p. 425.
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Often, commentators expressed concern about Indian intelligence capacity, and the
deleterious effect of the burden of Kashmir operations.100 In a comparative sense, previous
tactical studies have firmly situated India’s intelligence capability as well below that of
China,101 and this remains an accurate judgement.
While it has had notable successes, India’s HUMINT has been regularly criticised.
India’s relative lack of success in China has been highlighted.102 Further, the lack of trained
linguists to support intelligence has impeded efforts against China,103 and insufficient
linguistic capability has been raised in numerous contexts.104 Others observed that
the same HUMINT sources were sometimes unknowingly used by multiple Indian
intelligence agencies.105
India’s counter-intelligence capabilities have also been critiqued. Internal corruption and
foreign infiltration may diminish Australia’s confidence that India can protect specific
information. Yadav identified the likelihood that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
had ‘penetrated’ R&AW.106 Such claims are not unusual for large intelligence agencies,
but trust is a critical commodity for international intelligence sharing. If R&AW has been
prepared to let insider threats abscond from India (rather than investigate them) due to
reputational reasons, transparency may be an issue.
Some shortfalls have been identified in India’s capacity for intelligence analysis, noting
that all countries are in nascent stages of machine learning implementation.107 India has
made progress in analysis of large data sets using Artificial Intelligence.108 However, the
insular nature of the intelligence sharing between agencies may render the ability to
make sense of immense data quantities a difficult progression for India.
Although shared interests may lead to greater consideration of Australian-Indian
intelligence sharing, it is important that Australia understands the strengths and
weaknesses of its potential partner. India clearly has the potential to develop a highly
sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Currently, Indian intelligence’s organisational
limitations (particularly relating to corruption and deconfliction) and capability limitations
(for example, the relative weakness of maritime intelligence) are important for Australian
policymakers to understand. Some considerations for Australian policymakers will now
be highlighted.

100 Steve Coll, ‘India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks’, The New Yorker, 22 February 2009,
<www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/02/the-back-channel> [Accessed 2 December 2019].
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No Gift Like Friendship
On balance, there is benefit in Australia steadily pursuing greater intelligence sharing
with India. However, the geostrategic independence that is inherent to Indian strategic
culture, and the inadequate internal intelligence deconfliction, will make progress slow.
Perhaps foremost, Australia should expect a transactional intelligence relationship with
India. India is unlikely to enter into an intelligence sharing arrangement for a specific
mission, such as the Indian Ocean, with broader intelligence sharing aims in mind. India
has historically sought tightly bounded goals when sharing intelligence with France,109 the
United States,110 and others. Combined with the cautious Indian bureaucracy, a patient
and transactional Australian approach will be necessary. Australia should not be surprised
if India withdraws from intelligence sharing with little notice if the specific intelligence
effort is not seen as beneficial, even if other aspects of the relationship are very strong.
Second, given the parochial nature of the Indian intelligence organisations and the limited
internal communication, Australia may have to accept that intelligence sharing is likely
to occur within Indian-designated organisational boundaries. This is straightforward for
Indian Ocean surveillance, where a Navy-to-Navy interface is probably sufficient. However,
it could become challenging for the other shared interests, as China and terrorism are
multi-faceted and highly complex interagency intelligence targets. It is possible that
Indian intelligence would seek limitations in Australia on the organisations that could
access certain intelligence.
Third, at basic levels of intelligence sharing commitment, the alleged corruption within
Indian intelligence would probably not manifest into broader problems for Australia.
However, if linkages grow deeper over time, Australian policymakers should be prepared
to set clear expectations or ‘red lines’ for how intelligence operations will be managed.
For example, Australian intelligence capabilities or information being used to support
another Balakot-like mission could be politically problematic, not least because Australia
seeks to maintain good relations with Pakistan. Further, Australia should be conscious of
India’s threshold for intelligence ‘failure’. It is higher than in Australia. The 2008 Mumbai
attacks, with at least 174 people killed, did not elicit a major intelligence review despite
deficient intelligence coordination.111
Finally, although all three shared interests—China’s regional ambitions, Indian Ocean
security and counter-terrorism—should be considered for intelligence sharing, the Indian
Ocean mission is a logical starting point. Intelligence sharing would be meaningful for both
parties; intelligence could be shared at a relatively low classification; and, many Australian
and Indian maritime and air platforms already operate regularly in the region. The maritime
domain is relatively weaker for India (than other domains), and so it is possible that Indian
policymakers would view Indian Ocean intelligence sharing as beneficial to them. Indian
intelligence efforts against China have been less successful, but are likely to improve over
time, and intelligence sharing for that shared interest remains viable.
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Considering all factors, Australian-Indian intelligence sharing in the three identified
areas of shared interest is likely to be mutually beneficial, particularly as the demand for
intelligence grows, and a steady progression would appear to suit both nations.

Conclusion
Although not new issues, shared Australian-Indian strategic interests have gradually
emerged, and intelligence sharing relating to China’s growing Indo-Pacific ambitions,
Indian Ocean security and terrorism appears to be mutually beneficial, particularly as
the intelligence requirements for these three issues grows. Indian intelligence sharing
has been pragmatic and transactional in the past, and Australian policymakers should
expect this to remain the case.
Indian intelligence has the basis of a sophisticated capability, although there are
organisational and capability challenges, some of which were visible during the 2019
Balakot mission. Indian intelligence is strongest in the land environment, and is probably
least developed in the maritime environment, and intelligence sharing in the Indian Ocean
is a realistic first step for closer integration. As intelligence sharing occurs, Australian
policymakers may be exposed to some of India’s organisational shortfalls, and Australia
will need to set clear expectations for how intelligence could be used. Intelligence sharing
may not exactly be ‘natural’ between Australia and India, but it could provide an important
boost for a nascent strategic partnership.

Martin White is an Australian Army Officer. These views are the author’s alone and do
not represent the Australian Army or Department of Defence.
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Australian National Audit Office:
Evaluating Australian Army
Program Performance
Bert Chapman

Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reports should be studied by Australian army
personnel, scholars and the general public. This agency scrutinises the exercise of
authority and spending by Australian Government agencies. ANAO reports provide
valuable insights on the successes, failures and complexities of Army programs.
Individuals interested in these programs’ managerial and operational performance
should consult them to see whether they provide good value for money for taxpayers.
Army professionals may eventually manage these programs and be subject to ANAO,
judicial, media and parliamentary scrutiny for their management of these programs.
This article intends to demonstrate these reports’ public value.
Those studying contemporary Australian Army policymaking can use primary source
materials from the Department of Defence, the Army, and Parliament’s Joint Foreign
Affairs, Defence, and Trade Committees. Substantive study of Army policymaking
should also include Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) resources. Established
by the Auditor-General Act 1997, ANAO responsibilities include assisting parliament in
scrutinising the exercise of authority and public spending by Commonwealth executive
agencies. ANAO works with Parliament’s Joint Committee on Public Accounts and
Audit by providing information, assistance and briefings to parliamentary members and
committees and to the general public.1
Reports analysing the performance of Australian Army program performance and
government agency programs from Australia and other countries are important for giving
policymakers and taxpayers reliable information about the successes and failures of these
programs to ensure they provide value for money and deliver government policymaking
objectives.2 ANAO divisions including the Defence and Foreign Policy Infrastructure
Group and Defence and Major Projects Group are among its entities scrutinising Army
programs. ANAO has significant legal powers for accessing documents and information
to execute its authorities and its work is legally governed by Auditor-General established
auditing standards. This scrutiny is documented in annual audit work program reports
published in July, various assurance reviews including the Defence Major Projects Report,
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and other individual program-focused reports including audit insights and key lessons
from individual audits. Findings and assessments from ANAO reports constitute the
majority of this analysis. This work’s intent is enabling Australian military personnel
and civilian readers to understand the methodologies used in writing these documents.
It also demonstrates to Australian citizens and international audiences interested in
Australian national security policymaking the importance of being able to freely access
and study these reports and reach their own conclusions about Australian Army program
performance. Such transparency about national security programs is a critical indicator
of democratic governance and accountability.3

Specific ANAO Reports
Numerous ANAO reports on the Army, dating from 1997 to the present, are available on
ANAO’s website www.anao.gov.au/. One example is the Defence Major Projects Report:
Department of Defence. Issued 18 December 2018, the 2017–18 edition of this report is
430 pages long and provides detailed documentary coverage of the performance
of twenty-six Defence programs during that fiscal year. Examples of Army-related
programs addressed in this compilation and their annual approved budgets are listed in
Table 1 below:
Table 1: ANAO performance assessments of Army programs 2017–18
Project Number
(Defence Capability
Plan)

Project Name
(on Defence advice)

Abbreviation
(on Defence
advice)

AIR 9000 Phase 2/4/6

Multi-Role Helicopter

MRH90 Helicopters

LAND 121 Phase 3B

Medium-Heavy Capability,
Field Vehicles, Modules
and Trailers

Overlander
Medium/Heavy

LAND 121 Phase 4

Protected Mobility
Vehicle-Light

Hawkei

JP2 2072 Phase B

Battlespace Communications
Systems

Battle Sys (Land) 2B

AIR 9000 Phase 7

Helicopter Aircrew Training
System

HATS

LAND 75 Phase 4

Battle Management System

BMS

Approved
Budget
$million
3771.1
3428.9

1952.0
920.1
481.5
367.9

Source: Australian National Audit Office, 2017–18 Major Projects Report: Department of Defence,
Auditor-General Report No. 20 2018–19 (Canberra: ANAO, 2018), p. 5.

3
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Within the annual Major Project Report document are Project Data Summary
Sheets (PDSS) providing detailed descriptions of individual projects, project history
documentation, government approval milestones, cost performance, management
risk, and the names of responsible military personnel and contractor contact personnel.
The LAND 121 Phase 3B program is intended to replace the current Australian Defence
Force (ADF) fleet vehicles, modules and trailers to enhance ADF ground mobility. As of
30 June 2018, its 2017-18 financial expenditure was $659.7 million against a forecast
expenditure of $697.3 million with this variance stemming from delaying payment of an
invoice of $37.7 million for goods and services delivered this year due to portfolio cash
budget pressures.
Equipment due to be acquired by LAND 121 Phase 3B includes:
• 2,536 medium and heavy capability (MHC) vehicles and 3,054 modules supplied by
Rheinmetall Military Vehicles Australia
• 1,582 trailers from Haulmark Trailers (Australia)
• 122 Gelädewagen (G-Wagon) fitted with maintenance modules supplied by Mercedes
Benz Australia/Pacific Pty Ltd and associated trailers supplied by Haulmark Trailers
(Australia)
• 49 in-service Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles upgraded to Customised General
Vehicle variants and associated trailers
• 18 Line Laying Modules acquired by LAND 121 Phase 3A; and
• 664 specialised modules to be acquired which are not yet in contract.4
Risks and problems with this particular program include system specification changes
stemming from required engineering changes, technical certification, integration problems
with new generation communication equipment, access to public roads, and support
contracts potentially not meeting Commonwealth requirements. Additional difficulties
include key subcontractor performance, delays to recovery capability and training, and
interface problems between vehicles, trailers, modules, and other capabilities.5
Key lessons learned from this program covering categories such as contract management,
requirements managing, and sourcing include:
• Governments should not announce preferred tenderers until negotiations are complete.
Public announcements undermine negotiating leverage and may provide detail subject
to change during negotiations.
• Projects must have a robust suite of up-to-date capability documents (Operational
Concept Document and Functional Performance Specification) available during tender
evaluation and negotiations to provide critical contextual information for the negotiation
team. These documents also provide the framework for the acquisition authority and
capability manager to conduct an informed acceptance process.
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• Requirements must be fully agreed upon before beginning negotiations, to avoid
uncertainty and potential for delays.
• Team members on projects of this size and complexity need highly developed project
management and contracting skills and experience.
• Early involvement of Army Logistic Training Centre (ALTC) staff in the development
of the training requirement is mandatory.
• Ensure contractual provisions require the contractor to have executed contracts with
Approved Subcontractors within a specific time following contract execution, so as
to avoid impact on contract deliverables and slippage to key engineering reviews.6
On 14 January 2000, ANAO evaluated an Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN),
originally proposed in September 1995, which recommended that Army members be
placed on an individual readiness notice to supplement individual readiness. AIRN
was developed to respond to increasing personnel shortages in several regular units
while recognising that lengthy mobilisation periods in modern warfare are not always
available. In order to be “individually ready” members must meet or exceed minimum
readiness standards for areas such as dental, medical and physical fitness; weapons
and employment proficiency; and individual availability.7
Three recommendations were made by ANAO concerning AIRN including:
1. Recommending the Army identify the annual costs of maintaining an AIRN (including
assessment, recording and reporting costs) so its cost-effectiveness is assessable.
2. If AIRN is retained and revised that the Army ensure necessary changes to supporting
policies are made and promoted prior to release and that updates be accompanied
by proper communication, coordination, funding and oversight.
3. Army reviewing dental support provision to part-time members with this review
assessing risk if part-time members need to be deployed and the costs involved with
various dental options support options.
Defence agreed to the first two recommendations and agreed in principle to the third
recommendation. Examining Defence responses to ANAO reports provides additional
insight into the policymaking process. A later example in this work will demonstrate
that Defence and contractors can disagree with ANAO findings and recommendations.8
A 28 July 2005 ANAO report examined M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier upgrade project
performance. This document noted that the M113A1 vehicles had been introduced in the
mid-1960s with updates in 1979 while serving as a lightly armoured aluminium-bodied,
fully tracked vehicle available in different variants. Efforts to upgrade M113s began in 1972
and have continued subsequently. Various contractual and cost changes had produced
delays with the following phases and had cost by March 2005:

6

Ibid., pp. 218-19.

7

Australian National Audit Office, Army Individual Readiness Notice, Audit Report No. 26 1999–2000
(Canberra: ANAO, 2000), pp. 9, 12-17, <www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/anao_report_1999-00_26.pdf>
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Table 2: M113 cost
Component

Total Cost

Description

Status

Phase 1(a)

$27.97 million

New or modified turrets

Not produced

Cooled Drinking Water
System

No longer contracted for

Installation of components

No longer contracted for
Concerns over impact of
heat on unit parts and
personnel in Northern
Australia

Phase 1(b)

$1.28 million

Procurement of 12.7mm
quick change barrel
machine guns

Procured and introduced
into service

Phase 1(c)

$3.14 million

Procurement of off-theshelf A2 suspension kits

Procured but not introduced
into service

Phase 1(e)

$1.94 million

Procurement of spall
curtains

Procured but not introduced
into service

Phase 1(f)

$3.42 million

Procurement of off-theshelf engine cooling kits

Procured but not introduced
into service

Source: Australian National Audit Office, Management of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier Upgrade
Project, Audit Report No. 3 2005–06 (Canberra: ANAO, 2005), pp. 16, 53.

Three ANAO recommendations on the M113 included the Defence Material Organisation
(DMO) implementing control mechanisms to ensure that scope changes are approved at
the appropriate level; DMO recovering against deliverables the outstanding amount of
the May 1997 mobilisation payment from the $27.97 million Phase 1(a) M113 contract as
soon as possible; and DMO reviewing contracting policy and its application of liquidated
damages collection by either financial or agreed compensation and ensuring they are
collected in a timely manner.9
Continuing M113 problems were reflected in a 27 March 2009 ANAO report updating the
earlier report noting that total annual expenditure of $1 billion made this one of the top
thirty Defence project expenditures for 2008-2009. This assessment maintained that
upgraded M113s are a core ADF capability and considered as fundamental equipment
for the Army’s two mechanised battalions for the 5th and 7th Battalions Royal Australian
Regiments (RARs) with a forecast service lifespan until 2020.
This report concluded that earlier M113 technical difficulties had been resolved in 2007,
but that problems have persisted due to slow production with the Prime Contractor
informing Defence that existing Bandiana, Victoria, production facilities were inadequate,
resulting in a December 2008 determination that there would be a shortage of nearly

9
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100 upgraded vehicles by December 2010. Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbin announced
on 28 October 2008 that additional production would occur at Williamstown, Victoria, and
Wingfield, South Australia, but ANAO expressed concern that recovering lost production
would be challenging.10
This report went on to note that Defence will have to use its original M113 fleet, with some
of these being over thirty-five years old, until the new upgraded vehicles are delivered
and that there are no alternatives to the upgraded M113. Final report recommendations,
which Defence agreed with, include:
• Defence and DMO setting suitable threshold criteria for determining scope changes
to acquisition projects and promoting advice to staff allowing decision-makers to
receive appropriate, consistent, and efficient information on potential scope changes.
• Defence developing clear policy guidance on when prepayments will be considered
for inclusion in future major acquisition contracts, and maintaining an appropriate
record of the basis for agreeing to advance payments within contract negotiations.
• Defence ensuring that liquidated damages arrangements in subsequent major
acquisition projects apply to clearly identified and key contract milestones.11
A third ANAO M113 audit was released on 24 May 2012. This assessment concluded
that the ADF anticipates receiving 431 upgraded M113s with interim capability to last
through 2025 for over $1 billion. ANAO also noted that the upgrade continues to suffer
from administrative, contractual, and technical problems despite a November 2007
settlement between Defence and Tenix the initial prime contractor. A 2011 contract
renegotiation saw Defence believe that the remaining vehicles would be delivered by late
2012. However, ANAO determined that deficiencies in the original contract, including
failing to properly specify payloads, produced technical problems in vehicle design and
production that could not be effectively managed under contract provisions. Additional
ANAO-determined deficiencies include an ineffective Defence cost and management
schedule resulting in slow response to continuing project delays; senior Defence and
government decision-makers not always being informed of project status in a timely
and accurate matter adversely affecting their ability to make informed project-related
decisions; and the upgraded M113 falling behind armoured vehicles used by other armed
forces resulting in increased vulnerability in current threat environments and leaving an
acknowledged capability gap.12
These production delays in years for the following M113 components are quantified in
Table 3.

10 Australian National Audit Office, Management of the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier Upgrade Project,
Audit Report No. 27 2008–09 (Canberra: ANAO, 2009), pp. 13-15; <www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/
ANAO_Report_2008-2009_27.pdf> [Accessed 19 September 2019].
11
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2011–12 (Canberra: ANAO, 2012), pp. 17-18; <www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/201112%20Audit%20
Report%20No%2034.pdf> [Accessed 19 September 2019].
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Table 3: Production delays for M11s components
Component

Delay (years)

Recovery vehicle

1.7

Personnel carrier

2.3

Mortar

5.0

Logistics vehicle

5.4

Fitter

1.9

Command vehicle

3.7

Ambulance

3.7

Source: Australian National Audit Office, Upgrade of the M113 Fleet of
Armoured Vehicles, Audit Report No.34 2011–12 (Canberra: ANAO, 2012), p. 30.

Additional problems with M113 vehicle functionality, assessed by ANAO with data from the
School of Armour, showed that in December 2010 the percentage of vehicles classified
as Fully Functional fell from 62 per cent in 2008 to 38 per cent in 2010 with this total
only marginally improving to 39 per cent by March 2012. ANAO noted that Defence had
established adequate facilities to maintain and operate the M113s with the 7th RAR’s
move from Adelaide to Darwin in February 2011 enabling utilisation of training areas not
affected by Darwin’s tropical climate limitations. ANAO also expressed concern that the
upgraded M113 has deficient firepower and other vital capabilities when compared with
other armed forces. The report’s sole recommendation, which Defence agreed with, was
maintaining a focus on delivering Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) for each major
capability project, including FIC elements to be delivered to other capability projects.
Additionally, Defence should also conduct at least annual reviews in developing FIC
elements for each major capability project detailed in Joint Project Directives.13
19 April 2011 saw ANAO issuance of a report on explosive ordnance management by
ADF branches. This report began by noting a 30 June 2009 Defence report noting an
explosive ordnance inventory of $3.1 billion representing 60 per cent of Defence’s then
total reported inventory at 17 depots managed by the Joint Logistics Command (JLC)
which is then issued to ADF units. Preceding years have seen nearly 75,000 annual
explosive ordnance movements between explosive ordnance depots and ADF. Each
service then had different arrangements for recording and managing unit level explosive
ordnance. This ordnance becomes the responsibility of Air Force, Army, and Navy units
once it leaves these depots and is subject to risk of loss or theft. Various high-profile
security incidents brought this subject to ANAO’s attention including a rocket launcher
being obtained by criminal elements and requiring a joint investigation between Defence
and the Australian Federal Police.14
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Key findings on handling and management of explosive ordnance include:
• Explosive ordnance is distributed to and used by ADF units who manage over 800
magazines and storage lockers around Australia.
• Inventory of this ordnance cannot be centrally scrutinised in Defence unless ADF
units holding it correctly record it on Defence’s general inventory management
system Military Integrated Logistics Information System (MILIS). Instead of recording
explosive ordnance on MILIS, ANAO found ADF units used stand-alone computerbased spreadsheets and manual stock recording systems which were not subject to
effective monitoring and review.
• This makes it difficult for Defence to assure that explosive ordnance is visible and
being properly managed and controlled.
• Defence has been slow in implementing recommendations from a 2007 Weapons,
Munitions, and Explosives Security Performance Audit.
• It is critical for Defence to have clear instructions, policies, and procedures for
identifying and reporting explosive ordnance security incidents from initial identification
through outcome of subsequent investigations.15
Five ANAO recommendations, which Defence agreed to, include:
1. Widening the scope of existing explosive ordnance management reviews to include
expanded focus on arrangements for unit level physical control of explosive ordnance
including spot checks of unit explosive ordnance holdings; and consolidating review
results to facilitate monitoring of any required remediation work and analysing emerging
trends and problems at service units.
2. Defence “finalis[ing] its inaugural Defence Instruction (General)” for managing
explosive ordnance; and promoting ADF-wide advance for managing unit level
explosive ordnance.
3. “Defence developing an integrated inventory management system to account for”
unit level explosive ordnance.
4. “Defence taking steps to remove all inconsistencies in definitions and requirements
for managing explosive ordnance security incidents in Defence policy and procedural
documents.”
5. “Defence improving its incident reporting and data management of explosive ordnance
security incidents.”16
Documentation that Defence and private sector contractors do not unanimously agree
with ANAO report findings and recommendations is demonstrated by an 11 September
2018 report on the Army’s Protected Mobility Vehicle-Light (PMV-L). This project aspires
to provide the ADF with highly mobile field vehicles protected from ballistic and blast
threats. The acquisition process began in 2006 and in 2008 Defence decided to purchase
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) being developed by the United States. In 2015,
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Defence selected the Australian-developed Hawkei vehicle designed by Thales Australia.
During October 2015 Defence contracted with Thales to acquire and support 1,100 Hawkei
vehicles and 1,058 trailers at an ANAO-estimated cost of $2.2 billion. As of 30 June
2018, Defence had spent $463.1 million of project funds and $293.9 million on related
costs. Reasons for this audit included the subject of the equipment being procured,
adopting a sole-source procurement strategy, and the risk involved in manufacturing
a small number of these vehicles when the United States was beginning a similar and
much larger program.17
Some information in this report was not released due to a 28 June 2018 memo from
Attorney General Christian Porter to Auditor-General Grant Hehir maintaining that
release of some information in this document would be detrimental to the public interest
based on paragraphs 37(2)(a) and 37(2)e of the Auditor-General Act 1997 which state:
• It would prejudice the security, defence, or international relations of the
Commonwealth;
• It would unfairly prejudice the commercial interests of any body or person.18
ANAO findings concerning this program include Defence seeking approval to begin parallel
investment in 2009 of Australian-based options it had previously decided to be highrisk and high-cost. In December 2011 Defence recommended and received approval for
further development of Thales Hawkei since Defence considered it the best prospect of
meeting future needs despite assessing it as being the least developed Australian option.
ANAO went on to add that Defence failed to provide robust benchmarking of Hawkei and
JLTV vehicle options to the Government to inform the Government’s decision in context
of a sole-source procurement. In addition, ANAO contended that Defence may not have
exerted appropriate oversight of program process by postponing a Gate Review from
May-October 2017. Defence also advised the Government that Hawkei would be 23 per
cent more expensive than JLTV but have greater operational capability. Consequently,
Defence was unable to apply competitive pressure in its negotiations with Thales and
Defence did not properly inform the Minister when material circumstances changed
before contract signature.19
This report did not present recommendations but provided the following lessons learned
which ANAO considered relevant for all Australian governmental entities:
Procurement
• Effective cost and capability benchmarking provides a basis for assessing value
for money in sole-source procurements and maintaining competitive pressure in
negotiating and contracting phases.
• Effective benchmarking should provide information needed to assess and explain
differences in the price, quality, and quantity of purchased goods and services.
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Governance and risk management
• Contractual risk mitigation strategies including off-ramps should be practicable,
particularly in sole-source procurement.
• Circumstances external to a project materially changing may affect Commonwealth
interests, and entities should return to the Minister with updated advice on
responding to these changing circumstances.
• All key drivers for an acquisition project should be transparent in the planning,
advice, and selection/assessment criteria relating to the project.20
A 15 August 2018 response to ANAO by Defence Secretary Greg Moriarty and Chief of the
Defence Force Angus Campbell disputed ANAO’s contention that the project entered Low
Rate Initial Production without appropriate scrutiny. Moriarty and Campbell contended
that this decision was made with proper senior management oversight and subsequent
Gate Reviews did not identify concerns with this decision. They also contended that
Hawkei gives Australia a domestically developed and sovereign capability which can
be modified to meet emerging threats, protect ADF personnel, and can be modified to
meet security partner requirements while providing these nations with a highly effective
capability.21
More forceful criticism of ANAO was provided in a 20 August 2018 response by Thales
Australia and New Zealand Chief Executive Officer Chris Jenkins. He mentioned that only
receiving redacted comments from the ANAO report on PMV-L acquisition limited Thales
range of comment options. He chastised ANAO for not recognising that Hawkei provides
life-saving capability to ADF personnel in an Australian designed and manufactured
vehicle. Jenkins caustically commented that ANAO was highly critical of the Bushmaster
produced at Thales Bendigo plant which saved the lives of ADF personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan due to the protection it provided against roadside bombs noting that while
many Bushmasters were destroyed by bombs in these countries not one Australian soldier
was killed by such blasts in contrast to the fatalities suffered by the United States. and
other coalition partners.
His criticisms of ANAO stressed what he saw as ignoring the strategic value of Army
vehicle design, engineering and manufacturing being included as one of the ten Sovereign
Industry Capabilities announced in the May 2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan.
Jenkins maintained ANAO ignored the broader economic benefit from Australian vehicle
design, development and manufacture ignoring the 200 Hawkei jobs at the Protected
Vehicle facility in Bendigo; an additional 200 jobs in Australian small and medium
enterprises which are Tier 1 suppliers in the Hawkei supply chain; Australian industry
content of at least 55 per cent in Hawkei production representing more than $650 million;
$110 million of Hawkei development spending on an Australian vehicle; and broader
benefits to the Army of developing the Hawkei Integral Computing System which can
be adopted by other ADF vehicle fleets with considerable cost savings.

20 Ibid., p. 14.
21

Ibid., p. 76.

Australian National Audit Office: Evaluating Australian Army Program Performance

115

These comments went on to contend that Australia would derive augmented economic
benefits from Hawkei supply chain export sales with Bushmaster being exported to seven
countries and that ANAO’s report would be damaging to potential export prospects.
Jenkins also castigated ANAO for making selective comparisons with the United States
JLTV by ignoring a May 2018 Defense Department Inspector General report finding that
the US Army and Marine Corps “have not demonstrated effective test results to prepare
the JLTV program for full rate production” while acknowledging significant redactions in
this US report make it impossible to determine which performance requirements failed.
He concluded by stressing ANAO ignored heightened Australian Government emphasis
on increasing defence procurement from Australian sources.22

Forthcoming ANAO Audit Activity
In early 2019, ANAO published a list of audit activity it anticipated engaging in during
2019-20, inviting public review and comment between 18 February 2019 and 12 March
2019. At the time of writing, final publication of this activity will occur in early July 2019.23
A number of Defence related programs are scheduled for audit in 2019 and beyond with
Army pertinent examples including Army Battlefield Command System (LAND 200
Tranche 2), Defence Procurement of Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAND 400
Phase 2), and Defence Facilities in Benalla and Mulwalla.24
ANAO reports on the Australian Army in 2020 and beyond will also examine the possible
impact of Plan B on Australian military spending, procurement and program effectiveness.
As reflected in Australian security studies analysis and debate, Plan B is the contention
that Australia will have to rely less on the United States for its national defence due to
concerns that President Trump is less supportive of the US-Australian alliance resulting
from its America First strategy which some claim will cause US troops to leave South Korea
and Japan and remove Marine Corps forces from Darwin. An Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (ASPI) analyst has contended that Plan B would involve Australia doing more for
its own security, playing a stronger regional leadership role, and reconsidering ADF size
and strength for emerging security threats without confidence in the US security umbrella.25
Specific recommendations this analyst thinks are necessary for improving Australian
defence capacity include increasing defence spending to reach 2.5 or 3.0 per cent of
Gross National Product (GNP) within a decade with a 3 per cent increase representing
an $122 billion spending increase out to 2028; expediting equipment delivery dates and

22 See Ibid., 78-80; Australia, Department of Defence, 2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan, (Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia, 2018): 20; <www.defence.gov.au/SPI/Industry/CapabilityPlan/Docs/
DefenceIndustrialCapabilityPlan-web.pdf> [Accessed 20 September 2019]; and US Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General, Army and Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, (Washington, DC: DODIG,
2 May 2018); i; <media.defense.gov/2018/May/25/2001923004/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-113%20FOUO.PDF>
[Accessed 20 September 2019].
23 Australian National Audit Office, ‘Draft 2019-20 Annual Audit Work Program’, 13 March 2019, p. 1,
<www.anao.gov.au/work-program/draft> [Accessed 21 September 2019].
24 Australian National Audit Office, Read the Annual Audit Work Program 2018-19: Overview: Defence (ANAO,
2019), pp. 1-9; <www.anao.gov.au/work-program/portfolio/defence> [Accessed 21 September 2019].
25 Peter Jennings, ‘Trump Means We Need a “Plan B” for Defence’, Opinion, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, 21 July 2018, p. 2; <www.aspi.org.au/opinion/trump-means-we-need-plan-b-defence>
[Accessed 2 December 2020].
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maintaining high levels of force readiness; concluding a formal defence treaty with Japan
while pursuing and signing formal alliances with France and the United Kingdom; investing
significantly in building strategic partnerships with India and Indonesia; formalising
Australia’s role as defence and security guarantor for Pacific Island countries such as
Nauru and Kiribati; building a nuclear-powered submarine fleet with long-range cruise
missile capability enhancing long-range striking power while acquiring the ability to fire
these weapons from hard-to-detect ships and aircraft; developing a long-range bomber
aircraft; developing an Australian equivalent of the US Defence Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) to work on emerging technologies in artificial intelligence,
hypersonics, and autonomous systems while spending more than the 0.5 per cent
of the Defence budget currently spent on innovation programs; doubling the size of
the Australian Signals Directorate within a decade and enhancing cyber offensive and
defensive capabilities; and increasing ADF personnel from 58,000 to 90,000.26
The projected April 2020 parliamentary tabling of ANAO’s report on procurement of LAND
400 phase 2 combat reconnaissance vehicles is one potential indication of how Plan B
forecasting may influence Army power projection capabilities. ANAO audit criteria include
whether Defence has conducted an effective tender process achieving value for money;
conducted an effective evaluation process achieving value for money; and established
effective project governance conducive to achieving value for money.27
ANAO’s 16 December 2019 report on defence program readiness noted that the Chief
of the Army had delayed introduction of the MRH90 helicopter into the 6th Aviation
Regiment by three years due to reliability and design shortcomings while extending
the Black Hawk fleet to 2022 to lessen risk to capability. It also noted that the MRH90
project may be unable to retain sufficient levels of experienced and skilled manpower
to achieve delivery requirements. A more positive ANAO assessment was provided for
the Land 53 Phase 1 BR Night Fighting Equipment Replacement Program which has
achieved Initial Material Release and Initial Operational Capability, is on track to deliver
capability specified at Second Pass, and no material problems or changes have occurred
to adversely impact ongoing delivery requirements.28

Conclusion
ANAO reports provide detailed documentation of the ambiguities, successes and
failures of Australian Army and other Commonwealth public policy programs for military
professionals, policymakers, scholars and the general public. They are especially
insightful for their detailed coverage of program performance and cost, helping Australian
taxpayers determine whether programs provide good value for money and are beneficial
or detrimental to Australian national security requirements. They also provide detailed

26 Ibid., pp. 3-6.
27 Australian National Audit Office, ‘Defence’s Procurement of Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAND
400 Phase 2)’, 2019, p. 1, <www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/defence-procurement-combatreconnaissance-vehicles-land400-phase2> [Accessed 3 January 2020].
28 Australian National Audit Office, 2018-19 Major Projects Report: Department of Defence , Auditor-General
Report No. 19 2019–20 (Canberra: ANAO, 16 December 2019), pp. 177-78, 347-48; <www.anao.gov.au/sites/
default/files/Auditor-General_Report_2018-2019_19_a.pdf> [Accessed 3 January 2020].
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documentation on how Defence and private sector contractors respond to ANAO findings,
which may not always be favourable to ANAO or to their future commercial prospects of
obtaining Defence contracts.
Army personnel should be particularly attentive to ANAO reports since their career
trajectories may make them responsible for administering or scrutinising these programs
and interacting with defence contractors and other government personnel to ensure
that these programs perform effectively and meet national security requirements.
Responsibility for these programs will require them to interact with ANAO personnel
along with policymakers from parliamentary oversight committees and it will include
presenting sworn evidence before these committees and traditional broadcast and
social media, and potentially facing legal proceedings in the event of criminal activity
or malfeasance involving poor performance by these programs. Incorporating detailed
knowledge of ANAO policymaking activities and reports should be a required component
of Australian professional military education and of serious study and analysis of Australian
Army programs and their performance quality. ANAO reports will continue to provide
substantive analysis and insight into emerging Australian Army program procurement
and performance in the event the Plan B scenario—Australia having to increase its
defence spending and capabilities due to decreased US support of Australian security
interests—occurs.

Bert Chapman is Professor at Purdue University, USA.
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